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This dissertation examines marriage and sexuality in contemporary China through the 
lens of media and audience, with a specific focus on audience interpretations of the media 
discourse of “keeping a second wife” (bao ernai).   The emergence of this discourse, one that can 
be traced back to socialist condemnation of concubinage in Maoist China, is an awkward and 
unexpected finding at a time when the state has purportedly retreated from private life, and the 
media is increasingly globalized.  Even more unexpected, perhaps, is the startling diversity with 
which this discourse has been deployed, re-appropriated, and resisted by working and middle 
class women.  The Dissertation draws on discourse analysis, digital ethnography, and individual 
and focus group interviews to argue that the relationship between the media and audiences in 
contemporary China is dynamic and mutually transformative. Moreover, the ways of 
interpretation link to audiences ’social positions and subjectivities that help to conceive 
individuals’ perceptions of self and society in relation to marriage and sexuality. 
The first part of the dissertation draws on content analysis of news accounts to analyze 
how the media has consistently coded “keeping a second wife” as an instance of “family crisis,” 
and in so doing re-affirm a Maoist-era idea of marriage and sexuality. The second part of the 
dissertation draws upon reception analysis to investigate three dominant themes that emerged in 
the interviews and social media: managing marriage, sexuality, and corruption. The dissertation 
iv 
 
argues that “managing marriage” is a key phrase deployed by women, with subjectivity breaking 
down along class lines: indeed, while middle class women employ new discourses to perform 
gender within the household, working class women understand the management of marriage 
through Maoist-era vocabulary and ideology. A reception analysis also allows new insight into 
contemporary practices of sexuality; in contemporary China the transformation of sexual norms 
is a complex process, in which the dominant, the residual, and the emergent are intertwined to 
constitute a fuller picture of sexual culture in China. Finally, the dissertation highlights a link 
between “keeping a second wife” and official corruption through story-telling and instances of 
“talking back” to the media discourse.  I argue the audience’s own narratives and the ways in 
which they contest the media’s narrative illustrate that the media discourse of corruption has 
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In 2011, a serial TV program on “mediating marriage problems” aired on the Jiangxi 
Province’s satellite TV station. On August 10 at 9:15pm, the show broached the subject of 
“keeping a second wife”: three guests, the husband, the wife and the mistress (“second wife”), 
were all seated under the spotlight and asked to narrate their views of the affair. A number of 
marriage consultants and law experts sat behind the three guests and served as lecturers, 
mediators, and moral judges. Inevitably spectators also functioned as part of the observatory 
team. At the end of the show, the husband was convinced to reconcile with the wife, a woman 
who demonstrated her devotion to their family. He was enjoined to live up to his responsibilities 
“as a real man”; the wife was advised to be “more understanding”, “more caring”, and more 
attentive to her husband’s needs. The married couple were made to sign an agreement of 
reconciliation, and left the spotlighted area together as symbolic proof of “the triumph of 
marriage”. The mistress received sympathy and given a lecture. She appeared dejected and left 
the stage alone, signifying the doomed tragedy that befalls a woman who transgresses society’s 
laws and mores.  
The TV show illustrates the Chinese state media’s interest in manipulating the cultural 
understanding of extramarital affairs in very specific ways.
1
  Since the late 1990s, a news 
                                                          
1
 This is not by any means the only example demonstrating the Chinese television’s interest in extramarital affairs. 
For example, one of my friends, a TV producer in a provincial capital, has made a successful career on the strength 
of one of his most popular shows:  catching the “second wife” in bed. In a personal conversation in 2005, he 
revealed the secret of his success:  he had reporters spy on husbands and subsequently released incriminating 
evidence to their wives in order to spark a fight scene between two women. This was the show’s main selling point. 
The camera crew followed the angry wife as she moved to catch the husband with his mistress. After filming was 
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narrative focused on “keeping a second wife” (bao ernai, 包二奶) has played a vivid role in 
Chinese news media coverage. “Keeping a second wife”, once known as “concubinage”, is an 
old patriarchal adjunct of the traditional family institution that was abolished decades ago by 
both the Kuomingtang (KMT) government and Chinese Communist Party (CCP) 
2―and yet 
these kinds of stories still figure prominently in the mainstream press.  By the turn of the 
millennium, for example, a news report alleged that some 200,000 women were being “kept” 
(“supported”) (bao, 包) by “affluent men” in the Pearl River Delta alone.3  Extramarital affairs, in 
particular relationships between women and married men, have become one of the hottest topics 
in media coverage and public discussions.  The term ernai (second wife, 二奶),
4
  an oral 
expression derived from the formal term concubine (qie, 妾), has re-appeared in social life and 
occurs frequently in state media narratives.  
This “rebirth of concubinage” has drawn the attention of state authorities. In responding 
to this “resurgence” of “keeping a second wife”, the state authority often anxiously condemns 
this “feudal sediment”, characterizing it as a threat to “social stability” and “family harmony”. 
For example, on December 29, 2000, The People’s Daily (Remin Ribao 人民日报), the mouthpiece 
of the ruling CCP, declared that: “bigamy (重婚 chonghui), concubinage (纳妾 naqie), keeping a 
second wife (包二奶 bao ernai) and illicit cohabitation [without a marriage certificate] (非法同居
                                                                                                                                                                                           
done, the TV crew stopped fighting and acted as mediators lecturing the husband and the wife. I obtained his 
permission in the June of 2013 to disclose our conversation in my dissertation.  
2 Although the KMT government made an effort to abolish concubinage in the Civil Code issued in 1930, it is 
widely understood that the practice was not annihilated until the Chinese Communist Party’s Marriage Law took 
effect in 1950. See Yang 1959.  
3
 “Baiwan xiongshi xian falu zhongwei” (Million male lions besieged in the law), Yazhou zhoukai (Asian Weekly), 
August 28, 2000.  
4
 More recent news reports employ the terms ernai (a second wife), qingfu (mistress), and xiao san (the little third) 
interchangeably in reporting upon extramarital affairs. In particular, in the term of xiaosan, xiao means “little”, 
“minor” equivalent to xiao laopo (minor wife, concubine); san means “the third party”, a common usage to refer the 
female party in extramarital affairs. Therefore, xiaosan shows a combination or a negotiation between the old and 
the new.  
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feifa tongju) have become overbearing social problems”. The All China Women’s Federation 
(ACWF), the party-state apparatus formed to represent women, has attentively scrutinized this 
“immoral behaviour” that threatens the PRC’s family institution.5  The ACWF actively supports 
“vulnerable wives”, whose husbands are having an affair. In 2001, after intensive discussions, 
the People’s Congress passed revisions of the 1950 and the 1980 Marriage Laws in order to 
strengthen the institution of monogamy, amended the older codes with a clause in the General 
Principle that “forbids a married person for cohabiting with others”.6  Since the late 1990s, the 
ACWF, much more marginalized by the post Mao regime in the market economy, has re-
discovered its importance in re-entering the gendered territory of the family in order to search for 
solutions “to the challenges that established family values [must] confront”.7  In 2009, as part of 
the larger party-state project known as the “harmonious society”, the ACWF launched a 
“harmonious family” initiative designed to “integrate traditional family values into the new age 
of transition”.8  
Since concubinage was abolished by the CCP with vigorous political campaigns in the 
early 1950s, the terminology of “qie” had become obsolete in the People’s Republic of China 
(PRC) (it has only existed in fictional drama illustrating “feudal vice”). Hence, the reappearance 
of “keeping a second wife” in the state media and the state concerns about this issue raises 
puzzles: Why has a term referring to concubinage been employed in the state media after its 
abolition was declared a triumph of the “family revolution” during the Maoist period?  And 
                                                          
5
 “Fulian xiugan hunyinfa jianyi zhi yi: ezhi chonghun naqie he bao ernai” (One of Women’s Federation’s 
suggestions for amending the Marriage Law: restraining bigamy, concubinage, and keeping a second wife). 
December 29, 2000, accessed August 12, 2012. www.people.com.cn.  
6
 See Chapter 1 “General Provision”, in Marriage Law of the People’s Republic of China, accessed September 3 
2012:http://www.law-lib.com/law/law_view.asp?id=15279. 
7
 See Chen 2010.   
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given the evidence that the party-state in reform-era has largely retreated from the private sphere 
(Farrer 2002) and intended to produce autonomous neoliberal subjects through its technologies 
of the self (Bray 2006, Liu 2008, Jeffrey 2009, Tomba 2009), why are state authorities so 
obsessed with the issue of “keeping a second wife” during an era in which individuals have 
gained greater autonomy to pursue sexual freedom?  
This dissertation is concerned with “keeping a second wife” as a media construct, rather 
than as a social phenomenon; hence, it sets content analysis of “keeping a second wife” in the 
state media as the starting point. The media content offers a chance to examine how the 
dominant discourse of marriage and sexuality is disseminated through the media stories of 
“keeping a second wife”. The content analysis deals with the ways in which the phenomenon is 
encoded and examines the reasons which underlie the state and its media’s extreme reactions to 
the concept at certain historical and political junctures—centering upon the old notion of 
concubinage prior to the establishment of the Maoist regime and the post-socialist state’s scheme 
of the “harmonious family”.  Examining media accounts obviously raises the question: how do 
the media report on instances of “keeping a second wife”? In other words, how is the dominant 
discourse of marriage and sexuality reinforced through the media report of “keeping a second 
wife”? 
Furthermore, instead of dwelling on media messages alone, this dissertation sets an 
ambitious goal to examine meanings made by both media producers and media consumers. An 
analysis of the media’s construction opens up a space for investigating the adherence of the 
dominant discourse during the dramatic social change in contemporary China. The social use of 
the term “keeping a second wife” predates the media’s construction.  The term of “keeping a 
second wife” appeared among society members before the usage of the state media ( i.e. 
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referring to sexual relations between married Hong Kong men and Chinese Mainland women in 
Guangdong Province) , while media outlets code the term and imbue it with a meaning in line 
with the imperative to reinforce family and monogamous (and heteronomative) sexuality for the 
purposes of social control, it is also coded by members of the society at the conjuncture of 
gender relations and the emergence of class during the post-socialist period. This may lead to the 
possibility that various social actors could perceive the phenomenon in ways that differ from the 
state media’s construction. Hence, investigating the interaction between the media discourse and 
audience can reveal the degree to which social actors adhere to the dominant ideology of 
marriage and sexuality during China’s period of rapid transition, and can subsequently reveal 
how the culture is evolving and transforming Chinese society itself. How do audience members 
interact with the media accounts of “keeping a second wife”? To gauge the gaps between the 
media messages and the audiences leads to a question: to what extent do audience members 
adhere to the ideology? These questions demand an inquiry about the ways in which sexual 
culture is shifting under current social context.  
 These questions are the focus of this study, which is an examination of marriage and 
sexuality through the lens of media. I will argue, first, that the media stories of “keeping a second 
wife” have come to serve as (re)articulations of the PRC’s ideology of marriage and sexuality 
established during the Maoist regime as a means of controlling diverse sexual practices through 
which individuals have gained greater autonomy over the past three decades. This re-articulation 
not only illustrates a high degree of continuity in the interventionist approach to marriage, 
family, and sexuality, but also incorporates key features of the post-Mao state’s governance 
policies, which largely rely on reinforcing the discourse of gender and sexuality through the 
media to bolster the officially stated approach of “governing the country by laws”.  This 
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argument may help to revise the scholarly consensus regarding a “retreat of the state” vis-à-vis 
“sexual freedom”.  Second, the recent development of media technologies and media reforms 
towards a more market-oriented media industry have changed the ways in which audiences have 
engaged with media discourse. Hence, attachment to the official discourse is greatly diluted and 
the reception of media stories centering on the practice of “keeping a second wife” can pull 
audiences in many different directions, based upon competing interpretations. I argue not only 
that the degree of attachment to the established ideology is losing coherence among different 
social groups, but also that these attachments have become quite heterogeneous.   In particular, I 
argue that class identity has an impact on the degree and particular characteristics of adherence 
to the ideology of monogamous sexuality. Class plays an important role in perceptions of 
“keeping a second wife”. It is a major cleavage in contemporary Chinese society and thus it must 
be examined to gain any insight into the practice of sexuality in China today.  It becomes a 
significant variable in predicting “openness” or “conservatism” on issues related to marriage and 
sexuality. Class has emerged as a new and increasingly significant factor in determining social 
identity and media consumption choices in contemporary China. Class identity arises at the 
conjuncture of China’s modernity discourse of “suzhi” (human quality), which has been part of a 
social engineering project to develop “self-worth”. Hence, class plays an indicative role in 
determining attitudes towards the changing landscape of marriage, family and sexuality, as well 
as in fostering or inhibiting the practices of sex out of wedlock and cohabitation without a 
marriage license, homosexuality, and other forms of sexual behavior. This argument will add a 




 Moreover, given that audiences feel comfortable with certain components of the media 
stories (e.g. gender roles) while experiencing considerable alienation from other components 
(e.g., the script of “bad women” ruining “men’s world”/political life), I show that “audience 
activity” is a complex process, which cannot be dichotomized as “active” or “passive”. 
Resistance can occur to a certain extent while “audience activity” remains paralyzed by some 
structural factors. In order to account for this complex relationship, this study makes an effort to 
move beyond the “text decoder” paradigm and the binary distinction of passive/ active audience 
by crossing the boundary of media forms and situating audience in a larger social context. 
This chapter begins with a review of the ideology of family, marriage, and sexuality in 
the PRC established during the Maoist regime vis-à-vis the gradual opening up in individuals’ 
private affairs. These are the discursive settings that set the stage for the media stories of 
“keeping a second wife”. Subsequently, I also provide a critical review of studies on media and 
media consumption in contemporary China; in particular, I focus on the conception of a 
“Chinese audience” that needs to be re-conceptualized to account for the current development of 
media technologies and increasing global flows of media messages. In the final section of the 
chapter, I present a road map of the dissertation for the reader. 
Monogamy meets “opening up”  
How does the news narrative of “keeping a second wife” fit within the context of the 
dominant ideology? What available discourses and given frameworks can be drawn from and 
work within the journalistic practice? A brief review of the ideology of marriage and sexuality 
under the PRC is necessary in order to understand the ways in which these news stories present 
the resurgence of concubinage (or “keeping a second wife”). 
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The role of the state in intervening in the private sphere through laws, policies and 
official discourses dominates the society and defines marriage, family and sexuality and 
establishes the parameters of what the state will tolerate (Croll 1981, Evans 1997, Glosser 2003, 
Honig and Hershatter 1988, Glosser 2003, McMillan 2006, Yan 2003, Yang 1959). The impact 
of the state’s ideology on family, marriage and sexuality looms large in the literature of gender 
relations in PRC, particularly in scholarship dealing with the Maoist regime. Indeed, the ideology 
of family, marriage and sexuality established during the Maoist period can be reduced to the 
following points: first, a monogamous and heterosexual relation within marital status is officially 
considered as the only legitimate and moral form (Evans 1997, Jeffrey 2004, Sigley 2006, Yang 
1959). Subsequently, in spite of the CCP’s advocacy of “men and women’s equality” (nannü 
pingdeng) through its “women’s liberation” project, gender roles remain traditional in the 
organization of family life; in particular, women are encouraged to be “household managers” in 
the family while participating in the labor force (Manning 2010). These ideas have been 
inherited as part of the Maoist legacy by the post Mao regime and continuously appear in the 
discourse in contemporary China. Moreover, these ideas combine with the post Mao era’s family 
planning agenda (“one child policy”) to provide the moral image of an idealized family, marriage 
and sexuality under the post Mao regime.  
The ideology of family, marriage and sexuality was articulated well before the 
establishment of the PRC in 1949 (Glosser 2003, Gilmartin and Hershatter 1995). The issue 
remained crucial during the 1930s and the 1940s, when the CCP engaged in a critical military 
struggle for survival against both the Japanese and the KMT government. While the CCP 
targeted the “feudal” institution of concubinage, a rigid moral position towards exclusively 
monogamous sexuality was enforced across the board through its marriage policies/laws and 
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political campaigns in the CCP’s base regions (Glosser 2003, Gilmartin and Hershatter 1995).  
After the establishment of the PRC, the CCP identified the practice of exclusive monogamy as a 
means of ensuring “social stability” in the name of modernity (McMillan 2006), and as a 
consequence, heterosexual relations within marital status is seen as the only legitimate and moral 
form for sexual practices both expressed in the discourse and administrative/legal regulations 
(Evans 1997, Sigley 2006).  Sexual conduct and reproduction are linked to empowerment of the 
nation (Glosser 2003, Jeffrey 2004), and hence, heterosexual norms were strictly reinforced 
under the Maoist regime (Barlow 2004). The only legitimate sexual behavior was the sexual 
relation within heterosexual marriage, according to both the ideological discourse and legal 
sanctions (Evans 1997, Sigley 2006).  
Prior to 1949, rules regarding the family fell under the purview of society within the 
Confucian ethical system, which valued family as an essential stabilizing force. The traditional 
family institution was relatively autonomous in relation to the state.  The party-state, on the other 
hand, began taking an interventionist approach to the family and marriage in the 1950s.  Diamant 
(2000 and 2001) offers a good recent example of this historical interpretation. In his work on the 
state’s approach to reshaping the family, Diamant ( 2000 and 2001) argues that the state has 
made enormous efforts to encourage individuals, particularly the younger generations, to turn 
their backs on family authorities and search for “freedom of marriage” ; in so doing, the state 
subordinates individuals and becomes the authority in individuals’ personal lives. The traditional 
family institution stands for privacy and individuals’ interests against the state (the Maoist state 
emphasizes that individuals ought to sacrifice their own interests for the good of the state ); and 
moreover, the traditional family was seen as a potential site of resistance against and a standing 
challenge to the state’s administrative instruments. In order to dissolve the traditional family and 
10 
 
replace family prerogatives with state authority, the modern marriage registration system was 
introduced in the 1950s, privileging marriage registration prior to marriage consummation 
(Diamant 2001).  During this period, marriage registration was reinforced to an extreme extent. 
Marriage became the only legal conduit for sexual expression, and marriage became the 
equivalent term for sex (Evans 1997). Hence, marriage registration became a way of controlling 
sexuality.  
The 1950 marriage law aimed to emphasize the ideological dimensions of family (Meijer 
1972).  The state replaced family authority as the only power which could recognize or deny 
citizens’ marriages and assumed comprehensive control over marriage, family and sexuality. 
Mate selection, wedding customs, organization of family life, household management, sex 
behavior and divorce became prime targets for state intervention (Croll 1981, Diamant 2000, 
Johnson1983, Wolf 1985, Yan 1997 and 2003, Yang 1959). The pre-1949 family institution of 
concubinage was targeted as one of the symbolic codes of “backwardness” in the trajectory of 
modernizing the “backward” nation over the course of the 20th century. Monogamy equals 
“modernity”, “advance” and “civilization” vis-à-vis “feudal”, “backward” and “savage” 
polygamous sexual practices such as concubinage (Evans 1997, McMillan 2006). Historically, 
concubinage was an apparatus designed to institutionalize men’s extramarital affairs under the 
traditional Chinese family framework, providing an outlet for married men to engage in sexual 
behavior out of wedlock either for pleasure or for patrilineage (Ebrey 1986, Eastman 1988, Hsu 
1949, Jaschok 1988). It was abolished first by the KMT government through its Civil Code in 
1930, and later was declared a moral vice and a symbol of the “feudal” society’s incivility and 
ugliness by the CCP during its family revolution throughout the 1950s and 1960s (Yang 1959). 
The PRC’s family institution emphasized monogamy, presented as a modern and advanced form 
11 
 
of relations between the sexes that would help to foster modernization.  In addition to moral 
condemnation, any sexual intimacy out of wedlock was outlawed and became tightly monitored 
by laws and administrative regulations.
9
  Commercial sex was outlawed and eradicated under the 
Maoist regime (Hershatter 1999).  
Women are placed at the core of the “family revolution”. What it meant to be a woman 
has been articulated and re-articulated during the course of 20
th
 century China through a number 
of different political eras. Tani Barlow’s (2004) textual analysis of the discursive shifts around 
the definition of women in 20
th
 century literary and political texts in China, for example, reveals 
the political, social and cultural drift of the meaning of womanhood/femininity back and forth 
from nüxing (woman primarily as a sexual subject attached to her biological difference from 
men) to funü (woman struggling for social standing as a political category) in Maoist ideology 
and return to nüxing in the post Maoist era. She reveals the complex ways that gender roles are 
coded, and examines the construction of women’s roles through the ideological presentation of 
an “ideal woman”.  At the foundation of the Chinese feminism, Barlow (2004) argues, lies a firm 
belief in women’s biological and hence social difference from men, which forges the dominant 
paradigm of the “liberation” project. The definition of women and women’s role in the family 
and society are articulated through the party-state’s project of “women’s liberation” (funü 
jiefang), which is based on assumptions borrowed from the Marxist idea that women’s 
participation in productive work will ultimately lead to gender equality (Andors 1983, Johnson 
                                                          
9
  Adultery was not a terminology in the 1950 Marriage Law. Instead, “concubinage” was one of the targets of the 
PRC’s first marriage law in 1950. However, there was a crime called “liumang zui” (crimes of immoral 
behaviors/indecency or “hooligan crimes”) that was used to penalize behaviors that “challenge public morality”.  
Sexual behaviors such as homosexuality, rape, sexual harassment, sexual intimacy out of wedlock, sodomy, 
pedophile and the like can be prosecuted in the name of liumang zui (“hooligan crimes”) during Maoist time and at 
beginning of the “Reform and Openness”. It was considered a severe crime and many people were sentenced to 




1983, Stacey 1983, Wolf 1985). In this construction, a woman is defined as a socialist worker 
participating in the labour force during the Maoist period, and at the same time motherhood and 
wifehood are considered an essential element of femininity (Croll 1978 and 1981, Johnson 1983, 
Phyllis 1983, Wolf 1985). This perception led to a particular emphasis upon women as 
“household managers”—unloading domestic work primarily on women’s shoulders in the private 
sphere (Manning 2010, Wang 2005,).  
However, the incursions of the market economy during the post-Mao regime has 
gradually loosened adherence to rigid monogamous sexuality and resulted in a shift towards a 
pluralism of sexual practices since the 1980s (Evans 1997, Farrer 2002,  Farrer and Sun 2003, 
Huang et al. 2011, , Li 1996, Pan 2006, Rofel 2007). The increasing diversity of sexual practices 
has broken up the monolithic structure of the dominant ideology. Although still viewed through 
an ideological lens, family, marriage and sexuality have taken a back seat to the state’s 
sponsorship of economic growth and other political challenges; as a consequence, administrative 
regulations and the criminal code have become more tolerant of non-monogamous sexuality 
during recent years. The divorce rate has been increasing over the past two decades (Wang and 
Zhou 2010), and divorce itself is no longer considered a vice caused by moral weakness or 
sexual misbehavior. The wave of sexual autonomy in youth culture demonstrates new sexual 
behaviors in opposition to monogamous sexuality (Farrer 2002, Pan 2006).  The monogamous 
ideal has been challenged by the recent practices of extramarital affairs and sex out of wedlock 
which have emerged in urban China (Farrer and Sun 2003, Li 2009). Moreover, homosexuality 
has become increasingly visible in public spaces (Li 2006, Rofel 2007, Rofel and Liu 2010) and 
has triggered public discussions about discrimination against homosexuality and a call for the 
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legalization of homosexual marriage.
10
  In addition, commercialized sex has become a profitable 
industry despite frequent police raids during periodic “anti-porn campaigns” (Evans 1997, 
Hershatter 1999, Pan 2004, Zheng 2009).  
The occurrence of changes, such as new forms of governance, consumer culture and 
multiple media resources, produces diverse sexual subjectivities in the post-Mao period.  The 
formation of new subjectivities during the post-Mao era takes shape in the light of changing 
definitions of gender, family life and sexuality.  With the perception of women shifting from 
“funü” to “nüxing” under the post-Mao regime, post-Mao gender politics have returned to the 
progressive feminist model which predates the PRC. This approach articulates sexual difference 
and gender roles and views women primarily as sexual subjects (Barlow 2004). The 
representation and performance of gender in urban China have been characterized by the 
transformation of gendered subjectivity. The mother cohort and daughter cohort each identify the 
self with different experiences that have occurred under the auspices of this shift (Evans 2008). 
In comparison with the mother cohort, which was primarily shaped by the “unnatural” 
representation of women under Maoist gender ideology, the daughter cohort coming of age in the 
post socialist period reconfigures their gender identity in relation to sexual and material desires 
(Rofel 2007). The desires and practices of the daughter cohort takes shape in what Farrer calls a 
“youth culture”, in which changing sexual practices and capitalistic moral attitudes towards 
marriage emerge in urban China (Farrer 2002).  
                                                          
10
 Over the past decade, homosexuality in China has entered public discussions focusing on questions such as 
whether homosexuality is “normal” or abnormal and guy rights.  For example, in 2010, Li Yinhe, a well-known 
sociologist studying marriage and sexuality, made a proposition to the People’s Congress to legalize homosexual 
marriage. It stirred up a lively public discussion online and in the news media. Although the People’s Congress 
turned down the suggestion, but the concept of “homosexual marriage” has emerged as a challenge to the dominant 




The “sexual liberalization” of youth culture illustrates that the established ideology of 
marriage and sexuality during the Maoist period encountered challenges and was contested by 
members of the younger generations. However, the nature of these challenges must be 
understood in relation to a number of different social factors. The scholarly reconstruction of 
gender and sexuality in the post-Mao period has largely relied upon the variable of age or 
generation (Evans 2008, Farrer 2002, Rofel 1999 and 2007), and thus the cohorts of different 
generations are examined to parse out their different attitudes toward marriage and sexuality.  
Age (or generation) may continue to be a significant variable for scholars striving to understand 
the evolving process of sexual culture in the PRC. However, age difference is a generalized 
variable. In the scholarship, the young cohorts coming of age during the 1980s and 1990s are 
now middle-aged.  Have these cohorts become conservative by virtue of their age? Or has 
“sexual freedom” been embraced in China by the middle aged and by younger cohorts? Over the 
past three decades, younger generations of the PRC, have indeed confronted the dominant 
ideology in their sexual beliefs and practices, but generational difference alone can hardly 
explain the complex vagaries of these changes.  
 As opposed to the category of age/generation, I suggest that class should become a more 
significant variable in predicting “openness” or “conservatism” on issues related to marriage and 
sexuality. Defining class is important for a class-related analysis that is an empirical 
investigation as well as a theoretical conceptualization.  There are diverse conceptualizations of 
class in the studies of social classes, but choice of criteria ought to depend on the actual context 
and purpose of a research. It is difficult to situate the class phenomenon rising in China’s 
economic development in any particular Western class theories (e.g. Marxist, Weberian and 
Thompsonian class analyses). The conceptualization of class in this dissertation follows a class 
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analysis within a broadly Neo-Weberian perspective, which focuses on individuals’ positions in 
capitalist markets to inequality in the distribution of life chances (Breen 1978). In this sense, 
classes are “sets of structural positions. Social relationships within markets, especially within 
labour markets, and within firms define these positions. Class positions exist independently of 
individual occupants of these positions” (Sørenson 1991, 72).  A neo-Weberian class analysis 11 
allocates positions to classes so as to capture the major dimensions of differentiation in labour 
markets and production units that are consequential for distribution of life chances. Sociological 
analyses of classes have particularly focused on the types of employment relationship to examine 
the associations between class positions and differences of life chances (Erikson and Goldthorpe 
1992, Evans and Mills 1998). Importantly, different life chances dictate the conditions under 
which certain types of values and actions are undertaken according to class position, and these 
values and actions link to the variations of social and cultural resources that individuals can bring 
to bear (Breen 1978).  
 One’s occupation links to the possession of organizational, economic and cultural 
resources (Lu et al 2002 and 2005), which not only reflect economic inequality between classes 
but also subjectivities related to China’s modernity discourse and the state’s current social 
engineering projects. Therefore, the conceptualization of class in this dissertation also examines 
political and cultural dimensions of both middle class and working class. Considering that urban 
workers and migrant workers have constituted the new working class during the post-socialist 
                                                          
11  This conceptualization also draws on Lu (2002 and 2005) and his team’s framework of social stratification in 
contemporary China but without using the term “stratum”, which Lu and his colleagues generally define as class in 
neo-Weberian term based upon  occupational category. Nevertheless, their research attempts to avoid the term 
“class” by employing an alternative term “ stratum” because the term class  not only specifically refers to Maoist 
class ideology in the Chinese context but also the term itself politically sensitive for the researchers within the 




period, despite differences between these two social groups (Hurst and Sorace 2011), I use the 
term “working class” to identify informants of both urban workers and migrant workers in this 
dissertation. It includes the old “proletariat” in urban areas , the “most advanced productive 
force” in Maoist class ideology, many of whom were laid off by the state-owned enterprises 
during the massive wave of layoffs beginning during the late 1990s, and rural migrants working 
in the cities, estimated at one hundred fifty million migrant workers since the late 1980s (Li 
2011). 
Class has emerged as a new and increasingly significant factor in determining social 
identity and media consumption choices in contemporary China. Furthermore, the practice of 
“keeping a second wife” appears to be a class-coded issue. Finally, class identity arises at the 
conjuncture of China’s modernity discourse of “suzhi” (human quality), which has been part of a 
social engineering project to develop “self-worth”. For all of these reasons, class plays a more 
indicative role than age in determining attitudes towards the changing landscape of marriage, 
family and sexuality, as well as in fostering or inhibiting the practices of sex out of wedlock and 
cohabitation without a marriage license, homosexuality, and other forms of sexual behavior. An 
examination of the relationship between class and the attitude toward sex out of wedlock throws 
light on the extent of the attachment to state ideology among a broad spectrum of citizens, as 
well as upon the nature of the tolerance for and embrace of the subcultures which constitute the 
sexually liberated culture.  Therefore, this dissertation examines the ways in which class plays 
itself out in the attitude towards sex out of wedlock, and analyzes the extent to which class is 
significant to the evolution of the concepts of marriage, family and sexuality.  
The re-configuration of governance in the post-Mao era seemingly signals a “retreat from 
policing private life” (Farrer 2002, 252), which provides some basis for the claim that a new era 
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of sexual freedom has begun, particularly among younger people in urban China (Farrer 2002, 
Pan 2006, Pan et al 2011, Xiao et al 2011). Unlike the mother (and father) cohort, who absorbed 
much of the sexual austerity communicated by the Maoist ideology of sexuality, the younger 
cohorts in urban locales have gained greater freedom to engage in their sexual lives according to 
their desires. This “sexual freedom” has been further accompanied by an emerging gay culture in 
the public sphere (Li 2006, Rofel 2007), the proliferation of the commercial sex industry 
(Hershetter 1999, Pan 2004, Zheng 2007) and the increasing practice of extramarital affairs 
(Farrer 2003, Li 1998). 
The claim of sexual freedom overlooks the constraints and the persistence of the party-
state’s continuing interventionist approach to marriage and sexuality in the post Mao period, a 
time in which the party-state has adapted to new ways of controlling its citizens. It does not 
explain many countertrends and anomalies which mark the post-Mao period. The celebratory 
account overlooks the question of why sexuality in China today consists of entangled 
contradictions. Mere generational evolution cannot account entirely for this detachment from the 
official discourse of sexuality. Moreover, traditional norms of female chastity and virginity are 
still valued (Edwards 2012, Guo 2010, Sigley 2006). Homosexuality has been subject to 
administrative sanctions and widespread social discrimination fueled by accusations of 
“abnormality” and “pathology” (Li 2006, Sang 2003). The sexual freedom thesis also overlooks 
the state’s continuing efforts to discipline marriage and sexuality. The state sanction of legitimate 
outlet still does not recognize the validity of sexual relations beyond the confines of the 
heterosexual marital unit, and as a consequence of this stance, sex workers frequently encounter 
police raids and are targeted under the auspices of the Public Security Regulations (Li 2003, Pan 
2004, Zheng 2007). Police raids on adults watching pornography in private residences and adults 
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participating in sexual gatherings are still encouraged by the Penal Code.
12
 The post-socialist 
state continues to play an intrusive role as a regulator of sexual relations and reproductive 
practices. For example, the rigid “family planning” policy dictates that the birth permit 
(zhunsheng zheng) is only issued to couples with a marriage registration—a situation upheld both 
by state discourse and legal sanctions (McMillan 2006).  The claim of sexual freedom 
underestimates the forms of knowledge that the state utilizes to continue governing at a distance. 
Hence, though certain autonomous subjectivities (Farrer 2002) are indeed the fruit of the “neo-
liberal” era, private affairs (family, marriage and sexuality) are still vulnerable to the state’s 
attempts to reconfigure and re-organize them. Wang Jing (2001, 42) suggests that the state has 
not relinquished its interventionist prerogatives, contending that the post-socialist state performs 
this role “more skillfully” by “weaving its agenda into a new common sense that ideology is 
blurring into (commercial) culture”. 
Despite the fact that there is an ideological shift of gender subjectivity in post Mao period 
(Barlow 2004, Evens 1997, Luo and Hao 2007), the legacy of the dominant discourse established 
during the Maoist period remains a key ideological component of the post Mao regime’s effort to 
continue exerting social control. Hence, there is a potential gap and conflicts between the 
discourse and the post-Mao era’s social contexts, in which the private sphere has gained a greater 
autonomy in comparison with its role under the Maoist regime. Without a doubt, sexuality is 
undergoing a dramatic change in China, particularly when forms of governance, economic 
formations, and consumer cultures (both material goods and cultural products) have produced 
                                                          
12
  “Sichuan yibing yi nanzi zaijia kan huangtu bei zhua” (A man in Yibing of Sichuan Province was arrested for 
watching porn pictures at home). Tianya luntan, March 23, 2010. Accessed September 14, 2013. 
www.bbs.tianya.cn. 
 Also see Nanjing yi fu jiaoshou zuzhi juzong yinluan bei qishu (An associate professor in Nanjing prosecuted for 
organizing licentious activities). Xinhua News Agency, March 11, 2010.  Accessed March 5, 2013, 
www.xinhuanet.com. This case is discussed in Chapter Five. 
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diverse sexual subjectivities in an era of globalization. Hence, sexual culture is an ongoing 
process of negotiation and contestation between state intervention (discourse and laws) and the 
formation of new sexual subjectivities.  
Resistance to the ideology of gender and marriage under both the Maoist period and the 
post Mao regime has been observed by scholars engaging in empirical approaches (Diamant 
2000, Hershatter 2002, Honig 2003), but direct talking-back (or negotiation) to the dominant 
ideology of monogamous sexuality through the lens of media and audience is rather rare in the 
China scholarship. Farrer’s (2003) term “opening up” contains the emerging uncertainty and 
instability of the ideology, struggles between the established and new ideas.  If a dominant 
ideology never withdraws without a struggle (Grossberg 1986, Hall 1982, LaClau and Mouffe 
1985), how is the “openness” of the market economy working to erode the dominant ideology?   
Never secure, ideological constructs are always challenged, defended, and contested ( Grossberg 
1986, Hall 1982, LaClau and Mouffe 1985), but how and in what way does the struggle occur? 
The news narrative of “concubinage” is a crucial site of the party-state’s strategy for re-
articulating its ideology. How audiences comprehend this site remains unknown, and the 
meaning of “keeping a second wife” remains incomplete without an understanding of the 
audience’s participation. If the news media speak to this issue ideologically, do audiences 
interpret it ideologically? How and to what extent can audiences negotiate with ideological 
components? Are they able to overthrow the established ideology? Hence, this dissertation 
examines the ways in which the previously established ideology struggles over different 
ideas/cultures and vice versa, attempting to assess whether and to what extent these 
ideas/cultures may have undermined the hegemonic position of the established ideology. The 
media construction of “keeping a second wife” and audience members’ interpretations of this 
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narrative offer an ideal case study for observing the scrambled relations between official 
ideology and sexual liberalism.  
This dissertation focuses on social actors’ compliance and resistance as they engage with 
ideology through the site of the narrative of “keeping a second wife”.  In so doing, this 
dissertation adds a media study to our understanding of family, marriage and sexuality in 
everyday life and experience within the current social context in China. Hence, building upon 
and moving beyond the scholarly studies on the discourse of marriage, family and sexuality and 
the scholarly evidences of so called sexual freedom, this dissertation pays particular attention to 
the relations and tensions that arise between ideological structure and agency. On the one hand, 
social actors have gained increasing autonomy in advocating and negotiating ways of living of 
their own design; on the other hand, the state’s institutions, through media and education, are 
crucial structural factors that shape subjectivity in various ways. Moreover, contradictory forms 
of sexual culture in contemporary China—for example, some people still value female virginity, 
while others demonstrate much more tolerance toward sex out of wedlock— need to be further 
interpreted, using tools which go beyond both the official discourse  and “sexual freedom” 
account . Neither the official discourse concerning marriage and sexuality nor the broad claims 
of sexual freedom can singlehandedly capture the landscape of marriage, family and sexuality in 
the PRC. Hence, this dissertation asserts that the contradictory forms together constitute the 
sexual culture in a complex way.  
Media consumption in contemporary China 
 
 
 Asian media studies scholarship has employed a Cultural Studies approach to investigate 
the complex interplay between media texts, representations, and particular audiences. This 
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scholarship focuses on the practices of interpretation, negotiation/contestation and the sense 
making of identity. It explores the political, social, historical and cultural factors intertwined 
among textual producers, media consumers, ideology and particular social contexts (Erni and 
Chua 2004, Kim 2008). The Cultural Studies approach has been applied to the media studies in 
many Asian regions (Chua and Junaid 2005, Yang 2005). However, the Cultural Studies wing of 
Asian media studies has paid little attention to media in the PRC, and hence the complex nature 
of audience in China remains unknown to the scholarship.  
 Within a political-economy framework, studies on the Chinese media have largely 
focused, instead, on issues of media ownership and state control, and issues of media 
management and marketing (Fung 2008, Keane et al 2002, Latham et al. 2006, Li J 2000, Wang 
2008, Zhao 1998). These latter approaches stem from the role that the media has played in China 
as an arm of party propaganda. More recent analysis has focused on the rapid expansion of 
consumer culture in China, the influence of globalization on the nation’s media industries, and 
the increasing tensions between the state’s interest in media propaganda and the media industry’s 
pursuit of profit on a globalizing scale (Zhang 2009 and 2011). Studies of media in China also 
investigate the trends and possibilities of political liberalization opened up by the commercial 
liberalization of media in the authoritarian state (Stockmann 2009, Sun 2010).   
The commercialization of the media in China has oriented media outlets simultaneously 
toward the Chinese media and the free market. On the one hand, centralized political control 
ensures that the media continue to function as the party’s primary tool of political mobilization.  
For example, all the newspapers are under the supervision of state agencies and major 
newspapers are under the direct administration of the party’s Department of Propaganda (local 
newspapers fall under the purview of local propaganda departments). All television and radio 
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stations are supervised by the Bureau of Broadcast and Television, and the publishing houses are 
controlled by the Bureau of Journalism and Publication.  On the other hand, open market 
pluralism and competition has encouraged the media to develop as an industry with an eye to 
markets beyond the borders of China. Although the media industry is closely supervised by the 
party-state, new trends in media production are providing new possibilities for diluting state 
ideology as it appears in the media. In the meantime, individuals receive competing messages 
from different media resources in the age of the Internet (Yang 2009). This complex climate calls 
for a cultural study that can examine tensions and interactions between the state, media practices 
and society members. The existing literature, unfortunately, has little to tell us on this subject.  
To date, the few existing studies that examine reception of Chinese media (Meng 2009, 
Womack1986) cast the Chinese audience as a homogeneous subject, as a large group of passive 
consumers who embrace consumer culture and as survey subjects whose main role is to aid 
marketers.  Thus, the “audience” in China appears in these studies merely as a passive collective 
that simply receives the messages given by the authoritarian state. Because the state controls the 
media and employs the media for the purposes of party propaganda, studies on audience in China 
overlook the site of media as a cultural field in the age of opening up and globalization. Hence, 
this dissertation examines the cultural field (Bourdieu 1987) in China and conceptualizes the 
audience from a sociological perspective.  According to Bourdieu (1987), within the cultural 
field, audience members bring a variety of economic, symbolic, social and cultural capital to 
bear upon their consumption of cultural products. The audience cannot be treated as a 
homogenous entity that reads texts in the same way; instead, the audience is composed of 
individuals situated in definite social positions, possessing access to different kinds, and 
amounts, of capital. Therefore, this dissertation is a “situated” audience study of particular 
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relationships to the media discourse of “keeping a second wife.” I contend that this approach will 
add a significant, and heretofore missing, perspective to Chinese media studies. Such a study 
reveals the heterogeneity of media reception, and the internal contradictions and external impact 
that both reinforce and destabilize state ideologies as they are articulated through media 
discourse. 
Although the Cultural Studies approach has been deployed as a set of analytical and 
political tools in studying media in different regions of Asia, using this approach to study media 
in China is still very new. Today’s China, like many other parts of the world, is an increasingly 
mediated space. It is important to understand the consequences of media consumption as an 
everyday experience in a dramatically changing society where the party-state struggles to exert 
social control. This dissertation is intended to provide a much-needed perspective on these social 
transformations within the specific context of “keeping a second wife”. It explores the everyday 
experience of media reception and thus contributes to Chinese media studies that have largely 
focused on the media as a generator of economic growth. Moreover, studies engaging with a 
cultural approach in Asian Media Studies focus on the individual’s everyday experience in 
relation to the discourse they negotiate, but often overlook the historical and political aspects of 
the dominant discourse. While rigorously engaging with everyday experience, this study also 
explores important social and political questions dealing with contemporary China.  In addition, 
despite the cultural significance of news narratives, Cultural Studies scholarship has paid intense 
attention to the politics of “pleasure” in the media as embodied by popular fiction, films, TV and 
other types of popular culture, while it has under-examined news media, and in particular news 




This dissertation will analyze news reports of “keeping a second wife” for the purpose of 
examining the dominant discourse of marriage and sexuality inserted in the stories of “keeping a 
second wife”.  The intention of doing a news analysis, instead of a content analysis of the other 
types of media forms (e.g. films and women’s magazines), is based on two considerations. First, 
the news press (and TV) in China is the major form of state media tightly controlled by the 
Party’s propaganda departments, representing the authority of the Party-State voice. During the 
past decade, the state media have masterfully utilized technologies to develop online forms of 
news media and provide online space for audiences’ interaction within certain ways (e.g. the 
online news of the People’s Daily and the Xinhua News Agency). Therefore, the news reports in 
the state media have been read through the Internet by large audiences. Second, the online form 
of news reading provides convenience for researchers to collect data for discourse analysis.  
Because my focus is the content of “keeping a second wife” that links to the ideology of 
marriage and sexuality, for the analysis of audience’s interpretations, I employ other types of 
media forms that cover the content (e.g. TV and the Internet) due to the fact that the reception of 
“keeping a second wife” in the communication reality—in which audiences do not face single 
genre or single media form in today’s mediated world ( Hermes 2009)— does not come solely 
from the news press but also from the Internet and other types of media forms. My intention is to 
examine discrepancies in the understanding of the dominant discourse that has been discussed by 
different types of media resources that audiences may employ. 
The news media in post Mao China has undergone “news reforms” that add “soft news” 
(e.g., social events and glamour tabloids) to the previous news style of rigid party propaganda. 
These adjustments speak to the demands of marketization, accommodations that have allowed 
the news media to rise as a massively profitable industry (He 2000, Wu 2000). As a result of the 
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double function of the Chinese press (party line and the news market), party propaganda has 
been largely diluted, and predictably the news audiences have greater autonomy. Moreover, the 
Internet has recently emerged as a major news source for some social groups (e.g., younger 
populations, the middle class, and “public intellectuals” (gonggong zizhi fenzi), and 
consequently, some members of the society have been exposed to contradictory media messages. 
Under these changes, the patterns of news reception have shifted from news use (as passive 
pattern) to news consumption (as fragmentation and polarization of audience). 
13
  In short, media 
production and media consumption in China have undergone massive changes, manifesting in a 
much more complex range of developments such as pluralisation, diversification, 
commercialization, internationalization and decentralization. These changes require new 
perspectives for understanding how the media operates in a different way from the established 
paradigm of news as “the party’s throat and tongue” (Zheng 2005). 
In her discussion of the relations between audiences and publics in Western societies, 
Livingstone (2005, 12) points out that today’s “publics are increasingly mediated, moving ever 
closer to audiences, while audiences are increasingly diffused and diverse”. Indeed, scholars 
have argued that a “plurality of media” (Couldry, Livingstone and Markham 2007, 24) and the 
increasing “fragmentation of audience” (Couldry, Livingstone and Markham 2007, 35) has 
undermined the public sphere that used to have a “common understanding of the world” and “ a 
consensus regarding the collective interest” (Livingstone 2005, 9).  Lurking behind this 
“pessimistic” statement about the public sphere is the idea that media and audience are no longer 
attached to a monolithic ideology; an idea equally applicable to authoritarian states such as 
China. Although scholars have distinguished mass media systems between democratic societies 
                                                          
13




and authoritarian states (Becker 2004, Meyen and Schwer 2007), and have pointed out that the 
role of authoritarian states in media operation is to generate rhetoric symbols of power as a 
strategy for domination (Wedeen 1999), recent studies on media reform in authoritarian states 
reveal that audiences primarily receive ideological messages in the form of entertainment 
(Becker 2004). In the case of the Chinese media, the news media has emerged as a massive 
industry, no longer functioning solely as the party’s propaganda mechanism. Moreover, in the 
era of the internet, Chinese audience members are increasingly likely to receive contentious 
messages from non-official resources (Link et al. 2002, Yang 2009, Zheng and Wu 2005, Zheng 
2007). As a consequence of these contexts and developments, contradictory and confrontational 
messages are delivered, thus providing more diverse possibilities for audience interpretation. 
While the party-state continues to make an effort to intervene in marriage, family and sexuality 
via the dominant discourse, various media resources have proliferated during the course of the 
past decade, aided by China’s further “opening up” to the world, which has, by necessity led to 
the rise of more extensive and faster information transmission through the internet, popular 
culture or other channels, and consequently the monologue of the official discourse has come to 
an end.   
Moreover, classic audience research with a cultural studies approach has intensively 
focused on gender and race to investigate audiences’ activities in relation to media consumption 
and interpretations of media messages.  Studies focusing on social change in terms of sexuality 
in China have paid particular attention to age (generational) difference in examining “youth 
culture” due to China’s dramatic changes over the past three decades (Farrer 2002, Rofel 1999). 
This study acknowledges the continuing importance of age difference in determining attitudes 
toward sexual freedom and retains gender as a lens for looking at social change in terms of 
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marriage and sexuality. However, my research adds a key social category to mix—arguing for 
the importance of class in studying audiences’ media consumption and interpretations.  In other 
words, this study shows the ways in which the reception of “keeping a second wife” narrative 
reflects changing sexual culture and broader identity formation in terms of class.  
Organization of the dissertation 
The next chapter lays out the theoretical framework that guides the analysis. It also 
outlines methodological issues, the research data, and the challenges of fieldwork. It first outlines 
the central idea of the relation between media and ideology conceptualized in British Cultural 
Studies, within which this study is situated. I particularly link this study to feminist politics of 
gender and media that shed light on the media representation of women vis-à-vis feminist 
strategy of talking-back.  I then offer a critical review of the debate of audience activity and 
situate the audience for this study. Finally, this chapter outlines the methodology and research 
data, and the challenges of fieldwork.  
Chapter Three provides a content analysis of the media accounts of “keeping a second 
wife” as presented by the Chinese media. I show how the media accounts rely heavily upon 
crimes and perceived sexual chaos as a threat to the PRC’s family institutions, the foundation of 
Chinese society, through which the news stories have created a “family crisis” that is in line with 
the official condemnation of “keeping a second wife” and coordinates perfectly with the state’s 
efforts to reinforce the family. I thus argue that the news narrative of “keeping a second wife” is 
a re-articulation of the previously established ideology of marriage and sexuality, through which 
the post-socialist regime aims to maintain its hegemony over the increasing freedom in 
individuals’ private sphere.  
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Chapter Three is the basis for Chapters Four, Five and Six that examine the audience’s 
interpretations of “keeping a second wife”. Three themes emerged as predominant and they 
became the key touchstones for my reception analyses: “Managing marriage”, the linkage 
between corruption and “keeping a second wife”, and the media discourse of the heterosexual 
marital unit as the only legitimate sexual outlet and moral sexual relationship. In Chapter Four, I 
examine the ways of understanding “managing marriage”, which is a popular discourse that has 
appeared in the media as a strategy for fomenting the “family crisis” as well as in everyday life 
as a key word for mastering one’s happiness, particularly when referring to a woman’s well-
being. I first link the “family crisis” in the media to the state-affiliated ACWF’s “harmonious 
family” project, which is a component of the larger state project of building a “harmonious 
society”.  Subsequently, an analysis of the negotiations associated with “managing marriage” 
among audience members constitutes the bulk of the chapter. I argue that the entangled relations 
between gender and class play a crucial role in determining ways of “managing marriage”, and 
thus link to a subject’s compliance with or resistance to the idea of “managing marriage”.    
Chapter Five is concerned with the process of changing sexuality in contemporary China. 
While the state media continues to articulate heterosexual marital relations as the only moral and 
legitimate sexual behavior, contemporary audience members respond to this media discourse in 
various ways. This chapter deals with audience members’ diverse responses to official sexual 
discourse. It also incorporates elements from interviewees’ lived experiences, through which past 
beliefs, dominant discourse imperatives, and emerging sexual practices converge to sketch a 
fuller picture of sexuality in China today. I argue that the process contains multiple and 
overlapping forms of sexual culture, in which the party-state’s ideology, emergent sexual 
cultures, and traditional Chinese beliefs intertwine and struggle. 
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 In Chapter Six, I examine the theme of corruption as it appears in the news narrative of 
“keeping a second wife”. This chapter provides a gendered perspective by investigating the 
media discourse of corruption vis-à-vis the audience’s response to these stories. It focuses on 
audience members’ story-telling and instances of talking-back to the media discourse that 
highlights a link between “keeping a second wife” and official corruption.  I argue that despite 
the media narrative’s essentialist presentation of gendered “nature” and the gendered causes of 
this corruption as aspects of “common sense” (a firm or unquestioned article of social belief), the 
audience’s own narratives and the ways in which they talk back illustrate that the media’s 
discourse of corruption has encountered vigorous resistance. This reflects the intensity of social 
animosity towards officialdom as well as the persistence of a political consciousness that the 
regime has been trying to erase.  
The concluding Chapter summarizes this study with by making two primary arguments. 
First, the findings of the chapters reveal that the degree of adherence to the official ideology of 
marriage, family and sexuality is not uniform among different social groups. Taking class and 
age into account, this study demonstrates that class identity has an impact on the degree of 
adherence to the ideology of monogamous sexuality and age difference continually marks the 
differing attitudes toward sexual practices out of wedlock. Moreover, the process of modernity in 
China plays a predominant role for social change in terms of sexual culture. Second, through my 
approach to audience activity in this study, I show a broader sense of audience activity beyond 






Theoretical framework and methodology 
  
 This chapter discusses the theoretical framework and methodology that guide my study.  
This study is built on the Cultural Studies model, a model which enables me to examine the 
relations between the media accounts of “keeping a second wife” and the previously established 
ideology of marriage and sexuality, along with an analysis of the ways in which  audience 
members interpret the media discourse. This study also is built on the feminist perspective on 
gender and media.  In the first section of this chapter, I outline ideas of culture and representation 
on which this study is based. This theoretical approach not only enquires into the relations 
between media (news and other forms of media) and ideology, but also investigates responses of 
the audience. Hence, subsequently, I present a critique of audience activity in cultural studies and 
situate the audience in a larger social-cultural context for this study. In particular, I suggest that 
the plausible image of the “cultural hero” presented in audience activity requires revision. I focus 
particularly on the key issue of women’s resistance by focusing on instances of women’s talking-
back in a feminist politics of media that also sketches a “woman warrior” overthrowing cultural 
representations.
14
  I argue that resistance can occur to certain extent while “audience activity” 
remains partially paralyzed by structural factors. In the final section of this chapter, I discuss 
                                                          
14
 Feminist media studies have paid particular attention to representations of physically and mentally strong women 
heroes in popular culture that has challenged a male-dominant binary representation of gender. Feminist historical 
studies also have attempted to discover the role of women in wars. The image of “woman warrior” reflects a shifting 
nature of gender representation, which brings women out of shadows to spot light and challenge patriarchal norms in 
society. See the discussions in: Early 2001, Innes 1999, McLaughlin1990.  
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methodology, multiple research methods (and three data sets) for this study, and the challenges 
of fieldwork. 
Culture and representation 
This dissertationt presents textual analysis, as well as sociological communication 
research (through empirical study), and engages theories derived from Cultural Studies that 
bridges the gap between reception research and textual analysis. Cultural Studies aims to 
understand media as a cultural form and assess the media’s relationship to everyday life. Hence, 
it pays attention to audience in order to rethink the power relations between the media and 
message receivers. It is a critical perspective that focuses on the political, social and cultural 
implications of mass media. Notions of culture, representation, and encoding/decoding are 
important tools for this analysis of media and reception. 
Culture is one of the most crucial concepts in Raymond Williams’ work (1958, 1973, and 
1977).  His notion of culture highlights the importance of experience and activities in the making 
of culture and society.  Williams conceptualizes culture as “a whole way of life”, rather than 
simply “creative effort” (1958, 76). His definition of culture includes the activities of ordinary 
people, whose daily lives demonstrate a way of meaning-making and reflect a particular mode of 
social and economic organization. Therefore, this study of the textual reception of “keeping a 
second wife” strives to engage Williams’ concept of culture by examining the ways in which 
individuals use culture as a means of mediating experience and social relations in contemporary 
China. Williams sees individuals as active participants in creating their own culture, performing 
a role that is linked to social relations and reflects social change under specific political and 
economic conditions. Moreover, dominant culture is always co-existent with and destabilized by 
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oppositional cultures (Williams 1977). Hence, because the dominant culture of monogamous 
sexuality in China encounters the threat of contestation by other subcultures, it can never 
completely dominate the lives of its constituents. According to Williams’ (1973) argument, this 
dominant culture of monogamous sexuality is unstable and shifting despite its undeniable impact 
upon the ongoing process of the transformation of sexual relations.  
Moreover, Williams further elaborates how culture is organized, negotiated and modified. 
Williams argues that culture is organized through the competing forces of dominant, residual and 
emergent cultures. There exists “conflict, difference and contradiction” (1973, 55) between the 
dominant and the subordinate.  The dominant ideology is articulated through cultural practices. 
Residual culture, which comes from a former social existence, keeps alive a set of “experiences, 
meanings and values which cannot be verified or cannot be expressed in the terms of dominant 
culture” (1973, 10), while emergent culture is a set of new meanings and values that the 
dominant cannot integrate into its frame. Because culture is organized in this way, the dominant 
culture cannot entirely control other types of cultural production. Williams’ notion of culture 
offers a framework for this study’s investigation of the relations between and the intersections of 
the dominant ideology of monogamous sexuality and the emergent ideas of “sexual freedom” in 
contemporary China, under a particular context of liberalization and globalisation.  This 
dissertation pays particular attention to the ways in which sexual culture is changing in a 
complex way, in which the old and the new coexist and overlap in people’s daily lives. 
Cultural theorists pay particular attention to representation that transmits dominant 
ideology via the media. Representation signifies understandings of the world by using language, 
signs and images for communication (Hall 1997). It is the symbolic construction of meaning as 
well as the practice of representing others (Hall 1997, Spivak 1988).  Importantly, representation 
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is a process through which meanings are produced and culture is organized, transformed, and 
challenged.  According to Hall (1997), representation produces and disseminates meanings, 
values and identities through language and visual images; and yet, these meanings are also 
socially, historically and politically constructed. Therefore, media representation is far from 
neutral. For cultural theorists, representation is a medium through which meanings are produced 
by power/the ruling class (Curran and Morley 2006).  According to this perspective, mass media 
functions as a discourse in support of the dominant over the subordinate by creating 
rhetorical/symbolic images. Furthermore, representation is also a site of struggle between 
different positions on the power spectrum (Hall 1997). It is a set of political practices, in which 
power, on the one hand, consistently strives to define meanings, while on the other hand, finds 
itself unable to fix the meaning as a stable site of interpretation.  As a consequence of this lack of 
stability, these images are always beholden to interpretation, negotiation and resistance. Without 
an audience, the construction of meaning cannot be completed. The difficulty of fixing meaning 
derives from the fact that the receivers are socially, culturally, and historically located and thus 
disposed to interpret texts in a wide variety of ways. In short, cultural theorists see representation 
not just as meaning that is interrogated, but as the processes though which it is made and 
struggled over.  
Based on the theoretical framework described above, this dissertation interprets the media 
narrative of “keeping a second wife” as a reconstruction that disseminates the ideology of 
marriage and sexuality established during the Maoist period. The news narrative attempts to 
create a “family crisis” in order to maintain social control during a period of increasing diversity 
of sexual practices.  If it is true that concubinary practice has reappeared during the course of the 
rise of China’s new rich, it is also true that pluralism of sexuality has led to the idea that the 
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PRC’s monogamous idea of sexuality is threatened. The news narrative comes to perceive 
“keeping a second wife” as a sign of the disintegration of the social order and as a dangerous 
indicator of the possibility that the PRC’s sexual mores and family institution are coming apart at 
the seams. Therefore, the news analysis also deals with the “family crisis” surrounding the 
practice of “keeping a second wife”, in which sexual mores and the PRC’s family institution are 
assumed to be endangered.  
Audience activity  
 This dissertation explores the impact of the state ideology of marriage and sexuality 
through the site of “keeping a second wife” presented in the media, and thus it employs the term 
audience, a concept that has come to “cover the space of the individual/social distinction in 
locating the site of the impact of the media” (Allor 1988, 217). Hence, this section is not offering 
an overarching notion of audience, but is elaborating where to situate audience for this study.  
 The audience in this study is conceptualized within Cultural Studies. Early audience 
studies treat “audience” as an object of analysis in serving media industry, advertisers, and the 
state concerns of society. The Frankfurt School emphasizes the impact of the mass media, 
treating audience as a passive receiver who is easily manipulated (MacDonald 1959). Under this 
treatment, audience is an object of study ready for analysis. It also is the victim of media effects. 
In Ang’s words, this kind of audience research is “merely a function of the systemic design, and 
privatized reception completely subjected to the requirements of centralized transmission”, and 
thus it produces “the looming image of the ‘passive audience’” (1996, 7).  
It is at the core of the Cultural Studies to examine the dynamics of audiences’ 
interpretations. As Morley (1980, 15) points out,  
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the audience must be conceived of as composed of clusters of socially situated individual 
readers, whose individual readings will be framed by shared cultural formations and 
practices pre-existent to the individual: shared “ orientations” which will in turn be 
determined by factors derived from the objective position of the individual in the class 
structure. These objective factors must be seen as setting parameters to individual 
experience, although not “determine” consciousness in a mechanistic way; people 
understand their situation and react to it through the level of subcultures and meaning 
systems.  
 
The “readings” might seem heterogeneous, but the audiences’ activities reflect the functioning of 
“the ideological operation” (Ang 1996.) Hall’s model of encoding/decoding offers insight into 
the ways in which ideology operates through both media producers and audience interpretation 
(Hall 1973). By elaborating upon media message-receiver relations, Hall challenges the media 
effects model that claims that meaning is determined solely by cultural producers and then 
simply consumed by audience. For Hall, meanings embedded in messages are made in practice, 
and through the struggles between competing positions. This encoding/decoding model allows 
for a more process-oriented understanding of the production and consumption of representations. 
It emphases both sides of the notion: the dominant ideology that produces representation and the 
multiple interpretive possibilities available to different social groups (Hall 1973).  The encoding 
process reveals the relationship between media messages and ideology and shows the ways in 
which the representation embedded in the messages can be naturalized through this process, 
whereas the decoding process illustrates the possibilities for a contested reading of ideology 
(Hall 1973).   
 Cultural studies dismantled the idea that there is an “audience” as an object to be studied 
during the 1980s (Allor 1988, Ang 1985, Erni 1989, Fiske 1988, Grossberg 1988, Morley 1980 
and 1986, Radway 1988).  In contrast to the emphasis on “media power” and media effects in 
early audience studies, since the 1980s, the audience in Cultural Studies emerges as an “active” 
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agent struggling over meaning in the reception process of the media (McGuigan 1992, Moris 
1988, Morley 1983 and 1992). In particular, the emphasis in the conceptualization of audience 
not only perceives it as active in the sense that it produces meanings, but also examines the link 
between meaning-making and the micro-politics of media consumption. In contrast to early 
audience studies as conducted by the likes of the Frankfurt School, in Cultural Studies, the 
audience takes a critical and active position. Credited with making its own choices and “free” to 
engage in meaning-making (e.g. feminist audience studies on feminine genres emphasize the 
politics of pleasure and claim that watching TV or reading women’s magazines are not cultural 
oppression but the site of negotiation and contestation) (Ang 1985, Livingstone 1991, 
Nightingale 1986 and 1990, Radway 1984).  Nevertheless, this approach does not elaborate to 
the extent to which the audiences’ power is operative, and as a result, as Ang points out, the 
audience figures as a “cultural hero” that seems able to overthrow the structures (Ang 1996, 8).   
 The problem with the figure of “cultural hero” presented in audience studies is embedded 
within the larger structure and agency debate that continues to drive the social sciences. The two 
poles remain stranded at either end of an overstated dichotomy and thus interconnections 
between these two concepts are overlooked (Hays 1994). Hence structure is seen as a static set of 
external constraints, while agency shows its opposition to structure by being active, contingent 
and flying banner of absolute freedom. The interconnections between structure and agency are 
lost in this understanding of the dichotomies.  Examining interconnections between structure and 
agency may shed light on the entwined nature of compliance and resistance, though which we 
gain a better understanding of the ways in which cultural metamorphosis and social change 
actually occur. On the one hand, structure depends upon the participation of social actors (Berger 
and Luckmann 1966, Giddens 1982 and 1984) and thus it is empowering as well as constraining 
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(Hays 1994). On the other, agency maintains structure through interactions among individuals 
and is made possible by the empowering elements of structure, while it is hemmed in by the 
bounds of structural constraint.  As Hays points out, the power of agency is better conceptualized 
as “structurally transformative agency” (1994, 64). While making choices and contesting 
structural features, individuals also make ideological commitments that help to maintain aspects 
of the structure itself.   
 Based on this understanding of structure and agency, audience activity should be 
understood as an entanglement of compliance and resistance. This dissertation searches for a 
multiplicity of audience interpretations of the media messages that reflect audience members’ 
subject positions and other dynamics central to the ways in which they interpret their own lives 
and the rapid changes transforming China today. This implies that the complex interaction 
between audience and media cannot be reduced to the binary categorization of “passive” or 
“active” audience which dominates audience studies—a formula that casts audience members 
either as objects that are acted upon or as “cultural heroes”.  
 Audience activity is both complex and changing, and neither the passive nor the active 
interpretation accounts for all of its particularities. As Bird ( 2003) states, although individuals 
articulate their perception of media messages in different ways, the media are firmly anchored 
into the web of culture , the intricate process by which ideologies are embedded in a variety of 
practices and through which individuals are constructed as particular kinds of subjects. Audience 
becomes “active” whilst applying codes of their cultural competences to give negotiable or 
oppositional interpretations on the one hand. On the other hand, it can be passive when being 
manipulated as a victim of many kinds of ideologies (e.g. consumerism, gender ideology) 
(Takahashi 2010). It is due to media’s nature as a form of culture that this dissertation, on the one 
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hand, advocates the notion of active audience— the framework on which the dissertation moves 
to investigate audience’s responses; on the other hand, this dissertation has identified ideological 
factors that restrain audience activity. Hence, the debate of “active/passive” audience is not the 
way that we ought to think about audience activity.  
 Despite encoding/decoding model is conceptualized to investigate the relationships 
among discursive structures, social location and positioned interpretive practices (Allor 1988), 
recent media scholars have criticized Hall’s encoding/decoding model with an effort to move 
beyond the binary distinction of texts/recipient (Ang 1996). Hall’s model sheds light on audience 
research during the 1980s, but now is criticized as an “abstract hermeneutic model” that reduces 
audience to a simple decoder vis-à-vis texts (Bratich 2008).  Thus, Hall’s model does not 
fundamentally deconstruct the previous paradigm of audience as passive receiver. In Ang’s 
words, Hall presents a paradigm that merely opposes the “sender’s sphere to the receiver’s 
sphere” (1996, 20). Moving beyond the text/decoder model, the audience must be located in the 
communication practices (e.g., the party-state media institution and its development over the 
course of marketization and globalization) as well as the larger social and cultural context 
because a text is not an isolated phenomenon. This understanding of audience is two-fold: it first 
demonstrates the validity of Hall’s model for us to understand the power of audience, and 
subsequently it attempts to move beyond the boundary between texts and decoder.  
  Moreover, as audience research emerged within the cultural studies it often focused on a 
single medium or a single genre (Radway 1988, 363). This has fallen into a trap that Seiter 
(1999, 9) identifies in this way:  “how do we draw the line in our data collection and the study of 
society, the family, the community”?  The distinction between audience and the media is 
outdated in the age of internet. As Livingstone (2004, 81) points out, “ in the new media 
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environment, it seems that people increasingly engage with content more than forms or 
channels…as media become interconnected, increasingly intertextual, it is content irrespective of 
the medium that matters to people qua fans, for they follow it across media, weaving it 
seamlessly also into their face-face communications”. The weakness of audience research within 
the fold of cultural studies lies in both theoretical and methodological approaches, which rely 
heavily on bounded relations between texts and recipients (e.g. Hall’s encoding/decoding 
model). Consequently, this kind of research pays much less attention to the larger context of 
culture in which both texts and audience are embedded.  
 This study crosses the boundaries of a single medium and a single genre, and it focuses 
on the content of “keeping a second wife” represented in various media forms. It does not focus 
on a specific text/audience relationship within a particular newspaper. During the course of my 
field work, I provided news texts to audience members at the beginning. Later I realized that the 
understanding of audience facing particular texts failed to connect audience to their everyday life 
experience—audience members were tightly bounded to the texts. They read the texts carefully 
and made an effort to grasp the media messages’ meanings. While focusing on these texts, they 
overlooked the relationship between these texts and their own lives, and in consequence, it 
became impossible to look at their attachment to the established ideology during a time of social 
change. Later, I focused on small-scale explorations of individuals’ meaning making dealing 
with major themes appearing in the media stories that concerned the informants. These themes 
largely link to everyday life experiences that enable them to reflect upon their intimate lives, 
yearnings and emotions. I intend to shed light on how people (i.e. middle class women versus 
working class women and older generations versus younger generations) interact with the themes 
in the media stories to create meanings within their everyday lives. These themes are familiar 
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from discourse that they have been exposed to through different kinds of media (e.g. TV, films, 
news and literary work). Unlike the classic audience research in cultural studies, I am not 
focusing on the readers of one particular newspaper or one particular TV drama (i.e. Woju, 
Dwelling Narrowness). Instead, I am looking across a spectrum of media forms (printed press, 
internet, TV drama) that present audiences with the ideology of marriage and sexuality. This is to 
widen the range of approaches in the field, experimenting with different methodologies as well 
as to show the intensity of “media saturation” and of struggling in meaning-making during 
everyday life. As Bird (2003) points out, today’s world is media-saturated and thus it is 
impossible to single out the effects of a particular media form (as if it ever was in the classic 
studies of audience).  Hence, this research on audience in China is building on the models 
represented by Hall’s encoding/decoding model and the classic audience studies based in 
Western societies by pioneering audience scholars such as Ang (1985), Lull (1990), Morley 
(1980 and 1986), Radway (1984), and Hobson (1982), but it moves further towards a broader 
sense of audience by focusing on the reception of “keeping a second wife” across various media 
forms. 
 Acknowledging the validity of audience research through one particular genre and 
medium, this study includes different media on the subject of “keeping a second wife”, such as 
the printed press, the Internet, TV and different genres such as news stories and TV drama, all of 
which represent the site of “keeping a second wife” for negotiating the established ideology of 
marriage and sexuality. The aim of this approach is to link the media discourse and the audience 





Feminist politics of gender and media 
This dissertation is enlightened by a feminist perspective on gender and media, and thus 
employs political and epistemological dimensions of feminist scholarship. Theorizing within a 
cultural studies approach, feminist media scholarship primarily focuses on media representation 
and identity. In early media studies, feminist concepts and theoretical frameworks focused upon 
the theoretic framework of the “male gaze”. Feminist media scholars employ this framework to 
investigate the ways in which women become objects of the male gaze and the ways in which 
narratives produce subjectivities and identities.  The media’s portrayal of women is seen as false 
or limiting, communicating a narrow and stereotyped view of women’s social roles. For feminist 
critics, there exists a cultural lag between real media images and real roles of women in a 
changing society (Thornham 2000).  Early feminist media scholarship generally centered upon 
the analysis of representations of women in popular media as belonging to the paradigm of 
misogyny (Byerly and Ross 2006, Walters 1995). Gender stereotyping, misrepresentation and 
under-representation of women in media have been investigated by feminist media scholarship. 
Concerned with cultural representations of women, they ask questions about the ways in which 
meanings are made and the ways in which women are represented. Feminist media studies have 
developed major concepts and theoretical frameworks for investigating representation in 
accordance with feminist politics. These approaches to representation are inter-textual, 
multidisciplinary, and deeply invested in the demystification of patriarchal images and the 
creation of a cultural space for feminist images. The investigation of representation particularly 
includes the relationship between women and cultural representation, and between historical and 
material women and the category of “woman” represented in complex and contradictory ways by 
the media (Walters 1995). In particular, feminist news studies question women’s marginality and 
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misrepresentation. News has increased its representation of women over the last three decades, 
but women remain under-represented in general. Studies of news practices challenge the 
fantastical and ideological aspects of the media’s construction of the real world, revealing the 
contradictory relations between women and news discourse. Authenticity or the presentation of 
the real world is always socially constructed. These studies sought to understand the ways in 
which news is constructed, the ways in which content is made, and the ways in which sources are 
manipulated (while analyzing the purpose of news manipulation). Representation of women in 
the news media disseminated to the reading/listening public is regarded as significant in shaping 
women’s social roles and subjectivities. Feminist media scholars point out that the news media 
has a gendered organizational structure and produces a discourse that leads inevitably to a 
gendered discussion of public issues (Gill 2007). In summary, early feminist media studies of the 
representation of women are often characterized as an angry repudiation, condemning the 
media’s symbolic annihilation of women and silencing, marginalizing, trivializing, and 
objectifying women in the media. The purpose of this critique centers upon the demand for the 
production of positive images of women (Gill 2007). 
From the 1980s onwards, there was a shifting understanding of gender. Judith Butler 
(2004) argues that gender is the product of embedded social action. She conceptualizes gender 
performativity as acted within regulatory norms; and, in turn, repeated gender performance 
reproduces itself via its discursive effects, naturalizing the power structure.  Moreover, bodies 
are “intentionally organized materiality”, in accordance with the terms and imperatives of the 
“heterosexual matrix”, which represents the sedimentation of the iterative norms of cultural 
legibility through which particular gender performances are enacted (Butler 1988, 521).  
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Echoing this understanding of gender, there was a poststructuralist shift away from the 
focus upon the gap between representation and real women or real women’s pleasure toward the 
articulation of concerns about the media’s construction of all social categories, such as gender, 
race, class, and sexuality.  This model views the category of femininity and other categories as 
entirely socially constructed. Naturally, the media plays an important role in this construction. 
While interested in poststructuralist approaches to media studies, feminist critics still take 
representation very seriously. They investigate the ways in which media genre constructs 
representations, such as post-war female consumers and feminist heroines (Brunsdon, D'Acci 
and Spigel 1997). These constructed femininities trigger questions that invite feminists to revisit 
the problem of representation. The traditional model of content analysis does not produce a 
complete picture that explains how the images of women are constructed, so scholars supplement 
it with structural analysis. Feminist critics employ semiotic analysis to understand the ways in 
which meaning is produced and conveyed through media representation (Krishnan 2007). 
Studies focus on intertextuality, instead of close textual analysis of a single text, in order to 
examine media representations of women and femininity in a fuller context. This approach not 
only allows feminist media scholars to examine the media representation of women, but also to 
investigate the broader cultural system in which representation is embedded (Brunsdon 1997).  
In poststructuralist feminist media studies, media representation no longer figures as a 
skewed reflection of reality; instead, it is seen as a constructed reality that brings certain 
understandings/interpretations, subjectivities and complex images into cultural play. In the 
poststructuralist view, identities, subjectivities and desires are fragmentary, unfixed and 
contradictory, and thus the media’s construction of femininity occupies an unstable position. 
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Poststructuralist theorists work to exhibit these destabilized meanings. This opens up a space for 
the investigation of reception.  
 Feminist politics of gender and media shed light on the content analysis of “keeping a 
second wife” and women’s negotiation of the media discourse throughout this dissertation. In 
accordance with feminist theories of femininity and masculinity, gendered representations (e.g., 
“second wives” and “virtuous wives), and the form of masculinity privileged by the market 
economy loom large in this study. These representations are situated within the larger cultural 
and political context of the PRC, which produces these gendered subjectivities. Moreover, 
women’s “talking back” is a feminist strategy for resistance. Building upon feminist strategy, 
this dissertation emphasizes women’s ability to talk back to media representations. Nevertheless, 
while searching for women’s voices, this study scrutinizes the extent to which women’s agency 
can step outside of ideological structures. This study of the degree of women’s resistance helps 
to concretize the idea of moving beyond the debate of audience activity. 
Methodology, research data, and the challenges of fieldwork 
 This dissertation takes a cultural approach to studying the media discourse in 
contemporary China. A cultural approach centralizes “experience, subjectivity and 
consciousness, ideology, history” (Hay, Grossberg and Wartella 1996), and calls for an 
ethnographic study of the media. Methodologically, in order to provide a more informative 
account of the media discourse and its reception by audience members, this dissertation is a 
multi-method study, combining different types of data and approaches. Chapter Three provides a 
discourse analysis, focusing on the media reports of “keeping a second wife”. The media 
coverage of “keeping a second wife” offers a chance to study the interrelations between media 
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discourse, the state ideology, audience and social change in China. Chapters Four, Five and Six 
employ an ethnographic study of media reception and “digital ethnography” techniques.   
DISCOURSE ANALYSIS 
The initial methodology is a critical discourse analysis that examines how and why the 
news narrative of “keeping a second wife” comes into play. Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) 
aims to analyze news texts about social events, on the theory that these cultural products provide 
insight into “the subtle manipulation of images and the variations in meanings that result” 
(Furniss 2001, 33). This approach is particularly well suited to studying the treatment of women 
and other marginalized social groups in the media (Fairclough 1989). Drawing upon CDA 
methods, Chapter Three pays close attention to semantic strategies (e.g. ernai and xiaosan), 
representation, content and the structuring of the stories.  
Methodologically, feminist media scholarship has relied upon textual analysis (close 
reading of media messages), including the examination of narrative structures, iconography, 
symbolic codes, themes, and the solicitation of pleasure, identification and subjectivity. 
Similarly, this study employs a feminist discourse analysis of mediated women and gendered 
discourses in the media. Feminist discourse analysis links feminist politics and critical discourse 
analysis. Feminist media scholars have engaged in an in-depth analysis of mediated women and 
the gender politics behind the issues of representation in the media, including all mass-produced 
popular culture (Brunsdon, D'Acci, and Spigel 1997, Byerly and Ross 2006, Cuklanz and Moorti 
2009, Carter and Steiner 2004, Dow 1996, Gill 2007, Walters 1995).   
Feminist discourse analysis aims to disclose the unequal power relations in the complex 
of gender discourse and dominant ideology. A number of feminist scholars have engaged with 
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femininity and feminine genres through textual analysis – through studies such as Krishanan and 
Deghe’s work (1997) on the construction of femininity in India and Rowe (1997) on Roseanne.  
Others have examined gendered discourse in mass media, including D’Acci’s work (1997) on 
abortion discourse and 1970s television documentary and Kane’s study (1997) of the ideological 
function of “freshness” in feminine hygiene commercials.  In the field of feminist critical media 
studies, scholars have employed close textual analysis as a means of uncovering meanings 
behind representations of women. Recent feminist discourse analysis has paid particular attention 
to subtle meanings in gender discourse and ideology at a time when a cultural backlash has 
emerged against feminism (McRobbie 2009, Tasker and Negra 2007, Probyn 1997). In the case 
of China, the “state feminism” that advocated gender equality (nannü pingdeng, men and 
women’s equality) under the Maoist regime (Wang 2005) has fallen by the wayside remarkably 
quickly during the Post-Mao period. Femininity and gender roles in the public discourse have 
derived much of their reactionary energy from the cultural backlash emerging in the market 
economy against the previous socialist “iron girls” (Jin 2006).  
Chapter Three studies news reports between May 1, 2000 and December 30, 2004, which 
I consider the most active period for discussions about the new marriage law amended in 2001. I 
also collected some news items from March 2008 to September 2009 in order to examine 
changes and new trends that have developed in more recent media accounts. The latter collection 
demonstrates the state media’s continuing interest in the subject of “keeping a second wife”; in 
particular, a new terminology, xiaosan (little third) has entered into the narrative, which may 
reflect a negotiation of the identification.
15
 This new term, employed interchangeably with older 
                                                          
15
 My field research in Taiwan conducted in July of 2011 shows that “xiaosan” is common term employed in 
Taiwan to identify the woman in an extramarital affair while “bao ernai” specifically refers to an affair between a 
mainland woman and a Taiwanese businessman. These differences will be left to further studies. 
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forms in the news reports, illustrates that the media narrative itself is by no means a closed 
structure; rather, it is an open site through which new definitions and ideas may emerge. Chapter 
Three focuses on 134 news reports collected in 2004 and 2006, and 50 pieces collected in 2009. 
In total, there are 194 news reports collected from Jinyang Wang(金羊网), a news website run by 
the Yangcheng Evening News (Yangcheng Wanbao, 羊城晚报), one of the giant news corporations 
under China’s state capitalism.16  By typing the key word ernai (the second wife) into the 
website’s search engine, I was able to collect a number of items containing this crucial term.  
Some of these news reports derive originally from a variety of national and local newspapers, 
including the xinhua news agency, the news website of the CCP’s institutional newspaper— The 
People’s Daily, along with provincial and city newspapers, while others had previously appeared 
in the corporation’s own newspapers. Most of these news reports appear to have been widely 
circulated through repeated citations by different news websites and newspapers in other 
provinces of the PRC. Among these items, I singled out 194 news reports pertinent to the subject 
of “keeping a second wife”.17 
Subsequently, I divided these news articles into two categories for the purposes of a 
content analysis: stories and commentaries. There are 139 news stories and 55 news 
commentaries identified in the collection. I first examined the usage of the term “keeping a 
second wife” in the news and coded the content of each news story. I also observed and 
categorized the main storylines and differentiate between the types of advice given. In particular, 
                                                          
16
 The news corporation of Yangcheng wanbao owns its news website, jinyang wang, bringing together several 
newspapers run by the news corporation, which is under the supervision of the provincial Department of 
Propaganda. It is one of the most influential news corporations under China’s capitalist regime.  
17
 Irrelevant items are those ones that use the term of “ernai” but talk about irrelevant events such as football teams. 
In these items, the key word “ernai” is linguistically borrowed to refer to something “informal”, “illegal” “minor” 
and the like.  
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I pay close attention to the news descriptions in terms of gendered morality and representations 
of femininity vis-a-vis masculinity.                                                                                                                                                                 
ETHNOGRAPHY OF MEDIA 
 
Apart from the analysis of “encoding”, examining the reception of news is particularly 
important to this study.  With reference to the theories of cultural studies, textual analysis is 
detached from media culture in everyday life. Meanings contained in the media text cannot attain 
completion without the audience’s participation. Both Williams’ notion of culture and Hall’s 
encoding/decoding model consider audience members to be active subjects creating meaning 
from the signs contained in media (Hall 1973).  
 Despite criticisms of Hall’s model of encoding/decoding that characterize it as a closed 
relation between texts and recipients, the concept does serve as an important tool in my 
examination of audiences’ analyses of media texts. The model should not be understood as a 
closed system but as a useful constellation of ideas that we can add something onto. It is 
compatible with a methodological approach that focuses on everyday life experience. I link the 
process of “decoding” to the relation between media messages and everyday life (rather than the 
relation between messages and the readings of the messages); hence, “decoding” becomes 
heterogeneous and contingent upon the experiences of individual audience members.  
I bring different methodological strategies to bear upon my investigation of the media 
reception. Audience research in particular asks how different people understanding media 
messages and create meanings, and studies the ways in which those media are embedded in 
social, political, and economic systems.  Also, the audience is not understood as a monolithic 
group that receives the messages in the same way. An understanding of the plurality of audience 
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interaction with the media messages calls for situated audience research that uses qualitative 
methods of audience ethnography. The methodological tradition of cultural studies thus guides 
this dissertation into an ethnographical study of media. Pioneering scholars, such as Ien Ang 
(1985), Janice Radway (1995 and 2003), Joke Hermes (1995), Jennifer Hayward (2003) and 
Diana Crane (2003), have conducted audience research intended to develop a cultural 
understanding of media reception. Using ethnographic techniques and qualitative research 
methods, these scholars have examined the ways in which audience members respond to media 
messages. Their studies reveal interpretive and creative readings performed by media audience 
members—their articulation of cultural meanings and their insertion of such readings into daily 
lives.  
In addition, feminist ethnographic research strives to investigate power relations from 
“the standpoint of women” by engaging with women’s experience and agency (Harding 1987, 
Grossberg and Wartella 1996, 210). This approach to feminist sociological theory sheds 
important light upon the use of audience studies to gauge women’s responses. Recent feminist 
audience studies have taken gender relations into account by examining the articulation, 
production and interpretation of media texts and in differentiating gendered audiences (Ang 
1985, Hermes 1995, Hayward 2000, Radway 2003, Yang 2005). Moreover, the feminist strategy 
of talking-back to media texts focuses research investigation on how female audiences negotiate, 
resist, and re-interpret identity in opposition to the dominant discourse in media (Russo and 
Jackson 2002.) Hence, in comparison with the gendered representation that comes under the 
purview of this textual analysis, my data collection focused on the interpretations that women 
audience members offered in accordance with the methodology of feminist audience studies that 
has guided feminist researchers to conduct critical studies by bridging feminist epistemology and 
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methodology. A feminist epistemological approach focuses on power, gender, and sexuality and 
digs into the interrelationship between knowledge, experience, and reality (Skinner, Hester and 
Malos 2005). This approach to my research provides reliable data on women’s experiences in 
relation to the media representation of “second wives”.  
Three factors motivated me to add class component to this research. First, “keeping a 
second wife” is a class-coded issue (the “new rich” men and the lower-status women who are 
either urban workers or rural migrants in the media narrative) (Xiao 2011). It is important to 
remember that “keeping a second wife” is an issue related to the understanding of masculinity, 
and that Chinese masculinity has been substantially reshaped by the market economy. 
Consequently, masculinity is tightly linked to class identity in post-Mao era gender politics 
(Zheng 2007).  Second, the media discourse of “managing marriage” is preliminarily targeting 
the middle class wives in the time of “family crisis”. The media stories (and marriage 
consultants, “emotion experts”) suggest and lecture middle class wives to take heed of the 
“family crisis” and accordingly to adopt strategies in order to control the male’s sexual nature 
(i.e., promiscuity) and hold the family together. Third, the emerging landscape of class 
distinction is characterized by the rise of the new rich vis-à-vis the old “proletariat” and the new 
working class (composed mainly of rural migrant workers) (Carrillo and Goodman 2012).  Class 
has affected media consumption and as a result, the different media resources that each class 
depends upon may provide different views of “keeping a second wife”.   Based on all of these 
factors, I take class into account while investigating perceptions of issues related to marriage and 
sexuality (Chapters Four and Five).   
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The data for Chapters Four, Five and Six derives mainly from in-depth interviews with 
45 women, conducted during the summer of 2011.
18
  Because I was interested in class, I 
recruited both middle class and working class women through the snowballing method, via 
acquaintances, relatives and personal networks. In the urban settings, some of the participants are 
acquaintances of my own family members, my friends’ students, and some of them were 
introduced by the participants after the first round of interviews. A former colleague of mine, a 
journalist, arranged for me to interview the rural migrants in the two factories in Huizhou city. 
Some of the interviews were conducted individually, while due to circumstances some of them 
were conducted in focus groups, which included one middle class group, two female college 
student groups and two migrant worker groups. The interview with middle class focus group was 
arranged by an acquaintance of my family who was also interviewed by me.  This group consists 
of two medical doctors, one nurse and one dentist. The focus group interview was conducted in 
the doctors’ afternoon nap room in the hospital. Two friends of mine who were university 
professors arranged for me to meet their female students for the college student groups, and the 
informants consisted of 8 college students. The interviews occurred respectively in the 
professor’s office and a chemical laboratory.19  My inclusion of college students was to examine 




In total, the interviewees include 19 “middle class” women, 8 female college students    ( 
for the purpose of looking into age difference) and 18 working class women including urban 
factory workers, former laid off workers in the state sector and migrant workers in private 
                                                          
18
 I received ethics approval from Concordia University for interviews before I started my fieldwork.  
19
 The interviews were conducted without their professors’ presence. 
20
  Women in both of two migrant groups were allowed to be off-duty to participate in the interviews without 
deduction of their wage. None of managerial stuff attended the interviews.  
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factories. The middle class women I interviewed are from Chongqing, a metropolis in the South 
West of China that used to be an industrial city where the old “proletariat” gathered during the 
Maoist era and became a site of massive layoffs throughout the 1990s. Also, recent 
developments in this region on the maps of China’s economic blueprint have led to its 
designation as an “advanced” area, with a corresponding rise of “the new rich”. These middle 
class women included professionals and housewives whose husbands belong to the “new rich” 
class. Their ages ranged from 31 to 55. By way of contrast, at the lower end of the social ladder, 
the eight working class women I interviewed in Chongqing included former laid off workers and 
workers in state-owned factories. Most of the urban workers were in their 40s, and the youngest 
one was 29. None of these women is married to a middle class husband who would have moved 
their class category upward.  
While the working class women in Chongqing were willing to speak, the migrant workers 
I interviewed in Guangdong were not actively participating in the discussions. In total, I 
interviewed ten women working in a sports bag factory and an electronics factory in Huizhou, a 
Southern coastal city of Guangdong Province.  Their ages ranged from 18 to 42. I recruited these 
women through my personal contact. The interviews with rural migrants were conducted in a 
focus-group style in the manager’s meeting rooms (both groups consisted of five women), and 
each group took two hours to discuss questions related to the topic of “keeping a second wife”.  
 The voices of middle class women, urban workers, and migrant workers are not equally 
represented in this research. This is due to two reasons: the subject position of each social group 
and the flawed process of my interviews with migrant workers.  In contrast to the middle class 
women’s eloquence and confidence when employing current popular discourse and the urban 
workers’ empowerment by the Maoist terms, migrant workers failed to narrate their experience 
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in their own terms. The under-representation of migrant workers’ voice in this research is salient. 
As Adrienne Rich (1979, 204) points out, “Where language and naming are power, silence is 
oppression”.  This not only reflects social inequality, but also increases the challenges of 
conducting fieldwork. 
 Following some scholarly categorization (Chan and Ngai 2009, Ngai and Lu 2010), this 
research identifies both migrant workers (the new working class) and urban workers (the old 
“proletariat”) as the working class. However, it is important to note that migrant workers’ social 
status and cultural and political resources are rather different from urban working class (Lu et al. 
2012, Research Group for Social Structure in Contemporary China 2005). Migrant workers are a 
social group that is the most exploited on the factory floor and discriminated and stigmatized in 
the discourse (Li et al. 2007, Wong et al. 2007, Yan 2008). Their social condition requires 
interviewing techniques to ensure full participation. Bringing out their agency and their 
perspectives on their lives is the challenge of fieldwork. The problem with the two focus groups 
of migrant workers primarily lies in the “asymmetrical power relations of the research 
interviewer and the interviewed subject” (Kvale 2002) due to the fact that I was seen an urban 
person affiliated with a foreign university. Unfortunately, the arrangement of my interviewing 
migrant workers reinforced the asymmetrical power relations, and the ways of the interviewer- 
interviewee interaction exacerbated by presumptions arising from arrangements affected my data 
collection. 
 Two migrant worker focus groups were arranged by a former journalist who was a 
colleague of mine, now the head of a quasi-official organization and the wife of a high-profile 
leader of the city. Officials’ wives (and relatives) in contemporary China often function as the 
nexus of guanxi (social networks) practice (Li 2011). Because I was introduced as her friend, 
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managers did their best to “satisfy” my needs since my guanxi with the official’s wife worked as 
the codes of social conduct. The focus groups were arranged before I arrived at the city. The 
interviewees were chosen and organized by the managers. The location was the managers’ 
meeting rooms, which were the symbol of authority where the workers could not enter without 
permission. The whole process was arranged like an official visit. The workers were given a 
special permit to take two hours off, and the workers performed the interviews as a job task. All 
of these factors contributed to the silence of migrant workers. For example, some of the workers 
barely said a word over the course of the interviews. Often, they wanted to know my opinions 
and made an effort to answer my questions in a “correct” way. Most of the working class women 
from rural areas felt embarrassed and shy. This is similar to the situation that Jacka (2006) 
encountered during her interviews with “dagong mei” (rural migrant sisters) who claimed “not 
knowing how to speak”.  Therefore, as a result, the analysis of working class women does not 




 The Internet in China has opened the age of contention with the ascendance of online 
activism and a number of online communities that have helped to dilute the “culture of official-
centricity” in recent years (Yang 2009, 224). These tools give voice to the voiceless and provide 
a civic space within the authoritarian state. Encouraged by the fact that digital ethnography 
(Leibold 2011) has become a more frequently employed method during the age of internet, the 
data for Chapter Six also derives from social media in China that is less censored than the 
conventional press media. I began to collect data on the linkages between “keeping a second 
wife” and corruption through BBS, blogs and micro-blogs in 2010. Moreover, I took an 
immersion approach during the process of data collection. I signed up for a micro-blog (weibo) 
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on Sina to interact with and observe discussions related to the topics of corruption and “keeping 
a second wife”. Although major social media like Facebook and Twitter are officially blocked in 
the PRC, Chinese versions of social media like micro-blogs have emerged and experienced 
explosive growth.  The scholarship on social media in China, to date, has positively estimated the 
impact of social media in transforming China in terms of democratizing the communication of 
information (Tai 2006), promoting political openness (Zheng 2007), challenging the party-state’s 
ideology (Xiao 2011) and mobilizing collective actions (Yang 2009).  Social media in China has 
become a space for contestation, in which the party-state’s emphasis upon harmony and political 
consensus encounters challenges and conflicts. Netizens appear in the space with skeptical and 
antagonistic attitudes, forming a new model of public space that disseminates messages 
emphasizing contestation and resistance (Dayan 2008). Therefore, the method of collecting data 
from the blogosphere obviously derives from my intention to investigate and explore the 
possibilities of contesting official media discourse. 
 In summary, while drawing upon concepts derived from Cultural Studies model that have 
bridged the analysis of media discourse and the investigation of audience interpretation, this 
study attempts to move beyond the binary debate of passive/ active audience. I suggest that 
individuals are able to negotiate and contest ideological elements even while they are constrained 
by structural components. Methodologically, the multi-method approach in this study aims not 
only to provide a fuller account of social change, but also to cross the boundaries of single 
mediums and single genres presented in the classic audience research literature by incorporating 













This chapter offers a content analysis of the news accounts of “keeping a second wife”. It 
analyzes the ways in which the media has treated the topic in order to engender “family crisis”, 
through a process that Stuart Hall would describe as the “ideological construction of reality” 
(1978, 29).  I argue that concubinage was a complementary component in the traditional family 
institution, whereas “keeping a second wife” (bao ernai) is a semantic strategy that contains both 
moral condemnation and tabloid appeal. The news narrative of “keeping a second wife” suits 
Chinese journalism’s double function perfectly, allowing reporters to derive the maximum 
benefit from the loaded terminology and contents of the stories—naming the issue as 
“concubinage” and telling stories of crimes and “sexual chaos”. Hence, the news narrative is a 
signifying practice that the predominant ideology of family, marriage and sexuality employs to 
achieve social control.  
 In total, I analyze 194 news reports dating from between May 1, 2000 and December 30, 
2004 — the most active period for discussion about the new marriage law amended in 2001— 
and from March, 2008 to September, 2009, a control group added to keep track of changes and 
new trends in more recent news reports. All of these news reports were collected through 
Jinyang wang, a news website associated with Yangcheng Evening News (Yangcheng wanbao), 
located in Guangzhou—the capital of Guangdong Province. Some of the news items derive 
originally from a variety of national (e.g. the Xinhua News Agency and The People’s Daily) and 
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local newspapers (including provincial and city level press organs in other provinces), while 
others had previously appeared in the newspapers run by the Yangcheng Evening News 
corporation. I divided these news items into two categories: stories (139 items) and 
commentaries (55 items). I focus on terminology, the content of each news story, storylines and 
the dominant quality of the advice given. In particular, I pay close attention to the news 
descriptions in terms of gender roles, gendered morality and representations of femininity vis-à-
vis masculinity.  
Drawing upon Hall’s conceptualization of news and ideology, I first situate the news 
account as an ideological re-articulation of the conflicts between the longstanding discourse 
established under the Maoist regime and the increasing freedom of the private sphere since the 
beginning of the reform era. Then I take a close look at the “encoding” of the terminology with a 
focus on the convergence and divergence  between the origin of “keeping a second wife” and the 
meanings contained within its official adoption. Subsequently, I examine gendered 
representations of the three parties involved in the news stories—“second wives”, wives and 
husbands— through which I sketch the dominant image of gender roles within the family and 
marriage. Then, I lay out several types of news stories focusing on crimes and dangers that 
appeared repeatedly in the news media: homicide, injury, corruption, disputes over property and 
sexual chaos, all of which are used to construct the “family crisis” (jiating weiji, 家庭危机). The 
rhetoric of “crisis” contends that sexual conduct that trespasses beyond the bounds of marriage 
shakes the foundation of the social structure. In the final section of this chapter, I examine the 
official response to “keeping a second wife”, exploring the reactions of state agencies including 




News and ideology: situating “keeping a second wife” 
The Cultural Studies tradition suggests an approach to news media which privileges the 
empirical analysis of journalistic encoding practices (Hall 1973 and 1980). Employing a 
structuralist perspective, Stuart Hall (1978) assesses the news media’s strategies for “making an 
event intelligible”. In a study on mugging in the British news media, for example, Hall (1978) 
systematically investigates an ideological implication in encoding these events during the course 
of a moral panic over mugging during the 1970s. Hall (1978) demonstrates that news events are 
coded in order to serve the needs of everyday “ideological practice”. For Hall, encoding is a 
process through which meanings are produced (1973). The nexus of the encoding process lies in 
the ways in which codes of media are linked to ideology. Hall claims that news transforms the 
“historical’ into the ‘natural’, and through this transformation news stories “repress their 
ideological dimensions by representing” events and producing meanings as the “real world” 
(1973, 84). Moreover, for Hall, ideology is transmitted through representation in the news that 
signifies understandings of the world by using language, signs and images for communication. 
The process is achieved through the symbolic construction of meaning as well as the practice of 
representing others (Hall 1997). For Hall and other cultural theorists, representation is a medium 
through which meanings are produced by power (Curran and Morley 2006).  
Hall demonstrates that news media naturalizes ideological structures in news production. 
In his encoding model, denotation that works through the process of “naturalization” conceals 
the practices of coding in the media whereas connotation “intersects with the deep semantic 
codes of a culture and take on additional, more active ideological dimensions” (1980, 133). For 
Hall (1973), encoding is not completed in isolation, but works with the dominant ideology to 
ensure its hegemony throughout society. The encoding process includes reporting, reflecting and 
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orchestrating. Reporting and reflecting work to code events within the framework of the 
dominant ideology, whereas orchestrating aims to win the audience’s consent and to shape the 
audience’s decoding process within the given ideological structure. Hall demonstrates that the 
encoding process functions particularly during “crisis time”, in which news media report and 
reflect on an event so as to win consent in accordance with the ideological script (Hall 1974). 
Although Hall’s conceptual framework and analysis are theorized from and make 
reference to the British news media, Hall’s insights reveal complex relations between news and 
ideology and thus can shed light on the news media’s narrative of “keeping a second wife” in 
China. News is a social production, the bureaucratic organization of media, the structure of news 
values and the construction of news stories play key roles in promoting the dominant ideological 
interpretation of “the problematic reality” (Hall 1978, 56). “Keeping a second wife” becomes 
news worthy in the conjuncture of recent news media reforms and the party-state’s continuing 
interventionist approach to individuals’ private affairs.  Post-Mao journalism has two primary 
functions—targeting the market and news consumers while continuing to function as the party’s 
propaganda (Keane, Hong and Donald 2002, Latham, Thompson and Klein 2006, Li 2000,). The 
old institution of concubinage has been imaginatively represented in popular culture and literary 
work, such as films and fiction. The news media’s use of the term accommodates the industry’s 
search for “extraordinariness” and novelty. On the one hand, it fits into the recent trend toward 
“soft news”, and is helpful in targeting news consumers via tabloid-style exposure of 
extramarital affairs; on the other hand, the issue itself has attracted the attention of state 
authorities, for whom reporting the issue is in line with Chinese journalism’s imperative to 
deliver ideological messages. Hence, the news narrative that tells of a resurgence of concubinage 
demands scrutiny in order to reveal what is behind the narrative. Indeed, Hall’s critique of news 
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media representation helps us to understand how deeply rooted the (re)construction of “keeping a 
second wife” is within the ideology of marriage and sexuality established since the early 1950s.  




One of the numerous official posters in urban China representing an ideal family 
positioned in the background image of “modernity”. This kind of poster started to appear 
in the urban settings since the 1980s.  This was one in the 1980s. 
(source:http://photo.blog.sina.com.cn/photo/6f5e212ahacd303bd9f2b) 
 
When speaking of photographical images, both Hall (1985 and 1997) and Barthes (1981) 
argue that an image is a representation of implied meanings structured by the dominant ideology. 
61 
 
The ideological image of family and marriage in the post Mao regime can be illustrated through 
the official posters installed in streets in many cities (figure 1). The massive poster articulates the 
PRC’s ideal image of family. The image conveys three key concepts — heteronormative 
monogamy, family harmony, and the family organization of “one couple one child” within a 
marital status — all of which constitute the PRC’s prescribed way of living. This poster’s family 
image contributes to the project of nation building and modern industrialization, symbolized by 
the “modern” and “civilized” family. In contrast, the term “keeping a second wife” connotes 
three opposite elements—polygamy, family disharmony and children out of wedlock—all of 
which are linked to a “backward”, “uncivilized” way of living, signifying a crisis of the official 
image represented in the poster.   
 The “crisis” of the family created in the news media focusing on “keeping a second wife” 
relies on what Hall (1984) calls a “historical reconstruction”, which is signaled by the label as 
well as is engraved in framing storylines, the figure of the “second wife” as “the source of 
troubles”. It is also built on gender ideology governing sex nature and gender roles, which are 
used as the major elements in fabricating storylines and explaining the causes of “family crisis”. 
In this section, I focus on the ways in which the new reports of “keeping a second wife” create a 
“family crisis”, through which “keeping a second wife” becomes the state’s target while the 
narrative is organized to deliver messages supporting the dominant ideology of marriage and 
sexuality. I analyze the label of extramarital affairs, the gendered representation of wives, 
husbands and “second wives” and the plots associated with crimes and sexual chaos that are 





THE REBIRTH OF “CONCUBINAGE”:  A CRISIS OF MONOGAMY? 
When extramarital affairs are labeled as “keeping a second wife”, the terminology itself 
creates a crisis in the PRC’s family institution and subsequently justifies the state’s intervention, 
evidenced by the language of moral condemnation and the 2001 marriage law. As Hall (1978, 
19) points out, “labels are important, especially when applied to dramatic public events. They not 
only place and identify those events; they assign events to a context. Thereafter the use of the 
label is likely to mobilize this whole referential context, with all its associated meanings and 
connotations”. 
 The news stories employ the term of bao ernai (“keeping a second wife”) as a synonym 
for extramarital affairs, strongly invoking the old institution of concubinage. This usage has been 
particularly prevalent when the state, the media and society have reacted to news of extramarital 
affairs between married higher status men and lower status women. The re-appearance of the 
terminology does not necessarily imply the rebirth of the old institution in China today. Instead, 
the linkage between the practice and the old institution ought to be scrutinized as a “journalistic 
ritual” (Hall 1984). In his discussion of the British news media’s reporting of the Falklands’ 
crisis, Hall (1984) highlights an instance of historical reconstruction in journalistic practice. Hall 
discovers that news “narrative doesn’t come from anywhere. We mainly tell stories we’ve told 
before, or we borrow from the whole inventory of telling stories, and of narratives” (1984, 5).  
The label of “keeping a second wife” signals the history of concubinage. Either “ernai” or the 
later version “xiaosan” (the little third), is re-drawn from the available inventory found within 
the historical lexicon. The reappearance of the old terminology in the news narrative serves to re-
articulate the monogamous sexuality previously enforced, as well as to deny the increasing space 
for sexual freedom. Moreover, the resurgence of the terminology denies the concept of divorce 
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introduced at the beginning of the twentieth century by Chinese modernizers and subsequently 
suggests a strong monogamous idea embedded in the traditional Chinese family institution, 
which served as a permanent bond between two families rather than between two individual 
parties. This is an observed trend toward increasing individualization in the Chinese family.
21
 
The trope of “keeping a second wife” originated with truck drivers in Hong Kong who 
traveled frequently to Guangdong Province, bringing the terminology and practice into mainland 
China just as the state began to implement its open market policies. It is said that this group 
initiated the practice of “keeping a second wife” with mainland women (Smart and Long 2001). 
22
 Because of the large income gap between Hong Kong and the mainland during the 1980s and 
the 1990s, the lorry drivers experienced unprecedented upward social mobility once they crossed 
the border. These men leapt from a working class position in Hong Kong to the status of rich 
men with a foreign identity. Hence, within less than one hour’s driving distance, their working 
class masculinity was transformed into a far more valued masculine identity. These married 
middle aged lorry drivers were said to have found their “second youth” in mainland China by 
setting up a second household with young mainland women. Concubinage was outlawed in the 
British colony of Hong Kong in 1971.
23
  “Keeping a second wife” (bao yinai in Cantonese) is a 
term referring to concubinge in Hong Kong. Later, this Cantonese expression unexpectedly 
                                                          
21  The traditional Chinese family was a monogamous institution— rather than polygamy in some Islamic 
countries—for uniting two families with a complementary system, concubinage, to grant a particular privilege to 
men for extramarital relationships and to secure patriarchal lineage. See Goody 1990. Also see Watson, J. 1980 and  
Watson, R. 1991. The traditional family institution was vigorously interrupted by both KMT government and later 
the CCP regime, in which marriage has become a matter for two individual parties. See Yan 2009. 
22
  Tu Qiao, a news reporter in Guangdong who has gained fame for her stories of “second wives”, focused on the 
relationships between mainland women and married men from Hong Kong in Shenzhen, the “Special Economic 
Zone”.  See her serial news stories: Tu 2004. “Guanzhu ernai chun” (Concerning about ‘second wife’ villages). 
Yangcheng Wanbao, April 18-May 25. The collection of these stories was later published as a book. See Tu. 2004. 
Kuhun, yi ge yinchang nüxia wodi caifang shilu (Bitter Marriage: A Journalist Report by a Covert Female 
Warrior).Beijing: Zuojia chuban she. 
23
 The British had ruled Hong Kong in accordance with the local customs and laws established in the Qing dynasty 
since 1842.  
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spread throughout mainland China during the early 1990s and afterwards, despite the fact that 
concubinage had been abolished there by the KMT in 1930s,
24
 and again by the even more 
vigorous efforts of the CCP during the early 1950s.
25
 
 The terminology quickly diverged from its original meaning to refer to a different context 
in mainland China. The state media borrowed a Cantonese term that originally referred to 
particular relationships between married Hong Kong men and mainland women in Shenzhen, the 
first “special economic zone” in Deng Xiaoping’s economic experiment of the early 1980s, but 
encoded it with an ideological component designed to reinforce the monogamous sexual customs 
of the PRC. This adoption of the term borrowed from Cantonese installs a confusing camouflage 
in the identification of the issue. For example, “keeping a second wife” has recently come under 
scrutiny as a subject for studies mainly conducted by scholars based in Hong Kong and Taiwan 
that examine the causes and the nature of the phenomenon (Smart and Lang 2002, Shen 2005, So 
2003, Tam 2004, Xiao 2011, Yuen 2004). However, both the state’s construction and the 
scholarly studies have dwelled on the notion of the “rebirth of concubinage”, without ever asking 
the question: is “keeping a second wife” a resurgence of concubinage? The label is important in 
order to properly identify and define the issue. 
 This question is not as simple as the term suggests. If we accept the news at face value, 
we may take it for granted that concubinage experienced a resurrection during the “market 
economy” of the post Mao era — a time when individuals have been granted more “sexual 
                                                          
24
 In 1935, the KMT government revised Criminal Code by including men in the adultery law for equality between 
men and women to oppose retention of the late imperial law that punished only wives for adultery. Concubinage, 
thus, was considered adultery under the Criminal Code of the Republic of China. See Tran 2009. 
25 The term adultery in the CCP regime did not appear in Marriage Law, but it was strictly monitored by 
administrative regulations. See Diamant 2000. It is unclear why the CCP did not use the term “adultery” in its 
marriage law. The legal term close to “adultery” in the CCP’s marriage law is “bigamy”. Over the course of 




freedom”.  However, the news is never neutral. Rather, it is constructed within the specific 
framework of the dominant ideology (Hall 1978, 1973, 1982, 1984). Within the given framework 
of family, marriage and sexuality established during the early 1950s, neither engaging in 
extramarital relationships nor engaging in sexual relationships outside of wedlock can be 
considered legitimate and/or morally neutral activities.  Indeed, the re-emergence of the term 
“keeping a second wife” is rather ideological in the news media’s playful narrative.  According 
to the CCP’s discourse on marriage and the family, concubinage was a notorious practice 
condemned as an “ugly vice” that deprived women of human dignity (Yang 1959) and a 
“backward” barrier to the trajectory of the nation’s progress toward modernity (McMillan 2006).  
When we remember that the linguistic formulation/categorization of particular social events was 
a consciously undertaken and politically sensitive aspect of the CCP’s history and its regime 
(Schoenhals 1992), it becomes manifest that this terminology is linked to connotations of 
“backwardness” and “immorality” in the CCP’s political lexicon, as well as in the collective 
memory, which links a man’s extramarital relationship to moral condemnation, an imaginary 
eroticism, and a social context that reveals economic and gender inequality. 
  It is rather an extraordinary event that the news stories of “keeping a second wife” have 
recently assumed so much importance in the Chinese media. This effort to revive memories of 
the historical form of concubinage and its abolition has taken place under social conditions 
defined, on the one hand, by the party-state’s use of ideological language inherited from the 
Maoist era in order to maintain social control and, on the other hand, while advocating a brand of 
pluralism within the private sphere that has led to a gradual opening up of the culture (Farrer 
2002, Farrer and Sun 2003).  The strategic use of “concubinage” narratives helps to generate a 
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“family crisis” that will justify calls for legislative sanctions against sexual practices out of 
wedlock.  
“Concubine” and “concubinage” are the terms that equate (on the political level) to 
“vice”, “ugliness,” “incivility” and “backwards” social practices in the PRC’s political lexicon. 
These terms offered legitimate meanings that could be easily understood by the mainland 
population as descriptors for the increasing “sexual chaos” of the post-Mao period. “Ernai” is a 
term that functions as a label identifying a woman as a concubine, and through the label the 
rebirth of “concubinage” occurred. Ernai literally means “a second wife” (minor wife/concubine, 
xiao laopo). This term became obsolete after the 1950s family reforms, but has since re-emerged 
as a popular news construction and a part of the everyday lexicon.  Er (second) suggests a rank 
(number two/minor/younger) that is coexistent with, but lower in status than the first/legal 
wife.
26
   
In comparison with qie, the formal term for concubine, ernai is an informal term. The 
terminology itself sketches a female figure. Ernai also is playfully punned as “two breasts”, 
emphasizing the woman’s role as an erotic object (figure 2).  She is “kept”/ “supported” by a 
married man, lacking the social status of marriage (meiyou mingfen) that is considered the 
ultimate destination of all women. Therefore she is a materially-oriented whore, transgressive but 
tragic. The terminology also implies male power.  Bao (keeping/support) specifically highlights 
the similarity between the old institution and the new practice, in which the married man has the 
financial power to support “the other woman”. Indeed, bao alludes directly to the lower social 
status of the women through marking and elevating Chinese masculinity. While wen (cultural 
attainment) and wu (martial valour) were the main elements in traditional Chinese masculinity 
                                                          
26
 In oral usage, the legal wife traditionally was addressed as danai (Cantonese), dalaopo (Mandarin). 
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(Louie 2002), the contemporary news narrative indicates that economic power has become the 
most important aspect of Chinese masculinity. “Bao” not only suggests a dependent and passive 
status for the woman, but also situates her as a sexual object. Hence, the terminology of “keeping 




The term “Bao ernai” often is punned in an erotic way. For example, in 2010, a bra advertisement 
in Shenzhen was presented with a female figure in front of an underwear store. The banner beneath the 
billboard says that “bao ernai underwear”, and it plays with two meanings: “underwear for keeping second 
wife” and“underwear for covering up two breasts”. (http://www.laifudao.com/tupian/13639.htm), 




The (re)birth of the terminology indicates that “keeping a second wife” in the news media 
is an ideological construction. The meaning of the terminology ideologically refers to a crisis of 
the monogamous institution, the assumed core of modern family that is seen as the foundation of 
society.
27
  Sexual practices that occur out of wedlock are violations of the dominant ideology of 
family/marriage and sexuality. The rebirth of the terminology indicates that within the 
ideological framework there is no available language to address extramarital relationships. The 
emergence of new terms, such as xiaosan (the little third) and qingfu (mistress), does not alter the 
main issue described here.  
Nevertheless, the newly emerged term serves as satire: metaphorical, playful and 
plausible in the usage of the news stories.  It refers to concubinage but diverges from the old 
institution. The shift between “na qie”, an old term meaning “taking a concubine”, and the new 
term “bao ernai”, distinguishes current polygamous behaviour from the traditional family 
system. The new term sketches a different context from the old institution. The terminological 
shift from “qie” (concubine) to “ernai” (“a second wife”) reflects one of the outcomes of the 
Chinese drive to modernize over the course of the twentieth century. After all, the disappearance 
of “qie” from the contemporary lexicon implies a political achievement of the CCP, dating back 
to the abolition of concubinage via the family reforms of the 1950s.  The resurgence of “bao 
ernai,” on the other hand, speaks to the current political concerns of corruption and the 
maintenance of “harmonious families”, about which I will speak more shortly.  
 In short, the available language retrieved from the old institution serves to denounce 
relationships out of wedlock and the current pluralization of sexual practices. It constructs a 
                                                          
27
 Hu Jintao, the former General Party Secretary of the CCP and the president of the PRC (2003-2013), emphasized 
this idea in his speech on the 100th Anniversary of the International Women’s Day in 2010. See Chen 2010. 
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crisis in the PRC’s family institution, and subsequently serves to justify the state’s intervention.  
The usage of the terminology reveals that there is no room for sexual intimacy out of wedlock in 
the discourse; and, as a consequence, the terminology in the news reports tends to paint all 
women in extramarital affairs as concubines. This labeling practice is significant, as it serves to 
stigmatize and stereotype women participating in these relationships. Because of the ideological 
factors involved, the identification of women in the usage of the terminology is rather vague in 
the news reports. As it has been variously used, an ernai could be a lover/girlfriend, a mistress, 
an adulterous wife, and/or a sex worker. This wide application of ernai to any woman in an 
extramarital affair provides little space for a diverse understanding of sexual practices in the 
ideological framework, and creates a vast discrepancy between the identification and the reality. 
The terminology works to simplify the motivations and disparage the characters of women in 
extramarital relationships. With the creation of a materialistic woman involved in sexual 
intimacy out of wedlock, the news narrative forges a similar link between the woman in the news 
and the concubine in the history books – a link that brands her as a “second wife”.   
THE SCRIPTS OF GENDER: PROMISCUITY, WIVES, AND WHORES 
Social and political issues are attributed to problems caused by sexual “nature”, which 
leads to a talk of morality, particularly of “women’s morality”.  This construction of gender 
based on an essentialist understanding of biological differences is expressed as “common sense” 
(i.e. the “natural” way of living for men and women). The news media’s construction of 
“keeping a second wife” appeals to popular “common sense” and carries convincing messages to 
the audience because of entrenched beliefs regarding gender roles and the “nature” of male and 
female sexes in Chinese society. As Nowell-Smith points out, “the key to common sense is that 
the ideas it embodies are not so much incorrect as uncorrected and taken for granted…common 
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sense consists of all those ideas which can be tagged onto existing knowledge without 
challenging it” (cited in Hall 1978, 154). The entire narrative rests on implied assumptions based 
on gender interpretations which govern male sex nature and the bad morals of transgressive 
women. 
In her path-breaking work on the discourse of gender and sexuality in the PRC, Evans 
(1997) describes the state’s binary construction of sexuality in the discourse of marriage and 
sexuality. Men and women are defined by biological difference. The public discourse contrasts a 
strong male with a weak female. Female sexuality has been defined as the biologically passive 
and subservient counterpart of a more active and autonomous male sexuality. The essential 
understanding of gender roles defined by biological difference between men and women is the 
key to deciphering the family crisis through representations of the three parties tangled in an 
affair. Three figures play their parts in the drama plotted between male and female sexualities. 
Idealized representations of men and women are reduced to the stereotypically financially 
successful male and the physically attractive female.   
First, in spite of the market ideology that embraces the party’s slogan, “to be rich is 
glorious”, the characteristic representation of the newly rich subject in the news media is as a 
hedonist polluted by money. The key to male sexual identity is culturally understood as 
promiscuity (Chang 1999). Formerly “emasculated” by the Maoist state’s laws and 
administrative regulations for governing sexual behaviours (Zheng 2009), the post-socialist 
state’s withdrawal of sexual regulations has permitted the revival of (state) repressed male 
promiscuity. The sex industry, extramarital affairs and other types of sexual practices out of 
wedlock are seen as evidence of “sexual freedom” unleashed by the post-socialist regime (Farrer 
2002, Pan 2006). The market ideology has added one primary element to Chinese masculinity: 
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financial success. The men in news reports are often identified as businessmen and governmental 
officials who make up China’s new rich.  The combination of these two essentialist traits (male 
monetary power and male sexual promiscuity) work to construct a portrait of the new rich (an 
almost exclusively masculine social category) as a threat to the PRC’s monogamous family 
institution. A popular saying that “a man who gets rich will become bad” reflects the social 
perception of the new rich. News stories and commentaries embellish upon the popular saying by 
describing men as “lower body animals” (xia banshen dongwu), and propounding masculine 
dictums such as: “having a wild flower smells better than an indoor flower” (jia hua meiyou 
yehua xiang) and “off with the old and on with the new” (xixin yanjiu). Financial power becomes 
a means to undo the Maoist restraints on male sexuality and to reactivate patterns of promiscuity. 
News commentaries suggest that many wealthy men have a “red flag” (the legal wife) standing 
straight at home while flying “colourful flags” (mistresses) outside of the home (jiali hongqi 
budao, waimian caiqi piaopiao), hinting at the coexistence of the state ideology (red flag) and 
current pluralism in sexual practices (colourful flags), as well as of marriage/monogamy (red 
flag) and concubinage (colourful flags).  
On the other side of the story stands the popular construction of female sexual identity. 
The “nature” of the female sex is represented as weak and sexually passive; hence, she is 
represented as “the kept woman”, a sexual object who exists to satisfy the man.  The construction 
of female sexuality is derived from the sexual imperatives imposed upon women. While male 
sexuality is naturalized as promiscuity, female sexuality is defined primarily through a woman’s 
capacity for devotion both physical and mental. As a result, women’s sexual behaviour out of 
wedlock is culturally described as “red apricot flowers climbing out of the wall” and “ flying 
willow catkins on flowing water” (hongxin chuqiang, shuixing yanghua) (Chang 1999).  “Fallen” 
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women are stigmatized as “broken shoes” (poxie) in the common Chinese saying.  Based on this 
understanding of female sexuality, the culture distinguishes sharply between two types of female 
subject: the good woman (wife) and the whore (second wife). In speaking of “good women”, the 
news reports describe idealized wives boasting all of the virtues culturally ascribed to a “good 
woman”. The wife becomes a paragon of her gendered role and stands for monogamy, a position 
which bestows upon her the power of morality, a power that gives her considerable leverage vis-
à-vis an errant husband in news reports of corrupt officials. Bearing her wifehood with 
traditional (good) virtues, she is described as a woman “starting the family from scratch and 
managing the household through hardship” (baishou qijia, xinku chijia). When the husband 
achieves the status of “blue chip stock” (jiyougu, meaning the desirable masculinity) with his 
success in either business or officialdom, she becomes the “husk and chaff” (zaokang zhiqi), a 
term referring to a woman’s aging and the corresponding loss of her physical appeal. 
 Nevertheless, the “husk and chaff” connotes the “bitterness” that the wife eats (chiku)28  
in managing the household before the man’s prosperity. Culturally, a wife is expected to sacrifice 
herself for the man’s success. In return, she will never be dismissed due to her devotion, in spite 
of the fact that she is “an old woman with a sallow face” (huang lianpo), a cultural image 
referring to the loss of physical attraction. In spite of the wife’s permanent status in the marriage, 
the factor of her loss of physical attraction helps to trigger the promiscuous man’s infidelity. 
Below a news report offers an example that interprets “family crisis” caused by male promiscuity 
vis-à-vis wives’ loss of physical attraction. 
Some “muddy legs” who used to combat nature in the field now have become powerful 
village and township entrepreneurs after they left the farming land behind. The husbands 
have transformed their old appearance into a new feature whereas the wives still keep the 
                                                          
28
  For the cultural and political implications of this common expression, “eating bitterness” (or “eating husk and 
chaff”, particularly during the Maoist period, see Manning 2010 and 2011. 
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awkward appearance; therefore, some entrepreneurs began to be “psychopathically 
disturbed”. They eventually did not return home at night, but visited houses of ill repute. 
In order to solve these entrepreneurs’ “family crisis”, the department concerned held a 
“wife training course”, calling on the wives to get rid of “husk” and “chaff” (the wives’ 
distasteful appearance) and to give a fresh feeling to the husbands who are off with the 
old and on with the new: “a new wife everyday”. 29  
 
In the other female category come the whores, who echo a historical script of the “bad 
women” that endanger “social stability” and “family harmony”. Whores are “foxy witches” (huli 
jing) in the traditional Chinese narrative tradition, which presents them as youthful and beautiful 
female bodies metamorphosed from a non-human creature (the spirit of the fox). These women 
seduce men for the purpose of sucking the masculine essence (jingxie), taking advantage of his 
indulgence in copulating with the fox (and later killing him).
30
  The classic popular narrative of 
foxy witches is a cultural response to women who transgress the script of gender ideology that 
codes feminine virtue as a woman’s sacrificing herself for men. Transgressive women violate the 
codes by which women are measured according to certain norms and limitations. Unlike males, 
who are naturalized as “promiscuous”, the cultural script presents foxy witches (and “second 
wives”) as “incomprehensible” as women, who “only becomes intelligible through becoming 
gendered in conformity with recognizable standards of gender intelligibility” (Butler 1999, 22). 
The stories of foxy witches linger on as fictional constructs, and the narrative role plays in the 
cultural production of misogyny. The idea of the “incomprehensible” women, and the concept of 
the “foxy witch”, has long been applied to transgressive women. These women are understood as 
“morally fallen”, dangerous, and intent upon ruining men’s lives. Tradition abounds with 
                                                          
29
 “Shanghai juban taitai xuexi ban re zhengyi” (“wives’ training course” in Shanghai causes a debate), Jiefang 
ribao, April 29, 1998, Shanghai. 
30
  The tradition of “foxy witch” storytelling dates back to AD 900-1000 in China. See two popular short story 
collections, Liaozhai Zhiyi and Yuewei caotang biji, by two well-known writers Pu Songling and Ji Yun in Qing 
Dynasty. These stories were collected from folklore tales and retold by these two writers for the purpose of moral 
warning. See Zeitlin1993 and Chan 1998.  
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historical examples of this trope, from the notorious concubines owned by previous emperors to 
the most recent example of Mao’s wife, (Jiang Qing), and to ordinary men’s mistresses (second 
wives).  These women are seen as transgressors against the operation of gendered codes of 
femininity.  
The narrative of “foxy witch” repeatedly appearing in storytelling plays the part in 
“keeping mythologies and ideologies alive” (Macdonald 1995, 11). The news reports 
foregrounding the image of “second wives” have the potential to create awareness of a crisis of 
the established model of “the virtuous feminine”. Indeed, comments of so-called marriage 
experts employ the term “foxy witches” to illustrate the dangers of the “second wives” who 
violate the viability of the codes of gender ideology. Like foxy witches, “second wives” are 
described as youthful and physically attractive women who are materially oriented. They are not 
wives and mothers (with legal status); hence they are unnatural and incomprehensible. The 
comprehension of “second wives” in the state media falls into the dominant discourses. They are 
described as scheming and sexually loose whores with aspirations of “grabbing money bags” 
(bang daguan). They seduce men and ruin their lives as per the narrative of “foxy witches”.   
The news narrative has made an effort to incorporate these “incomprehensible” women. 
By identifying “second wives” as uncivil and backward beings, the news media further describes 
their lives as “indecent” and “fallen”. Cultural terms for “fallen” women reappear to describe the 
materialistic women “seeking ease and comfort” and “taking a shortcut to wealth”.31  The news 
discourse also depicts their lifestyle as “indecent”. They usually live in a more expensive 
residential quarter provided by the man, playing Mahjong all day, an indecent game in the 
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 Qian Lihong, “shui shihe liyong qingchun?”(“Who is suitable to take advantage of youth?”), September 26, 2002, 
Jinyang Wang.  
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official discourse. They frequently visit beauty salons, a signifier illustrating that her life is full 
of emptiness.
32
  In particular, in the news stories of corrupt officials, “second wives” are depicted 
as “the source of troubles”. They are spiritually destitute and morally fallen. News reports pay 
particular attention to the morality that the “second wives” represent, while the economic 
condition of these women is largely overlooked.  
 
 THE DANGEROUS RELATIONSHIP: MAIN CONTENT OF THE NEWS CONVERAGE  
   
 Ideology helps to narrate news stories and to make sense of events (Hall 1984). How do 
the news stories make sense of the “issue” within the given ideological framework? First, the 
news media borrow familiar storylines loaded with moral lessons for the audience while 
targeting their “consent” and reading pleasure that they used to receive from the old stories. The 
news narrative contains moral warnings inherited from Chinese narrative tradition. All of these 
bad consequences which are presented as the result of outlawed affairs that threaten family unity 
help to deliver a moralistic discourse of marriage and sexuality. Subsequently, “keeping a second 
wife” is identified by the state authorities as an “overbearing social problem” that breaches 
sexual mores and threatens the family, which is the foundation of social order. Moreover, the 
state media defines the problems/crisis and actively selects news items illustrating the problems, 
through which the reproduction of ideology is completed.  The selection of the news coverage of 
“keeping a second wife” is designed to illustrate the crisis of the central value of Chinese society 
posed by the practice of “keeping a second wife”. It carries the assumption that a resolution of 
the issue will restore social harmony. This is the key point of the news narrative; therefore, the 
news media creates specific topics and represents them to illustrate its key point.  
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 Tu Qiao, guanzhu ernai cui xie lie baodao (Concerning about “ernai village”: a serial news report). Yangcheng 
wanbao, April 25- May 24, 2004.  
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 The news production delivers the state’s concerns of the family and social order; hence, it 
is constructed as illustrative scripts of what and how the family crisis is caused. The main 
content of the news converge focuses on homicide, injury, corruption, family disharmony, all of 
which are consequences of “keeping a second wife”.  The persistence of these themes in the 
news narrative is evident. A content categorization study (cf. Table 1) reveals that particular 
types of stories are favoured, illustrating the ways in which general elements and processes of the 
news construction operate on the ideological level. In a total of 139 news stories, 40 involve 
crimes of homicide and injury and 25 items of the news stories are about civil lawsuits regarding 
disputes of property, all of which were deemed to be caused by “keeping a second wife”. These 
65 stories can be placed into one category: a kind of morality tale that explains the dissolution of 
the family (the essential unity on which society is built). Twenty eight stories discuss other 
serious crimes, such as bribery and embezzlement, caused by officials who are “keeping a 
second wife”, which I will discuss in Chapter Six. Fifteen stories focus on private detective 
companies investigating affairs and DNA testing for men suspected of bearing sons by second 
wives, which also illustrate the theme of family crisis. These contents count for 78 percent of 
total news stories analyzed. Each type of story provokes a particular “bad consequence” that 
“endangers social and family stability”, sending the clear message that “keeping a second wife” 
is a dangerous relationship. In addition, there are 33 items related to the discussion of the 2001 
marriage law and 55 items providing advice to husbands/officials, wives, and “second wives”. 
These reflect state efforts to control “keeping a second wife”, which I will discuss in the next 






Table1: Key contents of the news reports (numbers are the news items)   
                             Stories                       Commentary opinions  
Homicide/ injury  40 29% Advice given to wives 20 36% 
Official corruption   28 20% Warnings given to “second 
wives” 
15 27% 
Property dispute     25 18% Advice given to 
husbands/officials 
14 26% 
DNA testing & 
detectives 
 15 10% Other (morality, social 
stability, etc.) 
6 11% 
STIs & abortion    2 1%    
2001 Marriage Law   33 22%    
  Total  139 100% Total 55 100% 
 
 There are only two items specifically related to STIs ( Sexually Transmitted Infections) and abortion, but several 
stories describing the regrets of a “second wife” highlight STIs & abortion out of wedlock, which fall into the 
category of “commentaries speaking to ‘the second wife’”. This category is singled out due to its significance in the 
understanding of female sexuality and the female role in the discourse. Like the news stories and commentaries, 
“officials” in all tables as well as in this study exclusively refer to male sex.  
 
Crime news: homicide, injury and headlines 
 Crime news focusing on homicide, injury, and corruption is of particular importance for 
illustrating that “keeping a second wife” is a dangerous relationship. Crimes often are treated as 
news because they “evoke threats” as well as reaffirm the social morality (Hall 1978, 66), and 
subsequently crimes in the news call for symbolic and physical punishment. Crimes (homicide, 
injury, and corruption) in the news media’s construction of “keeping a second wife” consist of 
nearly 50 percent of the news contents. These crimes are narrated as the consequences of 
“keeping a second wife”, and through these crimes, “keeping a second wife” is singled out as not 
only a transgression of moral boundaries but also a violation of the law. This section only 
focuses on homicide and injury. Corruption will be discussed in Chapter Six.   
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The peak of the press coverage of “keeping a second wife” occurred from 2000 to 2002, 
during the discussion of amendment of the Marriage Law. Thereafter news media maintain the 
interest in reporting the event although new themes and new terms, such as xiaosan (the little 
third), appeared in the narrative as tabloid style journalism has grown. Crimes related to 
“keeping a second wife” emerge as major news stories because their dramatic plots fit the 
demands of “soft news”, which were not practiced under the previous regime.  The requirement 
of “softness” treats crimes as melodramas carrying moral warnings, attracting news consumers 
while delivering moral lessons that enforce the dominant ideology. The “extraordinariness” and 
“novelty” of news (Hall 1978, 71) have elevated crime stories to new levels of visibility; 
especially crimes caused by a particular event interpreted as a rebirth of the old institution. 
Hence, the frames of the stories are constructed to align them with the given language and ideas. 
The crimes ascribed to the practice of “keeping a second wife” are presented without reliable 
sources and the interpretations are entirely based on gender assumptions that conform to 
“common sense”, which is treated as a key factor to develop the storylines. These crimes are 
highlighted to illustrate that “keeping a second wife” is a dangerous relationship, helping to 
support the familiar narrative of “families broken, some dead and some gone away” (jiapo 
renwang) in the Chinese story-telling tradition. In order to create the particular theme of family 
crisis, crimes are reduced to reiterations of simplistic plot progressions and the complexity of life 
is reduced to a moralizing parable.  
Homicide caused by adultery (extramarital affairs) is a narrative tradition in the Chinese 
story-telling, which was employed by the CCP cadres to justify their condemnation of 
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extramarital affairs during the 1950 marriage law campaign.
33
  It is an available storyline in the 
inventory of story-telling for the news reports of “keeping a second wife”. The news stories 
exactly follow a gender script to formulate the crimes of homicide and injury, which are 
presented as aspects of a war between wives, second wives, and husbands, taking place on two 
fronts. On the one hand, these crimes are initiated by male promiscuity; on the other hand, wives 
are victimized in their own battle with transgressive whores. “Second wife”, husband, and wife 
are positioned as three major characters within the drama, based on an essentialist understanding 
of biological differences between males and females. News stories focus on the legal cases of 
homicide and injury in order to elucidate how the practice of “keeping a second wife” 
undermines the family (and society in general). The crime news of homicide and injury rarely 
involve firsthand accounts of the crimes themselves; instead, news reports assume an “increase 
of crimes committed by women” and assert that the women who commit murder and injury do so 
as a result of female weakness.  Indeed, these women, both wives and “second wives”, are 
accused of being excessively emotional, a state that drives women into “the entanglement of love 
and family”.34   
 Major storylines are dramatized on the basis of emotional “entanglement”. In the murder 
plot, jealousy, anger, and the need to maintain secrecy are described as the key motivations for 
the protagonists. Any of the three parties, the man, the wife, or the “second wife” can become the 
protagonist or victim in a killing drama. In addition, children (born to the wife or to the “second 
wife”) can sometimes become victims of the entanglement. The murders often confirm to a 
precisely choreographed script. First, due to the second wife’s demand of a marriage offer, the 
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 See the 1953 archival document: “Adultery causes murder and affects social security”, cited in Hershatter 2011, 
page 111. 
34
 Yu, Yaling 2004. “guanzhu nuxing fanzui: wei ai he jiating fenzheng sha ren” (Concerning crimes committed by 
women: killing for love and family entanglement”). Yangcheng wanbao, March 8. 
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man commits murder in order to keep the secret from his family. An alternative to this plot turns 
the “second wife” into a killer. She demands marriage, but when the man fails to divorce the 
wife, the second wife kills the man. In this plot, if the “second wife” is a sex worker or a miss 
san pei (a female companion for drinking, singing and dancing), she consorts with villains to 
have the man kidnapped and killed. The third plot turns the wife into a killer. Jealousy and anger 
drive her to commit murder, and she kills the “second wife” and the second wife’s children. The 
final variation of the story describes a desperate wife who kills her own children and then 
follows with her suicide as a form of vengeance against her husband.   
In her study of the depiction of extramarital affairs in the Taiwanese media, Chang 
(1999) points out that feminists are likely to focus on the ways in which women struggle against 
men as “sisters” and thus overlook conflicts between women. Chang discovers that wives are 
threatened both financially and emotionally by the other women, and they are likely to take 
revenge on “the other women” instead of their husbands.  The news stories on the other side of 
the Taiwan Strait share the same cultural heritage and also focus on the tension between two 
women. In the injury plots, wives injure “the second wives” (and vice versa), while the male 
protagonist is often absent from the drama. Instead of blaming husbands, wives blame “the 
second wives”, “foxy witches” (“huli jing”) who seduce men and destroy families. News stories 
also highlight dramatic forms of violence such as attacks with sulfuric acid or kitchen knives 
used by wives and second wives.  
 The crimes of homicide and injury are featured to illustrate the serious consequences of 
“keeping a second wife”: combining the disruption of family harmony with damage to “social 
stability”.  Disruption of family harmony is the most unfortunate outcome for human life in the 
Chinese storytelling tradition, and thus the storylines and morality tales are culturally available in 
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the storytelling tradition. The stories echo the state’s project of building a “harmonious family” 
that considers infidelity as the primary factor endangering the family. 
35
  While justifying the 
state’s intervention, the journalistic practice embodies the dominant ideology of the family. 
News headlines are important for news articles. They are designed to be particularly 
memorable and effective with particular linguistic features and representations. Headlines 
enclose the news content, but more importantly they contain signposts that lead the readers to 
understand the news content within the particular structural view of the events. Headlines dealing 
with crimes first clearly identify that the crimes are caused by the issue of “keeping a second 
wife”, with three figures involved in the event. The news headlines directly employ the term 
“second wife” to identify the “nature” of the crime. These headlines suggest a resurgence of 
“concubinage”. For example, 
January 11, 2002                     Second wife bites off wife’s ear 
January15, 2004                      Businessman’s wife drowns second wife 
December 8, 2008                   Wife and second wife slash each other; scared male    
                                                     Protagonist dodges conflict 
 
Once the event is identified, the headlines emphasize that the crimes are committed by women. 
The headlines treat the crime as a conflict driven by the male and female “natures”. Three 
characters appear in the headlines, but most of the headlines focus on violence conducted by 
women (wives/mothers and “second wives”). With the focus on women committing crimes, the 
headlines represent wives and “second wives” with different moral characteristics. Wives are 
represented as desperate mothers and vulnerable victims of male promiscuity driven by jealousy, 
the unavoidable feature of the female in the “gender war”. On the other hand, “second wives” are 
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 See Mi 2010.  
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treated as suspect and “wicked” and “greedy”. The headlines do not dwell on the figure of the 
man, but the male genitals are highlighted as evidence of “male promiscuity”. For example: 
September 5, 2001                 Mother kills son and jumps from roof 
February 26, 2002                  Desperate mother poisons three sons 
July 5, 2002                           Consorting with robbers the second wife kills the man 
October 14, 2002                   Wife chops off husband’s genitals 
January 15, 2004                    Businessman’s wife drowns second wife 
             August 13, 2004                    Furious wife kills “the second wife” and is put on the                      
                                             
                                                                   defendant seat 
 
October 13, 2008                        Suspected of keeping a second wife, wife pours boiling rice  
                                                      porridge on sleeping husband’s genitals. 
 
December18, 2008                 Extorting second wife demands permanent position, furious     
                                           
                                                      wife stabs her to death 
 
January 2, 2009                         Being a second wife for ten years she chases the man with a    
                                                     kitchen knife for five floors and the promiscuous man is   
                                                      hacked to death 
  
 The family is culturally and politically understood as the “smallest cell” of the societal 
structure, and hence family issues are taken in such a way that shakes the society’s foundation. 
When considering the cultural meanings of women and family in the Chinese context, these 
crimes committed by women seem fundamental as they attack the foundation of the cultural 
order. The implications of women committing crimes in the headlines highlights the message 
producer’s intention to locate the issue in the domestic domain, where a woman is  understood to 
be  primarily a figure playing a central role in the “backyard” of the household (houyuan). It is 
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the understanding of women’s role in the family that the state takes its particular approach to the 
issue of “keeping a second wife”. Hence, the news headlines highlight the seriousness of the 
crimes conducted by women (wives and “second wives”) in order to emphasize the extreme 
impact of “keeping a second wife” on social stability. Moreover, murder and serious injury are 
predominantly seen as male crimes with women murderers being seen as exceptional to the rule 
of human societies (Dobash 1995, Kelleher 1998). However, the news headlines strive to 
establish women as the default aggressors in cases connected with “keeping a second wife”. 
Naylor (1995, 81) suggests several typologies of women’s crimes in the Western media: 
1. Madonna/whore 
2. Sexual passion/love as an “excuse” for crime 
3. Reproduction and madness 
4. The figure of evil—the witch—the monster 
5. The criminal woman as “not woman” 
6. The female as devious and manipulative 
  
Naylor’s (1995) categorization of female crime media representation helps us to understand the 
narrative choice media outlets make in publicizing these stories. In the case of “keeping a second 
wife”, the “second wives” could be placed in both the category of “evil—the witch—the 
monster” (due to her seducing and distracting the man) and the category of “Madonna/whore” 
(based on her transgressive behavior that crosses sexual mores).  However, placing wives on 
Naylor’s grid is more problematic. They do not fit neatly within his typology. One of the threads 
in the image of wives seems to be that of “love as an excuse for crime”, but the cultural 
imagination of “wives” seemingly put them in the center of the family rather than as associated 
with the image of “love”/ “passion”. The iconic figure of the family— the wife —becomes a 
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criminal, which is highlighted in the news headlines. In so doing, the media attempts to suggest 
that the family is in crisis and consequently that society is breaking down.   In particular, the 
headlines highlight “wives” as “mothers” killing their own children, showing the horror of 
femininity, distorted from its “natural” course of motherhood.  Therefore, within the culturally 
specific context of the Chinese news media, we may add another type of representation to 
Naylor’s typology: “wives seeking revenge against husbands’ polygamous sexuality”. It is one in 
which women as wives and mothers attack the second wives, their husbands and their own 
children.  
 In short, these brief news headlines are formulated to highlight several aspects. First, they 
identify the issue at hand— pointing to “keeping a second wife”. Second, they pinpoint the 
causes of the crimes— again pointing to “keeping a second wife”. Subsequently, these headlines 
introduce the theme of family crisis, and raise the specter of subsequent disorder of “social 
harmony”— thereby justifying state intervention. 
Dispute of property 
The dangerous relationship is not only illustrated through violent crime news, but is also 
elucidated through disputes over property that dissolve family unity and family harmony: the 
essential cornerstone of society. “Family harmony” is constructed as indispensable to human 
happiness and likewise appears as a social norm.  For a family dispute to become caught in the 
machinery of the legal process it is culturally linked to a failure of the family, family prosperity 
and the social face of each family member.
36
  News stories are inclined to emphasize the cultural 
                                                          
36  The cultural expression “everything becomes possible if a family is harmonious” (jia he wan shi xing) is written 
in calligraphy on the walls of many households in China. Although Yan argues that there is increasing degree 
individualization within the Chinese family, the cultural understanding of family remains firmly entrenched in the 
discourse. For the meaning of family life in PRC and individualization in rural families, see Yan 2003. 
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understanding of marriage that reflects upon the interests of the family as a whole rather than 
upon the happiness of two individual parties. The collapse of family unity that leads to property 
disputes is overwhelmingly attributed to male infidelity. In accordance with an amended article 
in the 2001 Marriage Law, the misbehaving party—exclusively men in the news stories— must 
financially compensate the other party when a marriage dissolves.  Property disputes are one of 
the major themes in the news reports of “keeping a second wife”. Fighting over property plays a 
pivotal role in these narratives, which are used to illustrate the ways in which “keeping a second 
wife” can break up a family. 
In order to avoid compensating the wife, the husband bestows property upon the “second 
wife”; in other plots, the husband and the wife plan together to hide property or retrieve money 
from the “second wife”. A frequent trope depicts the wife suing the husband for bestowing gifts 
upon the other woman. She “wields the weapon of the law” (naqi falu de wuqi), as the Women’s 
Federation suggests, by protecting her property rights that have been violated by “the second 
wife”.  The new marriage law is propagated to strengthen the position of wives, and news stories 
describe the “second wife” as a thief who violates wives’ property rights. In some plots, the 
“second wife” takes the man to court, requiring alimony or child support. At the close of the 
drama, the law protects the wife; the husband (as the misbehaving party) ends up alone after all 
family members forsake him for his wrongdoing. In other stories, the promiscuous man is 
punished by the law for committing bigamy. In the end, the family is broken up, and the husband 





 Diseases, untamed fertility and the cuckold  
Stories focusing on Sexual Transmitted Infections (STIs), children out of wedlock and 
DNA testing are used to illustrate a crisis of monogamy and family institution through the angle 
of degenerated sexual mores. Sexual chaos is largely seen as a danger to the social order and the 
social norm of monogamous sexuality.  During the Maoist period, the state employed legal 
sanctions and administrative regulations to enforce sexual morality, criminalizing “abnormal” 
sexual practices such as homosexuality, sodomy and “collective sexual behaviours”. During the 
post-Mao era the regime has policed sexuality through ideological articulation. The news 
construction of “keeping a second wife” demonstrates the ways in which sexuality is articulated 
at the ideological level. The news stories involving STIs, DNA testing and detective stories serve 
to illustrate the kind of sexual chaos caused by “keeping a second wife”, including the spread of 
a sexually transmitted infections, the risk of untamed fertility challenging official “birth control” 
policies and a crisis of masculinity represented by the figure of the cuckold.  
STI is a term equivalent to moral vice and forbidden sexuality, inscribed into news stories 
as a consequence of unrestrained sexual behaviors with multiple sexual partners. It is estimated 
that some 10 million individuals had STIs when the CCP took power in 1949 (Cohen 1996), a 
figure that was used by the CCP as evidence of the sin of “the old China”. The CCP determined 
to remove the diseases of the “old society” through its propaganda machine and its policy-
making. For example, the 1950 Marriage Law forbade marriage if one of the two parties had a 
STI (Evans 1997). By the mid-1960s, the government's draconian public health measures had 
basically eradicated STIs (Cohen 1996), prompting a celebratory account of the CCP’s 
triumphant annihilation of social vices. Given the historical context of STIs in the PRC, attitudes 
towards STIs are still linked to sexual morality. In spite of increasing tolerance towards 
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transgression of sexual mores in the reform era, STIs continue to be considered moral diseases. 
For example, a study on STI patients in China reveals that among 406 patients, 80% felt 
stigmatized, 28% sought treatment only after symptoms persisted for at least one week, and 40% 
reported continuing to have sex while having symptoms (Liu et al 2002).   
STIs are constructed as factors disruptive to family harmony in two ways. First, sexuality 
is always linked to one’s morality in China, with the monogamous ideal and heteronormativity 
understood as the only acceptable moral positions. Hence, STIs signify ones’ transgression 
against the imperatives of monogamous sexuality or heteronormativity. Second, sexuality is 
bounded to the state’s eugenics project that aims to produce a healthier population for a strong 
nation. Monogamous and heteronormative sexuality is seen a hygienic sexuality, whereas 
polygamous sexuality and homosexuality are viewed as dangerous and dirty sexualities that 
cause STIs and AIDS. The state’s eugenics project disseminates information that STIs are 
damaging to women’s fertility (McMillan 2006), and thus a fundamental building block to happy 
marriages and “harmonious families”. The representation of sexual diseases in the media reflects 
these understandings of sexual diseases. STIs in the news narrative are explicitly associated with 
the discourse of sexuality. STIs are constructed as dangers and as a form of retribution against 
“second wives” for their transgressive behavior. This type of storyline is often narrated through 
the lens of the second wife’s regret, and as a warning to other young women who have the 
tendency to “take a shortcut to wealth”. The descriptions of STIs in the stories issue warnings 
about loss of social status and declining physical health. Stories of STIs hint at second wives’ 
loss of fertility, jeopardizing her only chances of obtaining a proper future position through a 
marriage offer; as a consequence, second wives are insecure and doomed to fall into tragedy:  
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Afang came to a hospital in Zhuzhou in January 15. The doctor confirmed her worry: she 
was pregnant. The worse thing was that she was diagnosed with a STI at the same time. 
After she knew the result, she emotionally cried to the doctor: “this can’t be true, 
absolutely not true!” However, the confirmation brutally broke her last hope…January 
23
rd
 was Afang’s cousin’s wedding day, but for her, she wrote: “it seems that I was 
several years older these days. I have tasted the joys and sorrows of life, the doctor’s 
taunt, the pain of my body, the wound of my soul. I slept alone crying on the pillow every 
night.” When Afang needed her beloved “Brother Lin” (the man who passed the STI to 
her), he was not there for her.  She was in fear and heartbroken, and she eventually began 




Importantly, monogamous sexuality is linked to the state concern for birth control. The 
population control policy has been seen as a triumph in the urban regions, whereas measures to 
restrict population growth have met with resistance in rural areas (White 2006, Zhang 1999). 
Both hukou registration and the system of work units (danwei) have been utilized as a means of 
maintaining social order related to birth control (Xie and Wu 2009). Rural migrants, described as 
“floating population” (liudong renkou) (Solinger1999, Zhang 2001), have crossed the boundary 
of hukou registration and transgressed birth control policies that are bound to a specific work 
unit. The representation of rural migrants has painted an image of uncivil, backward, traditional 
peasants coming to “modern” cities (Guang 2003, Yan 2008, Zheng 2007), and the 
stigmatization of rural migrants is obvious in popular culture. Films and TV comedies have 
connected unplanned childbirth to the rural migrants’  “traditional desire” of “wanting sons”. 38 
 In 2001, the Women’s Federation of Guangdong published a report in the media that 
claimed that nearly 70 percent of “second wives” were rural migrants, and most of them had only 
                                                          
37
 “Shiqi sui nusheng de xinlu lichen, dang ernai huaiyun ran xingbing” (a seventeen year-old girl tells her story: 
being a second wife and infected with a STI), October 27, 2008, jinyang wang, http://www.ycwb.com.cn  
38  For example, a famous comedy “guerrilla birth corps” (chaosheng youji dui) played by two celebrities, Zhao 
Benshan and Song Dandan, in the Chinese spring festival Gala on the CCTV in the 1990s. 
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junior middle school education.
39
  This emphasis upon disobedient, poorly educated rural 
migrants builds the case against “second wives” as “backward” and “uncivilized” (luohou 
yumei), while echoing the prevailing discourse concerning suzhi (categories of high or low 
human quality). Hence, “second wives” are targeted by state initiatives aimed at dealing with the 
“floating population” and the violation of birth control policy. As the rural population is often 
blamed for China’s high fertility rates, the “second wives” are described as low suzhi women 
whose sexuality cannot be controlled by the state’s policies. Hiding from the birth control 
inspector, she may produce unplanned children out of wedlock. In the official discourse, having 
more children is equivalent to poverty. Only backward, impoverished, and uncivilized rural 
people have a strong desire to produce unplanned children. The news reports orchestrate the 
discourse of rural population and birth control, showing another way in which “keeping a second 
wife” “endangers social stability” by violating birth control policy. For example:  
Those second wives hide in superior residential quarters to bear children outside of the 
birth plan. Some people move to Guangzhou from other regions and buy apartments in 
order to avoid the birth control policy and have more children. This is becoming 
common. Some wealthy men purchase expensive domiciles to build a cozy nest in order 
to escape from the birth control policy…now those second wives also adopt this trick to 




DNA testing and detective stories are highlighted to illustrate other dangers that threaten 
men and women, as well as family harmony in general. The DNA testing stories present the 
image of a cuckold who seeks desperately to confirm the biological legitimacy of his offspring. 
Doubting the fidelity of “the second wife”, and further suspecting that the child is not his 
                                                          
39
 “Guangdong fulian yanjiu baoernai” (Women’s Federation of Guangdong studies keeping  a second wife), 
Jinyang wang, originally from Qilu wanbao, Jan.21, 2003. 
40 “Bao ernail pohuai jihua shengyu zhengche” (Keeping a second wife violates the birth control policy). Yangcheng 




biological son, the cuckold utilizes modern technology to uncover the truth. He is found 
“wearing a green hat” (dai lu maozi), meaning that a man has an adulterous wife, a cultural 
reference to an unbearable humiliation for Chinese masculinity. For example, one news story 
about an adulterous wife/a second wife asserts:  
Since ancient times the adulteress has always triggered homicide….Men may swallow 
insults and humiliations for many things, but they can never bear “wearing a green hat” 
[…] if other wives behave like Wu Hong and become a “second wife” [as a married 
woman], what serious consequence will result? It is really hard for us to imagine. 
Therefore, Wu Hong’s behaviour is one hundred percent wrong and harmful in many 
respects. [Her behaviour] has many pernicious effects and benefits nobody. It is truly not 




The social discourse of “a green hat” is an engrained cultural script that refers to being 
emasculated and dishonored as a man in Chinese society. The news narrative highlights the 
discourse of “green hats” and hints at ways in which the law ought to punish adulterous women:  
A husband in Cangping of Beijing suspected that his child was not his biological 
descendant [so he sued for a divorce]. The court ruled that the couple have a DNA test, 
but the wife refused. Therefore, the court inferred that the husband was wearing a green 
hat, and thus granted a divorce. In addition, surprisingly, not only was the child given to 




Female protagonists of the news narrative hire detectives to follow their husbands in order to 
collect evidence for compensation in accordance with the 2001 Marriage Law. Detective stories 
take up quite a large amount of space in the news media (see Table 1).  A gendered morality is 
evidently described in the stories of DNA testing and detectives. When the husband ends an 
affair and returns to his wife, he is praised as “once lost now returning to the fold” (“mitu 
                                                          
41
 “Yihun nüzi dang ernai” (A married woman became a second wife). Jinyang Wang, March 28, 2007.  
42
 “DNA faxian zhangfu bei dai lumao” (DNA testing finds husband’s wearing a green hat), Xin kuaibao (the New 




zhifan”), but there is no route of return for a misbehaving wife. The male’s promiscuous nature 
is used to explain his affairs, whereas a woman’s affair is attributed to her emotional need and 
her desire to enact vengeance upon a man for his misbehaviour. Without these “two 
motivations”, a woman’s affair is always attributed to her status as a “fallen woman”. With 
reference to the representation of a “second wife”, keeping “a second wife” is described as a risk 
because she is, by definition, a gold digging whore, and thus incapable of feeling or expressing 
the “true love” that a man receives from his (legal) wife.   
In summary—taking the news coverage as a whole — more than 70 percent of the 139 
news stories identified through a single news website deal with crimes of homicide, injury, 
bigamy, and corruption.  These stories are used to explain the family crisis that threatens social 
stability.  Other stories focusing on “sexual chaos” are also linked to the same theme. There is a 
great deal missing from these stories about “keeping a second wife” in terms of their social and 
political impact. Chinese journalism simplifies the news reports of “keeping a second wife” and 
thus strengthens the link between news production and the dominant ideology, as per Hall’s 
fundamental insight (1978). Simplification helps to focus the story’s rhetoric and creates an 
opportunity for a moral lecture consistent with the Chinese storytelling tradition. The patterns of 
the news stories around the theme of “family crisis” are in line with the official condemnation of 
“keeping a second wife” and coordinate perfectly with the state’s efforts to reinforce the family. 
A majority of these news stories identify three parties involved in the affair and create a standard 
plot based on common gender assumptions. The journalistic practice irresistibly links crime and 
sexual chaos to the central theme of the family, the core of the social order. The condensed 
treatment of this link in news reports is presented rather like a moral parable driven by “common 
sense” assumptions of gender roles and cultural understandings of the family. The news narrative 
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asserts that these men and women have breached the accepted morality and the established way 
of living, paving the way for crimes and subsequent family crisis, which are the inevitable issue 
of this type of misconduct and violation of sexual mores. It is this treatment of the link between 
“keeping a second wife”, crime and crisis that articulates the dominant ideology of family, 
marriage, and sexuality.  
Controlling the family crisis 
 The discourse surrounding the negative social impact of “keeping a second wife” is 
generally organized around three main points: first, “keeping a second wife” violates wives’ 
rights (their property rights and financial support are at risk and the wives and children suffer 
psychologically from the men’s infidelity);  second, “keeping a second wife” severely damages 
the family, the foundation of society (seriously violating a number of social interests by giving 
rise to criminal behaviour and endangering social stability); third, “keeping a second wife” is 
seen to violate the state’s interests by destabilizing the  birth control policy and endangering the 
monogamy and heteronormativity.
43
  The efforts of controlling the family crisis reveal the 
relations between the media discourse, the state agencies and the laws.  A brief overview of the 
media and state’s orchestration of society’s reaction to these presumed threats is helpful to 
understand the extent to which the party-state is not simply seeking to exert ideological control, 
but is trying to regulate behavior through legal means as well. The following sections will 
examine media advices regarding how to manage marriage, the legislative approach to “keeping 
a second wife”, and efforts to defend the family made by a particular state agency, All China 
Women’s Federation (ACWF).  
                                                          
43




PRESCRIPTIONS TO WIVES, HUSBANDS AND “SECOND WIVES” 
 Fifty-five items in my data set are categorized as commentary opinions written by 
marriage consultants and “love experts” (cf. Table 1, p77). These newspaper articles speak to 
three parties in the affairs within the discourse of gender roles and sexual mores. Most of these 
opinions provide strategies for holding a marriage together and target middle class wives whose 
husbands are assumed to have the potential (i.e., financial power) to “keep a second wife”. 
 First, news commentaries, editorial opinions and marriage experts prescribe solutions to protect 
the family.  Because the crisis is constructed within the dominant ideological paradigm of gender 
and sexual mores, this advice is framed through the common sense identities respectively 
ascribed to husbands, wives and “second wives” in relation to the idea of “harmonious families” 
and social stability. News commentaries persuade men to restrain their “natural” male 
promiscuousness by making an appeal to the idea of “moral cultivation” (daode peiyang). Also, 
modernization is a key factor in appeals directed at men.  The behaviour of “keeping a second 
wife” is constructed as a “backward phenomenon” that undermines “modern civilization”. 
According to this narrative, “the Chinese men who have taken the lead in wealth”44  are still out 
of the trajectory of modernization and thus need to be educated in order to become “civilized” 
subjects. Hence, the news commentaries persuade men that being rich is not enough; a 
modernized rich man ought to have a “respectful and graceful life”. In addition, the idea of “true 
love” and the image of the wife are strongly advocated. While the “second wives” are 
constructed as gold digging whores, “proper” wives are described as virtuous and sacrificing 
women standing behind their men. Commentaries also suggest to men that an extramarital affair 
                                                          
44
 “Zhongguo nanren yinggai youya wenming de shenghuo” (Chinese men should live a civilized and decent life). 
Yangcheng wanbao, May 20, 2000.  
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is mentally and physically distracting. This type of prescription is directed at government 
officials keeping a “second wife”. For example:  
“The more corrupt, the earlier to die”. Yesterday, Hong Zhaoguang, the chief expert in 
health education of the Ministry of Health, was invited to hold a health lecture in 
Guangzhou.  By quoting authoritative works, he discussed the issue regarding shorter life 
expectancy of corrupt officials. Hong Zhaoguang pointed out that diseases come from the 
mind. The source of many diseases is psychological pressure and that 76 percent of 
diseases are depression related. Every corrupt official experiences tremendous 
psychological pressure and the reason why he is likely to catch diseases or have a 




The discourse addressed to “second wives” is characterized by warnings about male promiscuity. 
Because youth is short-lived, relying on transiently youthful attributes is dangerous. A second 
wife will be replaced by a younger woman within a very short period. She is also warned of the 
dangers of becoming devalued in the marriage market and losing the capacity for childbirth, 
through stories of second wives’ regrets. The primary dangers associated with second wives’ 
regrets come mainly from STIs—signifiers of tainted morality and a woman’s loss of fertility. A 
second wife is painted as doomed to the tragic life of a woman without a marital status.   
Commentaries recall the idea advocated by the Women’s Federation, persuading her that she 
should be “self-depending, self-improving and self-respecting” (zili, ziqiang, zizun)46.  
Commentaries and editorial opinions focus primarily on the wife, portrayed by the 
dominant ideology as the key figure in “managing marriage”, an embellishment upon Maoist 
“woman-work” (Manning 2010) adapted to the era of the market economy.  Women are 
expected to become marriage managers responsible for controlling male infidelity during a time 
                                                          
45
  “Guanyuan duanming lun, yisi mazui ji mihui tang” (Short life expectancy of officials seems anesthesia and 
magic potion). Yangcheng wanbao, Feb. 18, 2009.  
46
 See Judd’s discussion (2002) on “self-depending, self-improving and self-respecting”, a strategy designed by the 
ACWF to enhance women’s position in the society.   
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of family crisis in the post Mao period, while they were encouraged to become “household 
managers”, building upon their presumed responsibility for household finances and in-law 
harmony during the Maoist regime (Manning 2010, Wang 2005).  For example, wives are said to 
bear the primary responsibility for protecting the family and “managing the marriage” (jinying 
hunyin).  Considering that a divorce is damaging to wives’ psychological wellbeing and financial 
resources, editorials advise wives to make an effort to maintain the family when husbands are 
having an affair. The figure of a wife in the news is constructed as a woman who clings to the 
marriage as her ultimate life goal. She is advised to find a solution that will expel the “second 
wife” from the situation and to be accepting of her husband’s remorse, thereby encouraging him 
to return home.  In addition to encouraging the wife’s virtue and her tolerance of the husband’s 
“physical return”, commentaries also allude to feminine appeal as a means of encouraging the 
husband’s “emotional return”. Because the wife is portrayed as “an old woman with a sallow 
face” (huanglian po) and “husk and chaff” whose promiscuous husband no longer finds 
attractive, they bear some responsibility for pushing the husband into the arms of younger 
women.  Blaming wives’ lack of tenderness and caring character, commentaries teach strategies 
to defeat the younger rivals in order to hold the family together. Marriage experts suggest that 
wives improve their appearance and cultivate femininity, both “outside and inside” (neizai 
wanzai). 
 The family crisis takes place within the paradigm of the dominant gender ideology, and 
“fallen” women and bad sexual mores are blamed for the disturbance.  The representation of 
“fallen” women contradicts the official ideological position on women since the 1950s, which 
has sketched a positive image of women “holding up half the sky”. The news narrative has 
depicted “transgressive” women who cross moral boundaries and pose a threat to the idea of 
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“good women”. The emergence of the new “concubinage”, described as “feudal sediment stirred 
up”, caused by these women who have affairs with the “polluted businessmen” (Jeffrey 2010), is 
deemed to “endanger” the foundation of the family institution,  “pollute” all sexual morality, and 
trigger social chaos. Moreover, in the stories of corrupt officials, the news narrative helps to 
whip up a moral panic of sexual relations that corrupt the party’s cause as a foil to deflect 
attention away from more pressing issues. In addition, the “resurgence” of “keeping a second 
wife” is blamed for bringing sexual diseases back to Chinese society through “chaotic” sexual 
relations. In so doing, the news construction serves to illustrate that the society needs greater 
restraints on sexual mores and less tolerance toward the inclination of sexual freedom.  
 
“RULING THE COUNTRY IN ACCORDNCE WITH LAW” 
 
The practice of “keeping a second wife” gave rise to intensive coverage at the beginning 
of 2000s, bolstered by commentary from marriage consultants, legal experts, and state authorities 
during this period, culminating in the passage of the 2001 Marriage Law.
47
  The term “keeping a 
second wife” refers to the family crisis that had a massive impact upon a society still very much 
committed to family values, cultural inheritance and institutional stability; the media, academics, 
legal experts, marriage consultants, feminist scholars, activists, and state agencies all agitated for 
legal sanctions to restrain extramarital relationships. Instead of controlling the family and 
sexuality with Maoist approaches (e.g., targeting a larger-size of population with a rigid 
administrative regulation), the post-Mao state attempts to deal with the crisis through the 
                                                          
47
  The process of amending the Marriage Law started in the 1990s for the purpose of enhancing morals and defining 
rights regarding marriage and family. In October 1995, the 16
th
 Conference of the Standing Committee of the eighth 
National People’s Congress resolved to amend the Marriage Law. A marriage Law was drafted and submitted to the 
18th, 19th and 21st Conference for examination and approval. On 28 April 2001, the new Marriage Law was 
approved and adopted. Apart from protecting monogamy (targeting “keeping a second wife”), the 2001 Marriage 
Law also deals with issues such as domestic violence, void and voidable marriage, matrimonial property, divorce. 
See Zhang 2002.   
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approach of “ruling the country in accordance with law”.  From a Foucauldian perspective, 
sexuality always involves particular institutions, through which sexuality becomes visible and 
meaningful; hence, extramarital relationships always give rise to legal debate (Lechie 1999).   
The CCP’s Marriage Law had four distinct historical antecedents. The first marriage law 
was promulgated in the Red Soviet Areas of Jiangxi Province during the early 1930s, and later 
on in the Yan’an border regions. This code claimed to abolish concubinage and other types of 
“feudal” institutions (e.g., arranged marriage and child daughter-in-law, tongxiang xi). The 
impact of the first marriage law was limited, however, by the CCP’s all-encompassing military 
struggle against the KMT government and the Japanese. The CCP issued the 1950 marriage law 
immediately after it took control of China. By the late 1970s, after countless political campaigns 
reinforcing the marriage law, family reform, and harsh punishment for sex out of wedlock, the 
state believed it had successfully instituted monogamous sexual relations as an ideological norm. 
In 1980, based on the triumph that concubinage had been annihilated in the PRC, the statutes 
“prohibiting polygamy and concubinage” emphasized in 1950 Marriage Law were removed from 
the Marriage Law (Hershatter 2007 b, 18). 
The drive to amend the marriage law in order to enhance monogamous sexuality dates 
back to 1995 when pluralism of sexual practices was deemed to be ascending (Zhang 2002). 
Before 1997, any defiant sexuality against the dominant ideology was labeled as crimes of 
“hooligan sexual behaviors” (liumang zui) in the PRC’s criminal code (Li 2013), under which 
theoretically any sexual practices out of wedlock, including extramarital affairs and premarital 
sex, could be measured as crimes. 
48
 The new governance of the post Mao period appears to 
                                                          
48
 For example, one movie star, Chi Zhiqiang, and one pop singer, Zhang Xing, in the 1980s who had sexual 
behaviours out of wedlock with different women were found guilty of “hooliganism” (liumang zui) during the 
“wiping-out-yellow” campaigns (saohuang, anti-porn) and respectively served four years and three years in jail (and 
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intervene within the family and sexuality with more rational and skillful strategies, as 
exemplified by its claim that it “rules the country by laws” (yifa zhiguo). In 1997, the crime of 
“hooliganism” was removed from the criminal code, and “hooliganism” behaviors were left to 
the level of moral condemnation.     
However, without  punishing “hooliganism” behaviors in the criminal code, the social 
control of marriage and sexuality appeared to be threatened during the course of the discussion 
over  “keeping a second wife”, which stirred up a actual “moral panic”, and consequently, it 
appeared to be urgent for the state to resubmit  the family and sexuality to legal scrutiny. As 
McRobbie and Thorton (1995, 568) point out, moral panic act 
on behalf of the dominant social order. They are a means of orchestrating consent by 
actively intervening in the space of public opinion and social consciousness through the 
use of highly emotive and rhetorical language which has the effect of requiring that 
“something be done about it”. 
 
The reconstruction of the new “concubinage” has created a crisis of the “already modernized” 
family institution. In response to this crisis, legal experts, marriage counselors, and government 
agencies repeatedly— and in unison— condemn it as a threat to “family harmony” and social 
stability. The moral panic that followed led to the amendment of the Marriage Law, which was 
intended to restrain sexual relations out of wedlock.  
In 2001, the new marriage law was issued after intense discussions.  In order to restrain 
extramarital relationships and deal with them differently from the Maoist state’s approach, the 
post-socialist state targeted this within a legal framework instead of within rigid and wide-
spectrum administrative regulations (the targeting range was too wide in the Maoist regime). Hu 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
it fatally affected their careers afterwards). Although the crime of hooliganism was removed from the Penal Code in 
1997, individuals can still be subject to charges for “collective sexual behaviors” or for watching pornography at 
home.   
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Kangsheng, the head of the National Juridical Work Committee (quanguo sifa gongsuo weiyuan 
hui), argued for the necessity of amending the marriage law by claiming that “bigamy is 
intensely increasing in some areas in recent years. It endangers monogamy as well as violates the 
socialist morality, leads to broken families and affects social stability and the birth control 
policy”.49  Hu’s speech reflects official concerns about the family crisis—the crisis of 
monogamy, family harmony, and the family organization of “one couple one child”, which, 
under the Chinese cultural and political context, has become a crisis of the state.  
Over the course of discussing the amendment of the marriage law, the judicial body 
declared that “keeping a second wife” was a crime and launched campaigns designed to 
“severely attack” the “crime”.  Nevertheless, the “crime” is punished by the law within the 
terminology of bigamy. The discussion of bigamy achieved its most vociferous expression 
through discussions of the marriage law.  The judicial body categorized “keeping a second wife” 
as bigamy, which in the PRC’s penal code is defined as “a behavior exhibited by a person with a 
legal spouse who cohabits with another person in the name of husband and wife or a behavior 
committed by a person who knows that the other person is married, but cohabits with him 
anyway”. 50 
The People’s Supreme Court (zuigao renmin fayuan) (PSC) emphasized the definition of 
bigamy and set forth descriptions of two types of bigamy: first, a married person with two 
marriage registrations; second, a married person who lived with “the other person” “in the name 
of husband and wife” and “the other person” knew that the person was married but continued to 
live with him/her. Both of these situations were declared to be “actual bigamy”.   The PSC 
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 “Zengbu hunyin fa de jidian shuoming” (Illustrations for amending the marriage law). Xinhua news agency, 
December 11, 2000.  
50
 See Yuan 2006. 
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particularly highlighted the potential homicide, injuries and property disputes caused by bigamy 
as the media narrative describes. 
51
   
The new definition of bigamy stirred up the public interest in discussing “keeping a 
second wife”. Sociologists, law experts, academics, and moral advisors suggested controlling 
bigamy with two swords: punishment by law and condemnation through moral sanctions. The 
state’s intention to amend the marriage law in order to penalize extramarital affairs was released 
to the media, and initiated suggestions and discussions from government agencies as well as 
from legal experts, moral advisors, academic circles and the general public.  
Discussions about extramarital affairs centered on the question of whether “keeping a 
second wife” and being a “second wife” ought to be punished by the law. In order to penalize 
“actual bigamy”, legal experts suggested to the Committee of Amending Marriage Law three 
different possible definitions of bigamy: a married person holds a wedding reception with “the 
third party”; a married person cohabits with the “third party” for over six months and raises 
children with the third party; a married person lives with the third party for over six months. 
52
   
 Official concerns reached their peak during the discussions pertaining to the Marriage 
Law amendments in 2001. Despite the anxieties aroused by its desire to control the “family 
crisis”, the state retained the new governance approach to controlling the “family crisis”.  Legal 
experts argued that writing the term “keeping a second wife” into the marriage law would not be 
appropriate, since the institution had already been abolished during the 1950s; instead, they 
suggested using language that targeted the issue without making reference to the term. In 2001, 
the discussion of Marriage Laws ended with the insertion of an amended article in the new 
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  “Zhuajia jieshi xin hunyin fa” (Experts explain the new Marriage Law). Yangcheng wanbao, May 1, 2001. 
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  “Li Zhongfang tan hunyin fa” (Li Zhongfang talks about the marriage law). Beijing wanbao, October 10, 2000. 
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marriage law. As the legal experts suggested, the phrase “keeping a second wife” did not appear.  
The appearance of the term would deny the state already-declared triumph. Under the principle 
of the 2001 marriage law a new principle was added as follow: “prohibiting a married person 
living with a third party”.53  Ma Yinan, the senior member of the Marriage Law Amendment 
Committee, explained to the public that the term “second wife” was not written in the new law 
because “keeping a second wife” was not a legal conception; nevertheless, he claimed that the 
Marriage Law’s new article functioned as a legal sanction that would control the practice of 
“keeping a second wife”.54  Hence, instead of reassuming the “hooliganism” approach, the post-
Mao state approach to control the family crisis, in the end, exercises its power of disciplining 
sexuality through legal form. 
DEFENDING THE FAMIY: THE ROLE OF THE ACWF  
 
 When the ACWF (All China Women’s Federation) was established in 1949, its aim was 
to mobilize women as well as to address concerns regarding women’s interests and equal rights 
(Wang 2005). It has a longstanding tradition of working with the party-state on two fronts: 
mobilizing women to participate in the labour force (and to fulfill the party-state tasks) and 
devoting their energy to domains defined as “woman-work”. These two fronts often are 
overlapping and complementary. For example, during Maoist period, the ACWF mobilized 
women to participate in the state project known to “diligently and thriftily building the country” 
by emphasizing women’s responsibility as “diligently and thriftily managing the family” (Wang 
2006). The ACWF made an effort to mobilize women to participate in the political process for 
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women’s liberation framed within a nationalist approach designated by the party-state (Barlow 
2004).   
 The ACWF is bureaucratic tool of the state mechanism which advocates “woman-work” 
in order to enforce the party’s political and economic policies.  Historically, the ACWF has 
echoed the Party’s strategy for enforcing gender policy, treating “family work” as a woman’s 
major contribution to the “party work”. The ACWF played a predominant role in framing ideas 
of the socialist family and drafting the 1950 Marriage Law (Manning, unpublished manuscript). 
The 1950 marriage law was intended to bring the Chinese women’s movement to fruition, 
enshrining a number of ideas associated with the term “women’s liberation” that had driven the 
movement since the beginning of the twentieth century. It reflected the degree to which 
“women’s liberation” blossom under the CCP’s regime. The ACWF’s intention was not to 
abolish family and the marriage institution as radical feminists in the West suggested, but rather 
to establish a socialist family institution for the new state, based on a set of ideas including 
monogamy, “men and women’s equality” (nannü  pingdeng), and harmonious family relations 
among husband, wife and in-laws (Manning, unpublished manuscript). As the nature of the 
CCP’s revolution was a social reform from the bottom up, the 1950 marriage law aimed 
particularly to protect lower class women by abolishing concubinage and the practice of taking 
child brides (tongyang xi). It also aimed to protect abused wives by simplifying divorce 
procedures by granting a divorce based on one-party petition (Manning, unpublished 
manuscript). The 1950 marriage law reflected the triumph of the ACWF’s efforts.  
 In the post Mao regime, the ACWF has seemingly entered a “post-ACWF” period, due to 
the fact that it has been much more marginalized, along with the state’s withdrawal of “gender 
equality” in the public sphere. At the same time, feminist ideas outside of the party-state 
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framework (e.g., Western feminisms) have emerged as a cutting-edge perspective incompatible 
with the ACWF’s state-designed doctrines and have become increasingly popular, particularly 
among academic circles, “public intellectuals”(gonggong zhishi fenzi), and feminist activists (Liu 
2006).  The ACWF has remained as a party organ with a particular focus on family issues, and 
thus it focuses on “men and women’s equality”, largely within the framework of family. In the 
late 1990s, the ACWF launched a long term project to enhance “family construction” and solve 
major challenges to the PRC’s family institution (e.g., “keeping a second wife”). In 2005, Hu 
Jintao’s administration launched a state project “harmonious society” attempted to solve social 
disparities and conflicts. 
55
  Echoing the state’s strategy, the ACWF named its family project as 
“harmonious family” as a core “woman work” in the ACWF’s agenda during the Hu Jintao’s 
administration. 
 For the ACWF, the family is a means of protecting women (wives)’s interests and 
wellbeing; hence, the ACWF approaches gender equality within the family by emphasizing 
monogamy as the most equal form of marriage for women, and within heteronomative 
monogamy the ACWF employs “mutual respect between wives and husbands”, an idea that dates 
back to ACWF’s notion of woman-work during the Maoist regime. One of the important 
understandings of “monogamous family” in the ACWF’s agenda during Maoist period was to 
prevent husbands from straying as a means of protecting wives and family unity (Diamant 2000).  
Indeed, husbands’ extramarital affairs in Maoist period were punished by “hooliganism” in 
criminal code, but in the reform era, the male promiscuity has resurged and is justified as the 
“nature” of biological differences in the discourse. 
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  See Hu Jintao, “Zai Shengbuji Zhuyao Lingdao Ganbu Tigao Goujian Shehuizhuyi Hexie Shehui Nengli Zhuanti 
Yantao Shangde Jianghua “(Talk Delivered to Provincial Main Leading Cadres In Seminar about Enhancing 
Capacity to Build a Socialist Harmonious Society). Renmin ribao (The People’s Daily), June 27, 2005. 
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The ACWF approached the amendment of the marriage law as an opportunity chance to 
enhance the monogamous family institution and accordingly protect wives’ interests. The local 
levels of the ACWF provide active support to wives whose husbands have strayed. For example, 
the two levels of the Women’s Federation of both Guangdong Province and Guangzhou city, the 
“natal family”56  of women in this region have provided channels for wives to seek help and 
support.   Starting in the early 1990s, both the Women’s Federation of Guangdong Province and 
Guangzhou City provided a service for wives to voice concerns about their husbands’ affairs. 
This service acts as a moral support and a symbolic gesture, demonstrating an official concern, 
despite the fact that there are no longer any administrative regulations to monitor and punish 
extramarital affairs, as there were during the Maoist period. In order to illustrate the increasing 
prevalence of the practice of “keeping a second wife” and to call for legal sanctions during the 
discussion period of the marriage law, the Guangzhou Women’s Federation revealed their 
statistics to the media: Appeal cases were increased from 246 in 1999 to 582 in 2000.  During the 
same period, the Guangdong Province Women’s Federation also claimed through that it had 
received 20, 246 cases between 1992 and 1996.
57
  These appeals, according to the Guangdong 
Women’s Federation, came from wives whose husbands were living and had children with other 
women and from the “second wives” whose children had been abandoned by the men. When 
these statistics appeared in the press, they were intended to provide convincing evidence of the 
need for state’s intervention.   
                                                          
56
 “Natal family” (niangjia) is a nickname to address  the Women’s Federation. It contains a variety of political 
meanings: first, dating back to the early period of the ACWF during the enforcement of the 1950 Marriage Law, it is 
an emphasis to draw married women out of kinship networks into the socialist state (Freedman 1964).  Second, it 
illustrates the ACWF’s standpoint to support monogamous family institution of the PRC and to support wives who 
are abused by husbands. Third, “natal family” serves as an official support that empowers women to achieve “men 
and women’s equality” within the family.  
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  Sun, Chaofang, 2002. “Guangzhou fulian baohu funu quanyi” (Women’s Federation of Guangzhou defends 
women’s rights). Yangcheng wanbao, October 13.  
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 The Guangzhou Women’s Federation also provided funding to support research on the 
plight of “second wives”. It was in 2001, the moment of amending the marriage law, that the 
Guangzhou Women’s Federation opened their findings to the public through the news media, 
exposing the stories of transgressive women and their motivations. Women’s Federation’s 
research on the “second wives” claimed that these women were mainly “outside sisters” (wailai 
mei, rural migrants).
58
  According to the study, 69 percent of the second wives were from poorer 
provinces, and 95 percent of them were under the age of 35. Seventy-one percent were 
unmarried, while 58 percent had only junior middle school education. The women’s motivations 
were interpreted as follows: 75 percent of the second wives were deemed to be motivated by “the 
desire to live in the city leaving their home places”, 13 percent had chosen their lot “for love”, 
while 42 percent of second wives claimed to be “willing to have no marital status”. Interestingly, 
the WF’s research also explored men’s motivations in keeping a second wife: 64 percent of the 
respondents claimed to be “seeking stimulation”, 27 percent attributed their behaviour to their 
wives’ aging, while 10 percent of them claimed to relish the idea of “having a concubine”.59  
These findings not only label the issue as “concubinage”, but also reflect institutional 
discrimination towards rural migrant women in the current gender politics and geopolitics. The 
questions underlying these statistics not defined in this published research, however, are the 
following: What is the statistical category of “second wife”? How should one define the 
behaviour of “keeping a second wife”? By calling attention to the growth of this practice, the 
organization hoped to spur the party-state to take disciplinary action. Regardless of the 
definitions used and the reliability of the Guangzhou Women’s Federation’s research, these 









statistics precisely “confirmed” the reductive description of men and “second wives” in the 
media’s creation of “family crisis”. The statistics offer an interpretation that fits with “common 
sense” assumptions about gender and the stereotypes of promiscuous men and the materialistic 
women. As Hall (1978, 9) points out, statistics “have an ideological function: they appear to 
ground free floating and controversial impressions in the hard, incontrovertible soil of numbers. 
Both the media and the public have enormous respect for ‘the facts’ – hard facts. And there is no 
fact so ‘hard’ as a number”. 
The ACWF played an active role during the discussion of the marriage law. As an 
organization focusing on family and marriage, the ACWF suggested to the Amending Marriage 
Law Committee (xiugan hunyin fa weiyuan hui) that bigamy in the Penal Code should include 
the practice of any kind of cohabitation (regardless of whether they do so with or without an 
announcement of husband and wife) (Zhao 2000). The ACWF also advised the committee to add 
an article in the principle part of the marriage law “protecting marriage and family and 
prohibiting behaviors that destroy monogamy”.60 The Guangdong Women’s Federation 
suggested that the law must punish men and women who participate in the practice of “keeping a 
second wife”. Based on the service for supporting wives, the Guangdong Women’s Federation 
particularly suggested that the “third party” ( “second wives” ) have transgressed the boundary of 
family and marriage and hence bear legal liability for their actions.
61
 
The term “spousal rights” (pei’ou quan) circulated widely during the course of the public 
discussion, suggesting that wives have the right to require police and procuratorial bodies to 
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  See the Department of Rights and Interests of ACWF. 2000. “Firmly control behaviors of bigamy, concubinage, 
‘keeping a second wife’ and the like: one of suggestions for amending the Marriage Law”. Zhongguo fuyun 
(Women’s Movement of China) 9:2-3. 
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 Sun, Chaofang. 2002. “Guangzhou fulian baohu funü quanyi” (Guangzhou Women’s Federation defends 
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investigate husbands’ affairs and arrest second wives.62  The proclaimed “spousal rights” 
attracted a great deal of attention in the resultant media furor. In particular, the Guangzhou 
Women’s Federation supported the concept of “spousal rights” in the public discussions.  The 
Guangzhou Women’s Federation employed its statistics to demonstrate that the number of 
appeals had decreased and interpreted these figures to show that wives were expecting the 
promulgation of new legal punishments and compensation from their straying husbands. 
63
  The 
Guangdong Women’s Federation suggested adding the concept of spousal rights into the 
marriage law because the practice of “keeping a second wife” violated the legal wife’s “human 
rights”, defined as “spousal rights” with particular reference to her rights to access her husband’s 
financial resources (since the husband was assumed to be supporting the “second wife” as well). 
They defined spouse rights as “basic identity rights”, which included name rights, decision right 
of abode, compulsory cohabitation, and compulsory fidelity (or “compulsory chastity”). The 
laws did make provision for name right and decision right of abode; however, for the ACWF, 
compulsory cohabitation and compulsory fidelity were essential elements of “spousal rights” that 
the new law should include (Yuan 2006).  Therefore, the ACWF advocated that the law should 
penalize the “illicit cohabitation” of a married person (yihun feifa tongju zui). By criminalizing 
the practice of “keeping a second wife”, extramarital sex could finally be restrained, and 
monogamy be made triumphant. In the process, women’s rights and wellbeing are protected 
(Yuan 2006). 
 Nevertheless, the post-Mao state has shifted toward a new strategy of governance. It 
intends to restrain sexuality via the legislative framework as well as through a variety of media 
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 See Yuan 2006. 
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  Zhu Daqiang, 2001. “Xin hunyin fa hou ruhe chuli jiating hunyin wenti (How to solve family and marriage 
problems after the new marriage law). Yangcheng wanbao, May 14.  
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discourses. Unlike the drafting the 1950 marriage law, which primarily relied on ACWF leaders, 
the committee for amending the 2001 marriage law consisted of legal experts. The ACWF was 
marginalized during the time leading up to the passage of the new law, and ACWF’s suggestions 
were not adopted by the committee. The new clause added to the marriage law was carefully 
formulated by the legal experts in order to narrow the definition of bigamy and to limit the 
applicability of the concept. 
64
 
 With limited resources, this study is unable to address the conflicts and compromises 
forged between the ACWF and the Amending Marriage Law Committee. What were the exact 
particulars of ACWF’s role within the committee structure? How did the ACWF perceive the 
final draft of the new marriage law? Was the ACWF satisfied or disappointed?  What strategies 
did the ACWF employ to protect wives after the 2001 marriage law was issued? These details 
will be left to further studies. 
With the newly amended marriage law, women’s federations strived to make use of the 
added clause and encouraged wives to “wield the weapon of the law” to protect their interests 
when the marriage veers out of control. 
65
  One phenomenon appeared in the wake of the 
promulgation of the law: voluntary lawyers mobilized by the Women’s Federations frequently 
went to the streets to provide legal advice to wives who had evidence of their husbands’ “illicit 
cohabitation”.66 
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This chapter has focused intensively on news accounts of “keeping a second wife” in 
relation to the dominant discourses of gender, marriage and sexuality established at the founding 
of the PRC. It argued that the news reports of “keeping a second wife” formulate a narrative of 
“family crisis”, through which the ideology of marriage and sexuality is re-articulated to 
discipline diverse practices of sexuality prevalent during the post-Mao period.  
As demonstrated, the core of the news narrative is based on the gendered discourse of 
marriage, family and sexuality first established during the Maoist period. Moreover, news reports 
adopt and develop the discourse in the post Mao period.  A “common sense” understanding of 
gender (e.g., emphasis on the physical attraction of the female sex and the male promiscuity) is 
used to sketch the storylines to convince the news readers. Based on “common sense”, the news 
accounts portray crimes and perceived sexual chaos as threats to the PRC’s family institution, the 
foundation of the Chinese society, through which the news stories have created a ‘family crisis”. 
This narrative is in line with the official condemnation of “keeping a second wife” and 
coordinates perfectly with the state efforts to reinforce the family. Editorial opinions, 
commentators, legal experts, marriage counselors, and government agencies repeatedly 
condemned “keeping a second wife” as a threat to “family harmony” and social stability. This 
led to the amendment of the marriage law in 2001, which aimed to restrain sexual relations out of 
wedlock. 
Three salient themes are articulated in the news narrative of “keeping a second wife’. 
First, the family crisis suggests that one has to “manage marriage” in order to overcome 
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110 
 
challenges during the time of crisis; in particular, managing marriage is primarily considered the 
wives’ responsibility, and hence the media, marriage consultants, and love experts all prescribe 
solutions that aim to “improve” wives’ physical appearance and suzhi in order to manage the 
“nature” of male sex. Second, the ideological orchestration of gender apparent in the media 
discourse dictates that male promiscuity and the bad sexual mores of women lead to corruption 
that not only seriously undermines family harmony, but more seriously brings harm to the state. 
Third, the idea that sexual activity within the bounds of the marital relation is the only way to 
preserve morality is disseminated through stories of sexual chaos. These three themes will 
provide the interpretive keys used to discuss audience perception in the following chapters. 
The origin of the term “keeping a second wife” reflects two salient issues in the post-Mao 
era: gender inequality and the emergence of China’s new rich class. Gender relations in post-
Mao China have been marked by a return to the emphasis upon femininity and biological 
difference. Moreover, the post-socialist regime has withdrawn affirmative policies of gender 
equality (nannü pingdeng); as a consequence, women’s economic and symbolic status has 
deteriorated. For example, marketization and essentialist understandings of gender since the late 
1980s have given rise to the discourses of “women’s returning home” (Wallis 2006), “managing 
marriage”, and “doing well is not as good as marrying well”.67 During the flourishing discourse 
of domesticating women, what has emerged in tandem is men’s class, which becomes a primary 
condition for mate selection in terms of women’s social upward mobility. The media borrowed 
this term, and while seemingly echoing these social concerns, encoded the narrative for 
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reinforcing an established gendered discourse and pushing individuals into family structures 
designed to “achieve social stability”. The state and its media arm have filtered gender inequality 
and the issue of class out of the encoding process; instead, the media used “common sense” 
assumptions regarding gender to reinforce the established gender ideology for social control. 
Hall (1973) does not elaborate upon the complex encoding process in the case of British media. 
In an authoritarian state such as China, the encoding process regarding the narrative presentation 
of the practice of “keeping a second wife” may help to illustrate the ways in which encoding 
both orchestrates “reality” and deflects socials concerns. 
  The content analysis of “keeping a second wife” reveals that the state is still enthusiastic 
about intervening in the private sphere.  The supposed retreat of the state (Farrer 2002, Pan 2006) 
from individuals’ private lives is only partial.   Intervention under the Maoist regime governed 
nearly every aspect of private life: mate selection, wedding ceremonies, marital life, family 
organization (women as “house managers”) and sexual behaviours (penalizing sex outside of 
wedlock), whereas the post-socialist state has withdrawn these interventions in material 
regulations and laws. Nevertheless, this does not mean that the post-socialist state has no interest 
in managing individuals’ private lives. On the contrary, despite the diversity of sexual practices 
prevalent in Chinese society, the state still attempts to maintain a degree of its former control, 
such as through the promulgation of the 2001 Marriage Law. The established discourse remains 
operative at present, attempting to direct men and women and their ways of living in terms of 
marriage and sexuality, providing clear echoes of the state’s strategies for regulating sexuality 
and reinforcing the family.  
The media creation of the family crisis indicates, on the one hand, the state continues to 
takes an interventionist approach (mainly within the domain of discourse and ideology) with 
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regard to individuals’ private lives. On the other, it reflects emerging social changes in sexual 
culture that shake the dominant position of the established ideology. Reinforcing “family 
harmony” is a means of social control in a longstanding political tradition. Culturally, the 
concept of state (guojia) in the Chinese context literally combines two elements “guo” (state) and 
“jia” (family) that are tightly connected to complete the conception of the state.  Therefore, the 
“family crisis” is a crisis of the state. It is no wonder that the state has made efforts to respond to 
the crisis. In this sense, it is impossible for the state to retreat from regulating the family, 





















  A middle class woman discusses what “managing marriage” means to her: 
 
Because of our societal structure, a man focuses more on his career. He knows he has a 
wife and a kid at home, and [his] major responsibility is to make money and to maintain 
[his] career. He does not have more attention and energy in this respect [of managing 
marriage]. Also, a man’s heart is not as attentive as a woman’s. Sometimes he has needs, 
but he is unable to pay attention to trivial things that need to be taken care of. But when 
the woman has done [things that nurture the marriage], he will feel it. Therefore, 
managing marriage must be the woman’s responsibility. [She] must constantly give him 
fresh feelings and non-stop surprises, and then he will feel interested, and he will feel that 
he can’t wait to return home after work.   
 (ZhengZheng, thirty-one years old) 
 
 A woman factory worker, on the other hand, understands this differently: 
As some people said, you must manage marriage. It is not right if a woman always yells 
at her husband. Some of my coworkers are like that and they feel good about it. What do 
they say? “I let you (husband) stand, you don’t dare to sit down”. I feel it’s not right. A 
man wants to keep ‘face’. At least a couple should have mutual respect. 
(Huangjie, forty-seven years old) 
 
   
The two excerpts are expressions of the ways in which a woman may choose to maintain a good 
relationship with her husband. The first excerpt, from an interview with a “middle class” woman, 
emphasizes a woman’s imperative to cultivate her own mental and physical “self-improvement” 
in order to capture her husband’s heart. The second excerpt is derived from an interview with an 
urban factory worker. It illustrates a different understanding of how a woman should treat her 
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husband, highlighting an atmosphere of “mutual respect”.  These two excerpts also present two 
types of masculine figures in the domestic space, presenting two very different contexts, through 
which middle class and working class women “manage marriage”.   
In this chapter, I draw upon in-depth interviews to examine interpretations of “managing 
marriage” in terms of class identity. The interviewees include 19 middle class women, 8 urban 
workers. The “middle class” women I interviewed are from Chongqing, a metropolis in the 
South West of China that used to be an industrial city where the old “proletariat” gathered during 
the Maoist era and became a site of massive layoffs throughout the 1990s. Eight urban working 
class women I interviewed were from Chongqing included former laid off workers and workers 
in state-owned factories.  
In my interviews and focus group discussions, many women employed the term 
“managing marriage” (jingying hunyin), an understanding colored by class distinction. In this 
chapter, I ask two questions: how do women make sense of “managing marriage”? And why is it 
performed in a class-coded way?  I argue, first, that the discourse of “managing marriage” is a 
strategy of domesticating the social, unloading the state’s the state’s responsibility for social 
welfare onto the shoulders of family members. Second, audiences’ understandings of managing 
marriage are class specific, illustrating the targeted nature of China’s modernizing process, 
which has focused upon the middle class as its primary subject. Moreover, building upon Judith 
Butler’s conceptualization of “gender performativity” (1988) and West and Zimmerman’s study 
of “doing gender” (1987) through everyday interaction, I argue that class position dictates 
different “gender performances” within the sphere of intimate relations. Different ways of 
“performing gender” between middle class and working class women derive not only from 
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material and performative aspects of identity but also from the type of masculinity (winners and 
losers of the market economy) present within the household.   
In this chapter, I begin by examining the discourse of managing marriage in the media’s 
creation of a family crisis, and subsequently link it to the state’s “harmonious family” project. 
Audience members’ responses to and negotiations of this “managing marriage” discourse 
compose the majority of the chapter. Hence, subsequently, I examine how middle class women 
interpret managing marriage and their ways of performing gender within the household. In the 
third section, I present a contrasting way of managing marriage from working class women. In 
the final section of the chapter, I summarize three concluding remarks in relation to the 
intertwined relations between gender, modernity and class in the post-socialist China and the 
complexities of audiences’ negotiation reflected through the site of “managing marriage”.  
The Context: “Managing Marriage” and the “Harmonious Family”  
 Managing marriage (jingying hunyin) is advice given to wives in the media creation of 
family crisis. It is also one of the issues that the audience members focused on when discussing 
“keeping a second wife”. The terminology appears in the media as a cohesive strategy for a 
family crisis, and is also in popular use as an element of the discourse concerned with mastering 
one’s happiness.  The term also contains echoes of the state-affiliated ACWF’s “harmonious 
family” project, which is a component of the state’s larger harmonious society project. Indeed, 
the phrase managing marriage carries a wide range of social, cultural, and political meanings.  
 The family crisis is one of the major themes of the media narrative of “keeping a second 
wife”. It is culturally and ideologically linked to a larger discursive context that presents crisis as 
a threat to the foundation of social stability. The importance of marriage/family within Chinese 
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society is culturally understood as an essential element of individual identity; furthermore, the 
PRC has preserved the understanding of family as the “basic cell” of the societal structure.68  
Marriage is seen as a social norm that helps individuals to understand their place in the larger 
community, making it a vital bulwark of social stability.  The family crisis is created through the 
media’s narrative of “keeping a second wife”, which is presented as a practice that disintegrates 
monogamy, causes sexual chaos, and even leads to homicide, injury and property disputes. When 
viewed through the lens of gender, the family crisis is constructed as a disturbance caused by 
unrestrained masculinity, rooted in the male’s promiscuous nature. The open-market economy is 
presented as responsible for reviving a promiscuous masculinity that had been restrained (or 
emasculated) by the Maoist state (Zheng 2009). Masculinity, empowered by money, is likened to 
a runaway horse, undoing the shackles imposed upon it by the Maoist state. Moreover, the 
transactional paradigm for heterosexual relationships (Haram 1995, Wamoyi 2010) has a 
particular reference to the Chinese culture (both prior to and since the advent of the CCP’s 
marriage law and family reforms), within which sexual relations have often been understood as 
transactional in nature. This view underlies the media’s narrative presentation of middle aged 
men who have accumulated wealth and are driven by male promiscuity to have sexual relations 
with younger women, thereby triggering a crisis in the PRC’s monogamous order.  In short, 
family crisis is a crisis of masculinity and sexual mores, an effect of the shift to a market 
economy that has the potential to crumble social stability.  
Prescriptions for enhancing the PRC’s family institution and the public’s sexual mores 
and subsequently achieving social stability come into focus via the state’s key “solution” or 
counsel to “manage marriage”. This strategy is proposed as an antidote to the family crisis, and is 
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particularly offered as a strategy for mastering promiscuous masculinity. It refers, on the one 
hand, to the meanings of a modern, rational, scientific attitude towards marriage that are 
supposedly managed as a business of ups and downs. On the other hand—despite its implied 
modernity—the term also marks a return to a traditional understanding of marriage, which treats 
the institution an “investment” in well-being regardless of an individuals’ happiness. More 
importantly, the meaning of managing marriage is characterized as a gendered task, primarily 
loading responsibilities onto women’s shoulders, due to persistent understandings of gender roles 
in the PRC.  
Managing marriage is both personal and political. The discourse does not emerge from 
thin air. As discussed in Chapter Three, the state and its agencies, such as the ACWF, have 
actively responded to the family crisis. The state has not only applied ideological propaganda, 
but has also implemented policies to reinforce cultural understandings of family. For example, 
the Marriage Law has always functioned as one of the most important benchmarks of China’s 
political transition in the PRC history.  The 1950 Marriage Law marks the triumph of the 
Communist Party’s accession to power. Whereas the 1980 Marriage Law demonstrated the 
launch of the reform and opening period, the 2001 Marriage Law is a statement of the re-
articulation of the ideology to maintain control over increasing pluralism within the private 
sphere.  The importance of marriage/family for the state comes from two approaches, which may 
contradict each other:  first, the continuing project of familial modernization, established during 
the Republic of China (ROC) is intended to disrupt the traditional family institution. However, 
the re-arranging of family and marriage is also aimed at “stabilizing society”, which harkens 
back to a Confucian tradition which Chinese modernizers (the KMT and the CCP) rejected. The 
common denominator between these approaches is the understanding of marriage and family as a 
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means of achieving social control. The current social problems represented as part of the family 
crisis endangering society are identified as problems of morality in the state’s discourse, which 
characterize contemporary transgressors as victims of a “profit-before-everything mentality, 
money above everything else, cohabitation out of wedlock, pre-marital pregnancy, keeping 
mistresses, divorce as one pleases”.69  Morality is always the target in the state’s discursive 
understanding of social problems in Chinese political history (Thornton 2007). The project of re-
establishing the “harmonious family” emphasizes human relations within the family as a means 
of solving social problems.  Hence, the Confucian language of family once again becomes 
available to and re-appears in the CCP’s discussion of a “harmonious society” 
If a father is loving and a son shows filial obedience, there will be fewer abandoned 
children and fewer homeless old people; if there is fidelity between husband and wife, 
there will be fewer tragedies and homicides caused by extramarital affairs; if an older 
brother is friendly and a younger brother is respectful, there will be fewer disputes over 




 Second, the concept of a happy family/marriage conventionally connotes one’s well-
being and social security. This idea is particularly important to the post-socialist state. The 
strategy of reinforcing human relations within the family as a way of solving social problems and 
achieving a “harmonious society” is integral to the post socialist state’s project of social control. 
Because of the regime’s overall withdrawal of social welfare measures that used to be attached to 
work units during the Maoist period, and because of its inclination toward neo-liberal 
governance (Xu 2008), the move to strengthen family/marriage as the site of social security 
becomes a familiar and available strategy for “domesticating the social” (Clarke 2004, 2007), 
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unloading the state’s responsibility for social welfare onto the shoulders of family members,  
which can be easily retrieved from the Confucian ethics and an easy method of catering to the 
masses’ consent.  Unlike the neo-liberal policies which have taken hold in Western societies, 
such as the United States, “domesticating the social” is a taken-for-granted process that is clearly 
rooted in Chinese culture and Confucian ethics, which may partially help to explain the state’s 
recent enthusiastic move toward reintroducing Confucian tradition to the CCP’s discourse. 
Hence, the family has been reinforced as a site of welfare, well-being and security in post-
socialist politics. The existing Confucian ethics, which are re-evaluated as the essence of high 
Chinese culture among intellectuals, academic circles, the government and popular culture, are 
utilized as social engineering tools for “privatizing” welfare, social security, well-being, and 
care.  All of these responsibilities are key doctrines of Confucian ethics and hence 
“domesticating the social” is perfectly consistent with the revival of Confucian modes of 
thought/governance in the party’s discourse over the past two decades, with the costs of social 
welfare “naturally” shifted from the public to the private sphere.  
 Managing marriage is also a gendered discourse.  Within the historical context of family 
projects in the PRC, the “harmonious family” initiative is associated with the state’s past efforts 
to manage the family (dangjia) (Manning 2010, Wang 2006) during the 1950s and 1960s. The 
state’s gendered labour policies defined women as “household managers” under the Maoist 
regime (Wang 2006).  “Diligently and thriftily managing the family” (qinjian chijia) and “five 
goods family” (wuhao jiating) were defined as wives’ responsibilities, and women’s primary 
tasks were located within the domestic sphere.  Like “managing the family” during the 1950s and 
1960s, the task of maintaining a “harmonious family” at present is considered “woman-work”. In 
order to synchronize with the party’s larger goal of building a harmonious society, the ACWF’s 
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harmonious family project begins with the understanding that “family is the smallest cell of 
society and thus family harmony is the groundwork for social harmony”. 71 The ACWF claims 
that there is continuity between the “woman-work” of Maoist times and the contemporary task of 
managing marriage:  
Our party and government have been taking family construction seriously, which has 
been regarded as an important matter for state governance and social harmony and 
stability […].The ACWF has a good tradition and irreplaceable advantages in the domain 
of family work (Chen 2010, 2). 
 
In order to naturalize gender roles, the ACWF has declared that the task of maintaining a 
“harmonious family” is primarily a job for women (wives), just as the “woman work” “diligently 




 Interestingly, while it does derive much of its public appeal from a revival of Confucian 
ethics, the theme of managing marriage is also a modernizing discourse that produces new 
subjectivities, in which society members re-construct the self as the “subject of value” (Smith 
1997, 222) and become particular agents of gender and modernity.  Naturalized gender roles are 
attributed to a “scientific” approach to the question of gender (Evans 1997).  Because of the 
assumed “modern” knowledge of the sexes, the “harmonious family” initiative is a project based 
on the tangled relations between gender and modernity.  It plays an important role in the party-
state’s modernizing project, bringing two aspects of civilization into play: material (wuzhi) and 
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spiritual (jingshen). As Borge Bakken (2000, 54) points out, “roughly, material civilization 
represents the growth aspect of the model, and spiritual civilization the social control aspect”.  
The material side of civilization is accounted for through China’s economic growth, whereas 
“spiritual” civilization is expected to be fulfilled via society members’ commitment to values and 
behaviours that will produce a high “quality” (suzhi) population, so as to strengthen the nation 
(Tomba 2009, Yan 2003 ). As a part of the modernity project, ACWF’s “harmonious family” 
initiative combines “women’s role” in the family, which is understood as a scientifically (and 
modern) defined truth in harmony with gender nature, and the continuing effort of modernizing 
the family adapted to the “neoliberal” context. As Chen Zhili, the ACWF chair person, states: 
[Every level of Women’s Federation] must mobilize women in family construction, and 
extensively advocates modern ideas of family construction and styles of civilized family, 
such as managing family with virtues, scientifically establishing family, building a 
civilized family, learning for family prosperity and harmoniously guarding family (Chen 
2010, 2). 
 
The strategies for building a “harmonious family” introduced by the ACWF center on three key 
concepts: love, scientific knowledge and women’s virtue, all of which are proposed as means of 
empowering women (particularly wives) to manage marriage. As part of the “harmonious 
family” project, the ACWF includes detailed sub-projects, such as “ the green family” that 
emphasizes environment friendly(lüse jiating), and “ the learning family” that emphasizes 
modern knowledge (xuexi jiating), aiming to bring “advanced” and “modern” concepts into 
“family construction”, as well as to educate “not so advanced” women in the art of managing 
marriage. 
 The discourse of harmonious family provides the primary social context in which female 
subjects are formed. It introduces the challenge of the family crisis, caused by male promiscuity, 
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which the media’s narrative presents as “natural”, and suggests the strategy of managing 
marriage as a way for women to take control of their own happiness and well-being. In addition, 
as the desirable masculinity in the post Mao regime is marked by economic status, male sexual 
nature is understood to be unrestrained among the new rich, while working class masculinity is 
deemed to be emasculated by the process of marketization. Hence, class is brought into the site 
of managing marriage. The following sections explore the ways in which gender and class 
converge in the perception of managing marriage. 
 
Middle-class women manage marriage 
 
CONSUMERS WITH SUZHI:  MIDDLE CLASS IN CHINA 
 Class used to be the major political discourse and strategy for identification and exclusion 
of the population in Maoist period (Cai 2001). Nevertheless, despite social inequality which 
existed as a function of distinctions between rural and urban households, between the Han 
majority population and ethnic minorities and between a minority of high rank cadres and the 
masses, the economic gap was not a visible phenomenon in the Maoist egalitarian society. Along 
with Deng Xiaoping’s reform policies, which aimed to “let part of people get rich first and lead 
others towards common prosperity afterwards” 73 , China’s economic reform has ushered in a 
period of stark social and economic polarization and inequality.  Ironically, as Marc Blecher 
(2009, 114) points out: “the reformers shelved class politics precisely at the time that [their] 
                                                          
73
 Deng Xiaoping said this in the meeting with American journalist Mike Wallace in September 2, 1986. See “Da 
meiguo jizhe hualaishi wen” (Answer the US Journalist Wallace’s Questions). Deng Xiaoping Wenxuan (Selected 





policies were actively and purposefully promoting the rise of new classes, the differentiation of 
old ones, and the increase of inequality among them.” With China’s successful economic growth, 
Chinese society has endured a surge of inequality. Class has been erased from the current state 
discourse for achieving a harmonious society, but it has returned with a vengeance as the reality 
of class division becomes more acute than ever.  
China’s economic development has polarized the population’s access to economic 
resources.  Sharing the benefits of an open economy, party cadres, government officials, and 
entrepreneurs are the most privileged groups, enjoying unprecedented upward mobility and 
material pleasure thanks to the market reforms (Goodman 2008). Some professionals and 
managers of state-owned enterprises (including cultural industries such as the news media) are 
also on the list of higher income earners (Wang and Davis 2010, Li 2010). Together these social 
groups are loosely identified as middle class, through the discourse generated within media, 
government and academic circles (Goodman 2008). On the other hand, while busily creating an 
economic landscape of losers and winners, the party-state has systematically withdrawn social 
welfare measures—education, Medicare and “the iron rice bowl” (secured employment) for 
workers in state-owned enterprises, in order to forcefully impose an incomplete capitalism on the 
population (Frazier 2011, Lee 1999, Park and Cai 2011). The party-state has created millions of 
redundant workers in the state-section enterprises, and most of them are female workers who 
used to be protected by their “work units” and by social welfare regulations (Cai 2009, Rosenthal 
1998).  
 Research into China’s middle class, to date, has been uneven, and the terminology is 
loosely employed and inconclusively defined. In China, middle class does not have exactly the 
same meaning as the concept does in the rest of the world, particularly in Western societies 
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(Goodman and Robison 1992, Robison and Goodman 1996), and its development is an on-going 
phenomenon that requires further observation. A middle class status in the Chinese context is 
primarily assigned to social groups which have gained economic benefits from the party-state’s 
economic policies. These groups’ income and consumption patterns provide a means for 
distinguishing their social class (Goodman 2008, Tsang 2013, Tomba 2010). Therefore, as a 
corollary of the emergence of the new rich in the post socialist period, middle class identity in 
China is formed primarily via consumption, through which the measurement of one’s social 
status is gauged.  
The rise of the middle class in China has led to a radical change not only in patterns of 
consumption, but also in perceptions of the self; and both of these developments are associated 
with the process of modernization in China. Thanks to the party-state’s wealth creation 
programs, the subjectification of the middle class has been achieved through consumerism and 
furthermore through the discourse of modernity, in which suzhi discourse (human quality) has 
become one of the “technologies of self” (Foucault 1988).  A series of “scientist-rational 
measures and programs” have been developed for the construction of “civilized” and “modern” 
selfhood (Liu 2008). China’s proclaimed modernization project, closely tied to the introduction 
of a market economy and the state’s project of opening up to the world, has produced a 
neoliberal regime that requires the subject to cultivate self in the construction of identity (Liu 
2008).  
Citizens have actively participated in the process marking the self and others with suzhi 
discourse, which has become a collective narrative in shaping class identity (Hsu 2007). This 
modern selfhood is defined as the source of high suzhi (quality) subjects that constitute the most 
qualified population within the nation (Kipnis 2006, Yan 2008). It describes a disciplinary 
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measurement to evaluate citizens’ quality as human beings (primarily in terms of expected 
behaviours, values, education and life styles) and gauge their preparedness to become subjects of 
modernity. Suzhi is associated with a highly mobile, educated, and professional group that shares 
the potential or the experience of enhanced access to resources (Kipnis 2006, Yan 2008). Social 
groups with high suzhi are acclaimed as the “backbone” (shehui jiliang) of building the 
“harmonious family”, and deemed essential to further enhancing harmonious communities that 
are the base for a “harmonious society”—the party-state’s objective in order to achieve social 
control of emerging contingencies (Tomba 2009).  
The middle class is the subject of modernity and associated with the suzhi discourse.  
Members of the middle class—urban, educated and capital-rich—constitute the most important 
actors in China’s modernization process.  The role of the middle class in the state’s triumphalist 
project of achieving the “great revival of the Chinese nation” 74 (zhonghua minzu de weida 
fuxing) is, as Tomba (2009, 593) points out, to 
help to make China one of the world’s most powerful nations […] they appear as the 
most desirable type of subject for an authoritarian state: politically docile, but willing to 
participate in an ethical and moral community in the name of social stability, consumer 
rights and virtues [...] they are being engineered, stimulated and rewarded, coddled in the 
arms of the economic opportunities, empowered by a rhetoric that justifies their 
privileges and highlights their responsibilities.   
 
 
NARRATING THE “SELF”: GENDER AND MODERNITY 
 Studies of China’s new middle class, by and large, have focused on two themes. First, 
much research has been done on the socioeconomic characteristics of wealthier groups and on 
the question of the boundaries of the middle class—how large it is and what defines middle class 
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status in comparison with the rest of society (Buckley 1999, Donald and Zhang 2008, Goodman 
and Zhang 2008). Second, fragmentary research in recent years has moved forward to focus on 
the relations between the party-state and the new middle class, investigating the subjectification 
of middle class individuals in China’s discourse of modernity (Liu 2008, Tomba 2009). These 
fragmentary studies have addressed the processes of class formation and have provided 
observations of the characteristics of China’s middle class. In this section, I pay attention to the 
ways in which the formation of the middle class affects the subject’s position, or assessed the 
impact of class formation on the perception of the middle class self. In particular I examine the 
interplay between gender and class. How do middle class women perceive themselves in class 
terms? And how do they make sense of upward mobility on the class ladder in terms of 
marriage?  These questions may broaden our understanding of the emerging middle class in 
China and provide new insights into the process of class categorization with a gender 
perspective.  
Through my personal network and a process of snowball recruitment, I interviewed 
nineteen middle class women in Chongqing.  Two women were personal friends, and after I 
interviewed them, they introduced their friends to me. Of the 19 women, 17 were professionals 
and two were housewives.  
The self of the middle class informants lies in the subjectification of the emerging middle 
class during China’s modernization process.  On the one hand, middle class women have pursued 
careers and most of them have claimed that they wanted to “feel independent”; they earn a 
relatively high income and subsequently have become more prominent consumers of material 
goods and cultural production. On the other hand, they are the “subject of gender” (Evans 2008), 
subscribe to the post-Mao discourse of gender roles and biological difference and thus their sense 
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of class identity is tightly affiliated with their husbands’ social status, through which they obtain 
access to a “middle class” state of being in China. 
One’s understanding of the self is intimately related to the social-cultural context in 
which one’s life is embedded. At the beginning of each interview, I let the interviewee talk about 
herself.  Their narratives about themselves often include terms such as education,  occupation, 
particular taste as consumers and lifestyle, all of which help to constitute middle class identity in 
China today. These women often began to talk about their educational and career backgrounds. 
All of the middle class informants have university degrees (two of them have master’s degrees), 
one of the prime social engineering tools provided to advance one’s self and to distinguish the 
self from the rest of the population.  It also implies one’s suzhi, or status as an “advanced” 
subject, with further possibilities for upward mobility, in comparison with the “backward” 
uneducated masses. Moreover, a university degree is also considered one of the keys to enjoying 
a better material and richer spiritual life. Traditionally education has been a prime means of 
entering “elite culture”, which is one of the most important social identities in Chinese society. 
Higher education for a woman (to a certain extent), in particular, adds to her value on the 
marriage market. 
The sense of self as a subject of modernity is explicitly expressed through a person’s 
narrative of the self.  The self often highlights the temporality and spatiality in which a being 
lives, with an emphasis upon the term “modern society”, in which certain values and behaviors 
are privileged vis-à-vis being “traditional”/ “conservative”. In fact, many of the informants 
employ the term “modern” to describe the world in which they live when discussing what is 
occurring in the society. Some of them explicitly employed the term “traditional” to refer to 
“other” women who stand on the opposite side of the modernization process. The comparison 
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between the “modern” being and the “traditional” “other” truly shows that the self is not 
constructed in isolation; rather, it is located in a complex of relationality. The middle class 
woman as a modern subject is likely to connect herself to  suzhi through her open-minded 
attitude and approach to the world, as contrasted with “conservative” and thus “narrow minded” 
other. 
The modern self also is the subject of consumer culture. Don Slater (1997, 1) argues that 
“consumer culture is a motif threaded through the texture of modernity, a motif that recapitulates 
the preoccupations and characteristic styles of thought of the modern west”. Middle class identity 
shapes the consuming patterns (Ho 2008, Elfick 2008) and leisure habits of the modern subject. 
When I began to contact middle class informants, each of these women expressed a preference 
regarding interview locations. Most of the middle class women I interviewed chose a quiet, 
nicely decorated space with air conditioning.  In the end, the location generally turned out to be a 
western style café or restaurant. In comparison with most Chinese style restaurants, these 
locations are characterized by a clientele that speaks with lower voices that blend into the light 
music background and behave in a “civil” manner while eating. This kind of place highlights the 
ongoing process of modernization and attracts higher income consumers (with higher suzhi), 
seeking to distance themselves from the working class behaviour seen in lower-end Chinese style 
restaurants.  
After the interviews, I also spent time with many interviewees as friends, and this gave 
me opportunities to engage in further conversations and to observe their lives.
75
  “Being cultural” 
(you wenhua, educated and thus civilized) and being modern and global in consumption are 
central to a women’s sense of identity. For example, one of my informants explicitly reveled in 
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the distinction of having a middle class consumer identity when she talked about the coupon for 
a fashion show she received in the street: “the coupon wasn’t given to anyone in street. It was 
given to someone who looked like that kind of consumer.” By “that kind of consumer”, she 
meant someone who was fashionably dressed, demonstrating not only access to money but also a 
degree of “taste.” Many middle class women participate in tea culture, both in high end tea 
houses and within their tastefully decorated homes. Middle class “tea culture” is not a thirst-
based enterprise, but rather a form of luxury consumption that demonstrates cultural identity. I 
was invited to sample tea culture by two informants at their beautiful homes and had the chance 
to see their exquisite tea equipment representing many different styles, regions and aesthetic 
tendencies. One informant claimed that all of her tea came from a small village in Hangzhou of 
Zhejiang Province, a place in South East China traditionally producing a small quantity of 
longjing cha. She makes the three hour flight at the beginning of every April, the period of the 
year when the tea achieves its optimal taste, freshness and genuine quality. She pays 60 to 100 
US dollars per 50 gram of this precious tea.
76
  Another informant told me that she was obsessed 
with an expensive type of silk made with the help of a complicated ancient technique that 
produces a distinct fabric that used to be the symbol of the evil “landlord class” during the 
Maoist period. She claimed all her clothing was made from this type of fabric. She revealed that 
this type of fabric had become a favorite with the male party cadres and officials in that region.
77
  
Some of them travel internationally as tourists for pleasure. Owning a car is also a 
statement of class identity. Each member of the household has at least one car. Moreover, the 
brand of car is crucial to demonstrate one’s class identity. One informant told me that all of her 
colleagues drove better brands of cars than she did, and that this made her feel inferior and 
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provided her with a motivation for finding a higher status husband. Many housing projects in 
urban areas have manifested evidence of the development of class status and privileges, as well 
as the ideological process of achieving self worth (Li 2010, Pow 2011). Most of my middle class 
informants live in relatively high end residential areas, with large size apartments or detached 
houses in gated communities with alert security guards.  
The desire for material goods and the taste of for luxurious pleasures are justified as the 
common pursuit of all members of today’s Chinese society, despite the major income gaps which 
shape actual patterns of consumption. Class identity generally links to the patterns of 
consumption in China as the scholars suggest (Cartier 2010, Tomba and Tang 2010), but how 
does class identity affect media consumption in particular? My fieldwork findings reveal that 
middle class women in China are likely to consume non-official media (e.g. foreign films, news 
from internet sources and social media, new consumerism magazines and the like), which 
indicates a “taste” oriented choice. The media resources of middle class women are taste-
orientated and go beyond the official structured frame (i.e. local party press and official TV 
channels). These women consume media in a way that shows the diversity of the media 
industries within a consumer culture that opens up choices that diverge from the official 
channels. Interviewees spent a considerable amount of time discussing their media 
consumption—movies they like to watch, magazines they read, websites they went to and the 
like. Cultural consumption for middle class women, particularly for younger middle class 
women, becomes a means of class distinction. Bourdieu (1984) states that taste is determined by 
one’s cultural capital and is often internalized as a marker of class identity. Middle class Chinese 
taste is produced by the pushing force of modernizing discourse that distinguishes the middle 
class from the rest of the population.  
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All of the thirty-something middle class informants I spoke to are internet shoppers, and 
many of them have blogs and/or micro-blogs (weibo) for social interaction and for recording 
their feelings and everyday lives as consumers of materials, cultural products and tourism. Most 
of these micro-blogs fall into the category of consumption diaries that provide a way of sharing 
their experiences of new food, new clothing, new home decorations, and new adventures as 
tourists, or allowing them to comment on new movies consumed via the internet or on DVD. 
When the modern women speak, they use English terms that are fashionably circulated in the 
media and social media.  Moreover, the types of cultural products they consume constitute a 
crucial distinction for middle class identity. Many informants I interviewed in Chongqing read a 
local women’s magazine The New Woman (xin nüxing) that provides fashion, brands, tourist 
information (both domestic and international), cuisines, discussions of feelings and love. By 
alluding to a “new woman”, the magazine refers to a different language of the gender from that 
of the ACWF’s state feminism, advocated through its institutional journal, zhongguo funü (the 
Women of China), which is seen as out of fashion in what McRobbie (2008) calls  the “ 
aftermath of feminism”. Internet and pirate copies of foreign cultural products have successfully 
eluded China’s censorship of foreign cultural products, despite the state’s lack of commitment to 
its promise to the WTO that it allows borderless cultural production exchanges.  Rather than 
consuming Chinese films, most of the middle class women claimed to have a preference for 
watching foreign films (Korean, Japanese and Western) that symbolize their taste and modernity.  
Moreover, the modern subject is the subject of gender. China’s middle class women 
cannot be understood without taking their male partners into account. The concept of self is 
tightly attached to marriage and the husband’s status. The perception of class identity is 
connected to marital status and, in particular, the husband’s social status. The middle class 
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women only perceive themselves as middle class via their connections to their husbands. They 
are aware of these connections between the middle class self and their male partner’s status. 
Without a middle class man to anchor her identity, a woman may easily drop out of the middle 
class category. With their income alone, they could not maintain their life style. Consequently I 
engaged in conversations with them about their husbands. Below are four excerpts exploring the 
ways in which women make sense of the relationship between middle class life and the 
husband’s earning power. These four women (Zizi, Peng, Nansan, Zhuzhu) are professionals in 
their middle thirties, whose husbands are either management staff of the state-owned enterprises 
or successful private businessmen.  
 
[As a woman] your income alone can’t support you and the child. You will also have to 
cover your car’s expenses. It costs a lot you know. You are already used to that kind of 
life. Think about it.  Can the money you are making now maintain your living standard? 
If you don’t have working experience, as a woman, in a place like Chongqing, although 
you have a university diploma, we can see how much money you will make.  
 (Zizi, a 33 year-old middle class woman) 
 
Two people (the wife and the husband) must be middle class. This is very important. It is 
something to do with what kind of home you live in and what kind of residential area you 
live in. [It is also something to do with] whether you have financial capability to take 
good care of your parents, to afford medical costs when [someone in the family] is sick, 
and to pay the mortgage when you want to buy a house. It relates to too many things. I 
think [the husband’s] economic power is so important. It is too important at present when 
everyone is responsible for his own social welfare. Now the hospitals are very corrupt. If 
you are sick, you will pay at least 100,000 [yuan], and you are required to pay it 
immediately [before you see a doctor]. You have to manage all of these. We are 
supporting four parents, and they all will be old and sick. If two of them are sick at the 
same time, we will have to pay 200,000—300,000 [yuan] for the sick elders at once. 
What will you do? At the same time, if your kid is in school, [you can’t cope with these]. 
How can one manage these things without economic foundation?   




If [my job] is going to get too demanding, I will retire. I will focus on taking care of my 
[future] child. My pension won’t be enough [to cover living expenses], so it is very 
important to have my husband to support the family […]. I won’t be working again [even 
if my child grows up].  Staying home is fine with me. I can develop some hobbies, [such 
as] learning piano, reading books and practicing tea culture. I have a bunch of friends too. 
There is a problem in Chongqing—it might be better in Beijing and Shanghai—that is, 
there doesn’t exist a circle. For example, if I am surrounded by a social circle in which 
everyone is staying home to take care of children, and we have some activities within the 
circle, such as going trips and communicating, that would be better [for women to stay at 
home]. 
 (Nansan, a 34 year-old middle class woman) 
 
According to [my husband], the work I am doing now is just to entertain myself and to 
have fun. We don’t need my income at all. I just need my work to enrich my life. I don’t 
need to be home every day, so I choose to keep my job. Money never has been an issue 
between me and my husband. We hire two nannies (baomu) to take care of the 
housework. I am the one who pays for the nannies. My income alone is enough to pay the 
living expenses for my family. [My husband] gives me a large sum of money once in a 
while or buys luxury stuff. Because of his economic status, I have no worry about living 
expenses. He makes me worry free about money”.  
 (Zhuzhu, a 31 year-old middle class woman) 
 
These reflections reveal that having a middle class husband is the key factor to 
maintaining a middle class life, due to gender inequality in access to economic resources. The 
four informants above confirm that women’s income cannot maintain a middle class living 
standard; the husbands are the “backbone” of middle class households. All middle class women 
claimed that their husbands brought more income into the household.  Informant Peng confirms 
that the process of domesticating the social has devolved responsibility for social welfare onto 
family members and has consequently enhanced the value of marriage, furthermore raising the 
potential for transactional sex, which is seen as a key cause of the phenomenon of “keeping a 
second wife”.  
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Moreover, women’s social identity is an elusive category, which is always attached to 
and determined by their husbands’ social (and class) identity. This is particularly evident in 
women’s approach to narrating the self.  Through the husband’s economic status, the women 
complete and secure the desired conception of self as the subject of modernity and become 
middle class beings. The husband’s status plays a dominant role in the emergence of a sense of 
middle class selfhood in women’s class identity. This selfhood remains unstable at best if it 
stands alone. A woman’s profession, education, and income (individual income and contribution 
to household income) cannot reduce the degree of her need to rely on her husband’s economic 
resources in determining the self. All of the middle class informants confirmed that their 
husbands (or boyfriends whom they intended to marry) are men with higher social status than 
themselves. One of the informants lived with someone she liked for a while, but she chose 
another man simply because the first person’s earning power was relatively low. She said: “even 
my parents said he would be a perfect husband if he had a better job”.78  
Studies of wives’ class identification in Europe and North America have shown that a 
woman’s degree of involvement in paid work and her education appear to be important 
determinants of the extent to which she relies upon her husband’s social class for status (Davis 
and Robinson 1998). Individualism in Western industrial societies manifests itself through 
women’s participation in the labour force, declining rates of marriage, lower fertility, and men’s 
diminishing responsibility for women and children; hence, women have gained greater 
independence from men in their class identification and class awareness (Davis and Robinson 
1988). However, in the case of China, despite some gains in terms of career options and income 
earning potential, middle class women feel insecure in their class identity without a male partner. 
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“The borrowing model” of social class (Baxter 1994) between husband and wife that is 
employed to test the societies in which women have much lower employment rates still exists 
among China’s middle class women, even among those who have empowered themselves by 
pursuing their own careers.  Women in middle class occupations by no means identify 
themselves as middle class unless they confirm their class identity via their husbands’ (always 
higher) status. Hence, marriage becomes a means of attaining class identity.  
My findings on the identity of middle class women add some gender specific insights to 
the scholarship on the emerging middle class in China. First, in comparison to western societies, 
the middle class women’s sense of self remained tightly dependent upon the husband’s class 
position, revealing that the marriage pattern in China still conforms to a model of “marrying up” 
in which women, including middle class women, choose to marry men whose social status 
(economic, educational,  and political) is higher than their own. Second, the hidden power of 
gender ideology, which posits men as the breadwinners, remains an article of faith in middle 
class households, which confirms that the most desirable aspect of masculinity in China today is 
the man’s economic prowess. Because of these entrenched gender roles, China’s middle class 
women are a long way from achieving true independence, both economically and ideologically. 
When asked what an ideal husband for them is, many middle class informants pointed out that 
they had witnessed the failure of many marriages caused by the factor that wives had a higher 
income, referencing the symbolic/psychological injury to a man whose wife has more powerful 
position.  Informants clearly expressed their disapproval of marriages in which gender roles “go 
upside down”. For examples, two middle class women (Zhenzi and Kunkun) said: 
 I am in favor of this opinion [that husband should make more money than wife]. I am 
just following my instinct.  We are not living in a vacuum.  It is the reality of China. You 
feel it not a problem if you make more money than your husband does, but what about 
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your parents and other people? [All of them] will constitute every element of your 
marriage. There is no such a man who has made me admire him but needs me to support 
him. My own life is by no means in a high standard. If he is not better than me [in terms 
of earning power], or at least his capability is not as good as mine, [I wouldn’t marry 
him]. I haven’t met any man whose capability is high but makes little money. I think 
[capability and money] generally are in direct proportions. 
 (Zhenzi, A 33 year-old middle class woman) 
  
[A woman] has her own capability of making a living, but [she] mustn’t make more 
money than her husband. I have seen too many cases that a wife makes more money than 
her husband and hence leads to an unhappy marriage. Because, in China, even though the 
man doesn’t mind [his wife makes more money than he does], what about the people 
surrounding him?  
 (Kunkun, A 35 year-old middle class woman) 
 
 Third, although China’s “state feminism” (Wang 2005) has advocated “men and 
women’s equality” (nannü pingdeng) over the past six decades, women are clearly 
disadvantaged in comparison with men in terms of their access to well-paid employment, 
political representation, social status, and education. Particularly in the post-socialist period, the 
state withdrew affirmative policies of gender equality (Stockman 1994, Cai and Wu 2006). 
Middle class women’s continuing tendency to seek security through marriage illustrates that the 
current context still places serious obstacles in the way of women’s ability to achieve middle 
class status without the borrowing model. In a society in which men have the absolute power to 
control resources, as Jaschok (1988) points out in her study on concubines and bondservants in 






DOING SUZHI, DOING GENDER 
In my conversations with middle class women, I discovered that they derived much less 
happiness from career satisfaction than from marital satisfaction. This is rooted in the society’s 
lower expectations for women’s career success, along with a correspondingly higher expectation 
of marital success for women. As the popular axiom makes clear, for a woman, “working well is 
not as good as marrying well” (gan de hao buru jia de hao). Also, women’s chances for 
promotion in their careers are much lower than men’s; therefore, a woman’s occupation becomes 
the cultivation of a high suzhi, which provides her with access to higher status men in the 
marriage market. A woman’s success in life depends primarily upon her success in mate 
selection and maintaining a good marriage that will secure for her the benefits of “modern” life.  
 How is the self of middle class women related to their marriage? In other words, how do 
women articulate the self when seeking to make sense of managing marriage? Women’s 
approach to this problem reveals much about relations between the self, the discourse of 
modernity and gender ideology in contemporary China. The “technologies of the self”, in a 
gender perspective, offer women a means to manage their marriage. Managing marriage is a 
discourse of modernity, and middle class women buy into the idea as subjects of modernity. 
Distinguishing themselves from working class women, middle class women locate the self in 
modernity, a strategy that employs “modern” terms, such as love, communication, caring and 
nurture to strengthen their intimate relationships, which they understand as the keys to master the 
marriage. Some informants used the term “strong box” (baoxian xiang) to describe a “traditional 
marriage”, in which a woman makes no effort to preserve the husband’s fidelity. Against this 
construct, they counter with the idea of a “modern” marriage, which is no longer secure during 
the period of opening up.  The market economy is understood as the only means of achieving 
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modernity, and this has a pronounced psychological impact on the perception of marriage. For 
example, Zhuzhu used her cell phone as an example to illustrate how to manage marriage: 
The marriage must be managed. I give you an example. You like a cell phone at the time 
when you just have bought it. However after you have used it for a couple of years, you 
will have the desire to use another kind of cell phone. If you have the old cell phone to 
get the cover changed, and change some parts too, you will feel that you don’t have to 
buy another cell phone. [A woman] must manage [marriage]. [She] must let her life full 
of fresh feelings.  
 (Zhuzhu, a 31 year-old middle class woman) 
 
 
The mixed metaphor in this reflection echoes the media’s description of the “family 
crisis”, which is primarily deemed to be caused by masculine nature (e.g. “off with the old and 
on with the new”).79 It also complies with the media prescription that advises women to improve 
themselves both physically and “culturally”.  Performing these concepts in intimate lives is a 
matter of suzhi for middle class women. These concepts of modernity in intimate lives (Giddens 
1991, 1992) pervade with middle class women providing key words to be performed in the erotic 
sphere. 
The ways of managing marriage are understood as part of a modern woman’s suzhi, 
providing the tools which empower women to master the nature of masculinity, namely 
promiscuity, and to enter the complex of human feelings with a particular reference to 
heterosexual relations, and subsequently to satisfy men’s physical and psychological needs. 
Hence, suzhi is essential to a woman’s capacity for overcoming the challenges posed by 
masculinity. In performing love and communication, women understand the importance of 
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“wisdom” – the suzhi of the “modern self”. For example, Fong expresses how a woman with 
“wisdom” can maintain her attractiveness and confidently master her marriage:  
[A woman] should give [her husband] different kinds of feelings. She can make the man 
feel that she is his wife as well as his lover.  She can MAKE herself his bosom friend, 
and meanwhile, she is a good mother of his child…for a woman, wealth is not important, 
but wisdom for her is as important as her youth and beauty. But a women’s beauty is 
defined differently in every stage. Speaking of youth, age is a hard index, but speaking of 
beauty, a twenty something has her beauty of that age, and a thirty something has beauty 
in her way too. The key is whether a woman is clever enough to show her beauty in every 
stage. 
 (Fong, a 33 year-old middle class woman) 
 
Often middle class women compare these “qualities” with the image of “traditional” wives who 
are unable to bring these qualities into play for the purposes of managing marriage. The failure 
of marriage is attributed to the woman’s traditional (low) suzhi, which is defined as “backward”, 
“conservative” “narrow minded”, “uneducated”, and “irrational”. In the women’s perception, 
male promiscuity is deemed to be the cause of “keeping a second wife”; however, the wives also 
bear the responsibility by virtue of their suzhi. By contrast, middle class women, as “modern” 
beings, have the suzhi to cope with the family crisis, and to achieve a triumph over promiscuous 
masculinity, as Zhuzhu eloquently expressed:   
“Keeping a second wife”, in my opinion, is not a bad thing as a challenge to wives’ suzhi. 
I stand in the position as a married woman. When you have a family, for many women, 
perhaps 80 of percent women, she doesn’t know very much about exploring what the 
man exactly needs. For a traditional Chinese woman, she feels that marriage is a “strong 
box”. Many women think that way. In fact, the thing called feeling can’t be secured in 
any way. But traditional women always ignore this. So when men have money or become 
government officials, they may start to have supporting relationships. But more 
importantly, for a rich man or a government official, after all, he has much pressure from 
his career. If his wife cannot provide what he needs both physically and psychologically, 
in particular psychologically, he always will step out of the track (chugui). He has 
feelings, and he will seek [these feelings] both physically and psychologically from 
younger and prettier women. Nevertheless, I feel, a woman with good enough suzhi, as a 
140 
 
wife she can master whatever the man needs in his heart at every step, and thus this man 
will not seek a second wife ever.” 
 (Zhuzhu, a 31 year-old middle class woman) 
 
Suzhi is also a gendered discourse, in that it assigns particular qualities to males and females. It 
emphasizes gender roles based on biological difference between men and women, through which 
the marriage is invariably forged. When describing the ideal masculine qualities within marriage, 
middle class women tend to emphasize “the motivation of upward mobility” (shangjin xin) and 
“a responsible heart” (zeren xin ), referring to the man’s capacity and awareness of constantly 
providing a middle class material life. Meanwhile, the ideal feminine qualities are listed as 
attentiveness (xixin), thoughtfulness (titie), tenderness (wenrou) and supportiveness (zhichi). 
These feminine qualities are understood as the qualities needed for managing marriage, and 
hence through suzhi discourse, women are relocated in the domestic sphere and managing 
marriage becomes woman-work.  Below is an excerpt illustrating the ways in which gender roles 
are played out within marriage by Juanzi who claimed that she was in a happy marriage: 
Question: have you ever thought about quitting your job? 
 
Answer: In fact, my husband doesn’t want me to completely become a housewife. He 
feels that a woman should have her own career and her own circle of friends. He supports 
my work, but he doesn’t want me to spend too much energy on my work. He wants me to 
have enough energy to focus on the family… I put more energy on my family 
responsibility although I want to have a career. My husband says that there exist 2:8 
portions between him and me. It means that I spend 20 percent energy on my work while 
as a woman I ought to spend 80 percent energy on the household. We think this is more 
scientific.  
 
Question: in contrast, he spends 80 percent energy on his work and 20 percent on the 
household? 
 
Answer: Yes. Because he is a man, (stop to think). Before we got married, we discussed 
this. [Considering] his personalities as a man, we agreed that we ought to differentiate the 
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role between managing the inside (zhunei, household) [as my job] and the outside 
(zhuwai, career) [as his job].  
(Juanzi, a 34 year-old middle class woman) 
 
 
 Tichenor and Jaris’ studies (1999 and 2005) on the relationship between income and 
marital power in the Eastern United States challenges resource and exchange theory, which 
argues that husbands’ resources and income decide their marital power over wives within the 
household. Instead, the authors argue that the hidden power of gender ideology plays a powerful 
role in forcing wives with higher incomes to continue “doing gender” in bearing the larger 
burden of domestic labour and in bearing responsibility for their success as wives and mothers. 
They show how normative gender expectations constrain interactions in order to construct 
appropriate gender identities and to maintain men’s dominance within marriage.  
My study of middle class women in China confirms that “performing gender” prevails, 
although middle class women do not need financial support to run the household. Nevertheless, a 
belief in men as breadwinners still firmly exists among middle class women in China. However, 
the key difference here is that middle class female informants in China accept as axiomatic the 
creed that women must seek out higher status husbands, both as a means of upward social 
mobility and in order to ensure a middle class identity and their life style. Therefore, performing 
gender can be interpreted on the two aspects in China: marital satisfaction is culturally prescribed 
(with the model of “men as breadwinners”); it also entails the performance of ideologically 
scripted gender roles.  
Emphasizing gender perfomativity as acted within regulatory norms, Judith Butler (2004, 
1) argues that one does not “do” one’s gender alone, instead, one is always “doing” it with or for 
another. In West and Zimmerman's (1987) empirical study, their conceptualization of “doing 
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gender” also highlights the relationality of gender performativity.  Gender is displayed and 
constituted through everyday interaction, in which gendered identity is naturalized and validated 
(West and Zimmerman 1987), thereby allowing it to maintain asymmetrical power relations. The 
relationality of performing gender can be illustrated by the ways of middle class women’s 
interaction with the masculinity within the household.  
Because of the ways in which middle class women perceive themselves as subjects of 
modernity (i.e. their sense of entitlement to class identity) and the masculinity in the household 
(as the economic winner), they adopt particular ways of doing gender within marriage. Gendered 
labour both at work and within the household is an ongoing social practice. Hochschild’s 
conceptualization of “emotional labour” (1983 and 2003) refers to the exploitative and 
subordinating nature in feminist studies, which centres upon the socially reproduced, gendered 
commodification of emotion in organizations as well as in the sex industry and domestic 
housework. Xiao’s study (2011) on the “second wives” phenomenon in China reveals that in 
order to secure their financial resources, the “second wives” perform emotional care that wives 
with secured marital status are not necessarily eager to perform. However, my interviews with 
middle class women reveal that middle class wives (whose husbands are the primary group that 
is accused of keeping a “second wife”) perform the same emotional care as the “second wives” 
do, yet they are convinced by the discourse of modernity that this is the suzhi of a modern 
subject.  
While gendered labour within marriage exists in most societies, dictating that women 
undertake childrearing and housework, most middle class women in China have given household 
chores to different types of domestic workers (baomu, ayi and zhongdian gong), primarily rural 
migrant women and former laid-off women workers in the state sector (the new and old working 
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class women). While domestic work (childcare, cleaning, grocery shopping, cooking and 
laundry, etc) is primarily given to lower class women (Yan 2008), middle class women no longer 
need to perform domestic care tasks; instead, they focus specifically on “emotional care”, which 
is defined as work particularly related to feminine “nature”, in order to perform gender within 
marriage. The “emotional care” that middle class women perform is undertaken as a 
management strategy, a device for mastering the promiscuous masculinity of middle class men, 
success in which endeavour is deemed essential to marital satisfaction, the “natural” route to a 
woman’s success. For middle class women, performing the role of good wife and good mother, 
as one informant says, no longer refers to managing domestic chores; rather, it refers to 
“understanding” and “communication” that is linked to middle class quality (suzhi).  Fong’s 
elaborating a particular routine between her and her husband illustrates how middle class women 
do “emotional care” in managing marriage: 
First you have to make him feel you are a good wife. [For example], my husband is very 
busy. When he comes back home from work, he is too tired to say a word. Before he 
heads home from his office, he always gives me a call. [Having received his notice], I put 
his towels and house robe in the bathroom, then make his favorite tea. He doesn’t say a 
word when he steps into the door. He first goes to have a bath, and gets changed. 
Afterwards, he goes to lie down in his chair for about 20 minutes and drinks the tea I 
have made for him. A moment later, he comes to me and starts to chat: how the capital is, 
how the business meeting has gone today, and tells me about his day. Then he asks about 
our kid. This has become a routine before we go to bed. I think this whole process 
contains a lot of [meaning]. When he goes to have a bath, I make the tea for him; this 
MEANS I am a good wife. When he doesn’t want to talk, you mustn’t feel he is turning 
cold to you. He is just tired. Wait until he recovers, he will tell you everything as if you 
were his good friend. Sometimes, I give him advice and my ideas for solutions. When his 
day has not gone well, I always comfort him. We will talk like friends. Afterwards, when 
he asks about our child, I tell him something funny about the child to amuse him….you 
can’t generally conclude that because you cook and do laundry that you are a good wife. 
A good wife means more than that. A high quality marriage needs the woman to be very 
smart….the wisdom in a woman. She understands everything that the man needs. If you 
give him whatever he feels, he won’t keep a second wife….I have made [my husband] 
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feel that he must tell me everything. [For example], if he is stuck on a contract in a 
meeting, he’d go to a washroom to talk to me on the phone….yes, the management of 
marriage is very important. ”  
 (Fong, a 33 year-old middle class woman) 
 
 
The “emotional care” performed by the middle class wives illustrates that “emotional 
care” is not only rooted in the discourse of modernity (through concepts such as suzhi) and 
gender ideology, but also is something that correlates with a type of masculinity (economic 
winners). As West and Zimmerman (1987) point out, gender performativity is relational, and 
thus the “emotional care” of middle class wives is linked to the performance of masculinity.  
Many middle class women are satisfied with their husbands’ “qualities”. They employ the same 
vocabulary to express their satisfaction with masculine performance within marriage, using 
concepts like “chengsu” (maturity, a mature man is expected to be a breadwinner and to take the 
responsibilities of supporting the family), “shangjin xin” (the motivation for upward mobility) 
and “shiye xin” (career oriented), which positively describe qualities of the desirable masculinity 
that is able to bring a better life to family members.  Zhuzhu clearly explained the characteristics 
of desirable masculinity as follows:  
 
 The first condition that we should talk about is a realistic question. Economically he 
must let me feel rich; then I will have no worries about material life. This is the most 
basic security. An ideal husband at least should let his wife not worry about where to eat 
the next meal. 
 (Zhuzhu, a 31 year-old middle class woman) 
 
In addition, gender performativity in the case of middle class women’s “emotional care” 
also has a specific cultural context, which explicitly engages with the socialization of women 
into appropriate gender roles that correspond to varying definitions of “family”. This may help to 
elucidate Butler’s conceptualization of gender performativity. Many informants attempted to 
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highlight culturally defined aspects of Chinese marriage by using the term of “en qing” (kindness 
and gratitude) in order to distinguish the relationship from the western-imported term “love”, 
when asked to describe the intimate relations between a wife and a husband. Within this context, 
women not only perform as a good wife/lover/mother/a woman with suzhi, but also must 
perform as a good sister-in-law and a good daughter-in-law, by taking care of the in-laws and the 
husband’s family members. In return, she receives long term gratitude from the husband and his 
family members, which is valued as the strongest human relationship that can develop between 
married couples. This particular cultural context is utilized more intentionally as a strategy for 
managing marriage in the middle class household.  
 “Diligently and thriftily manage the family” 
 
 
THE URBAN WORKING CLASS 
The eight urban workers I interviewed individually include both urban factory workers 
and former redundant workers from the Chongqing Steel Iron Company, a gigantic state-owned 
enterprise established during the Great Leap Forward on the basis of the Maoist ideology of the 
“strong nation” and the “leading working class”. I recruited some of my interview subjects 
through a relative (also a former laid-off worker). After the first round of interviews, the group 
introduced me to their friends whom I also recruited. Their ages ranged from 29 to 55. The 
particular context of China’s Marketization, privatization and globalization processes has created 
a majority of losers while providing opportunities for the new rich to gain status (Hurst and 
Sorace 2011). During this period, the material conditions of working class life have deteriorated, 
and the repression of workers’ rights has been the inevitable consequence of the rapid 
polarization of society. As Weil (2006) puts it, “rampant corruption unites party and state 
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authorities and enterprise managers with the new private entrepreneurs in a web of alliances that 
are enriching a burgeoning capitalist class, while the working classes are exploited in ways that 
have not been seen for over half a century”. 
The devaluation of China’s working class coincided with an ideological transition which 
relegated that same class (formerly a central actor in the revolutionary struggle) to a marginal 
role in society. Linguistic formulations play a key role in these political events, as it has 
throughout the CCP’s history (Schoenhals 1992). For example, in order to minimize the impact 
of massive layoffs, the official discourse defines the layoff  as xiagang ( off duty ) and laid off 
workers as “surplus workers” (Lei 2009), convincing the workers of the necessity of the lay-offs 
in the state’s grand scheme for pursuing modernity, which requires a more “advanced” and more 
efficient work force. China’s economic reform has ushered in stark social and economic 
polarization, inequality and unrest; but, ironically, as Marc Blecher (2009, 114) points out:  
The reformers shelved class politics precisely at the time that their policies were actively 
and purposefully promoting the rise of new classes, the differentiation of old ones, and 
the increase of inequality among them.  
 
The discourse of modernity, once again, appears as a ‘taken-for-granted’ tool to 
marginalize working class, and thus, the class ideology of the Maoist regime has been 
“naturally” replaced with a binary distinction between the middle class with “modern” suzhi and 
the “traditional/conservative/backward” “other” in the dominant discourse. The capitalist class 
and middle class are categorized as the “modern” beings, whereas the “other” has been cast out 
as a backward and “traditional” population. With Jiang Zemin’s “three representatives”, 
capitalist class has been defined as the representative of “the most advanced productive force” 
(Li 2011), which has fully overthrown the Maoist ideology of the working class. The Maoist 
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understanding of the working class/proletariat (gongren jieji) as the leading class of the state has 
given way to an ideology which relegates that class to the fallen position, which are subject to a 
“symbolic annihilation” (Tuchman 1978) in the current state’s modernity project. The working 
class’ sharp loss of political power is camouflaged with the binary distinction between 
“modernity” and “tradition”. 
In contrast to middle class as the higher suzhi subject that is “placed on a higher step of 
the civilization ladder” (Tomba 2009, 597), the working class, has been dislocated as low suzhi 
population that is the barrier of the state’s modernization trajectory (Sun 2009, Tamara 2006, 
Yan 2009). The working class is represented as having “very low ability to represent and pursue 
their own interests” (Tomba 2009). The discourse of suzhi functions as an agent of alienation 
among the working class, and furthers an agenda of class oppression that covers up class 
struggles and social conflicts in China’s polarization today.  Suzhi discourse also converges with 
the state’s project of building a harmonious society to tackle social contingences when resistance 
arises to challenge the state’s authority. 
When I interviewed working class women, informants expressed a hopeful wish for their 
children’s upward mobility: I want him/her to become “a useful person in society”, a common 
expression derived from the dominant discourse which refers to individuals with high suzhi (and 
who are therefore useful). By comparison with the “useful” social groups, working class women 
obviously felt they were disposable and had little value. Compared to middle class women’s 
enthusiasm for locating themselves within the discourse of modernity, working class women 
surprisingly identified themselves as “traditional” and “conservative”. Informants were 
recommended by my networks as the ones who know “how to speak” and they did speak 
eloquently, but often qualified their opinions as “conservative” and “no longer fashionable”.  In 
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her ethnographical study on Hangzhou silk workers’  narrative of the self in relation to the “post-
socialist allegory of modernity” ( Rofel 1999, 217), Rofel points out that younger working class 
women who came of age since the end of Maoism enthusiastically embraced consumer-oriented 
domestic preoccupations generated in the post-Mao’s modernization discourse. Rofel’s finding is 
based on her fieldwork in the 1990s. During China’s accelerated modernization process in the 
past decade, the population has been more dramatically divided into different social groups based 
on their relationship with the market that links to other types of resources. As the loser of 
commodity capitalism, the working class no longer finds a place in the modernity discourse that 
it had been previously drawn to. The working class women I interviewed seemed to feel that they 
had been cast aside during China’s quest for modernity. In sharp contrast to the confidence 
displayed by middle class women in narrating the middle class self, working class women were 
hesitant when they spoke of the self. Their attitude toward speaking of the self reflects their 
dislocation of identity in the context of the modernity, in which class struggle has been erased 
and class identity is replaced by the binary distinction between “modern” and “traditional”, 
which represses what Rofel (1999, 128) calls “socialist nostalgia” as a resistance against the 
post-socialist scheme among the working class women. 
MEMORY AND LANGAUGE 
In contrast to middle class women’s taste-orientated media consumption, working class 
women have tighter relations to the official media (e.g. news from local dailies and CCTV or 
local TV channels supervised by the party’s propaganda departments), which indicates a 
structured choice. In comparison with middle class media menu, the working class is media poor. 
Working class women in the state section I interviewed in Chongqing claimed that there were no 
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newspapers or TV provided in their dormitory by the work unit (danwei) although these used to 
be available to workers during the pre-market reform era.  
The CCP has articulated workers’ interests and class leadership in its discourse since the 
Maoist period (Hershatter 2007), and some of the vocabulary has been employed in popular 
culture (e.g. films and TV dramas) and official media. As Ching Kwan Lee (2007a) points out, 
the urban workers employ the discourse provided by the regime and speak with the vocabulary 
available to them. There has been a radicalization of working class consciousness during the 
process of marketization and privatization (Chen 2006, Lee 2007b, Li 2011, Nang and Pun 
2009). Contrary to middle class women exposed to the subjectification of modernity, working 
class women locate themselves on the “traditional” side. However, their self identification as 
“being traditional” comes from a class consciousness that arises from their everyday life 
experiences. Their everyday life experience in their class position provides the available 
language, which is often quoted from Maoist working class ideology, to perceive the relations 
between themselves and other social groups.  
Urban working class women demonstrate a strong class identity which informs their 
subject position.  The Maoist legacy of the “leading working class” has provided a strong sense 
of class identity and an awareness of their marginalized position among the state-sector workers, 
including both redundant workers and current workers. The Chongqing Steel and Iron Plants 
used to include immense factories, with more than 100,000 workers and their family members 
living on the plants’ land. In the late 1990s, a large number of workers were laid off. Most of 
them were women.  One day, when I was searching for informants via my networks, my contact 
told me that several women were convinced to accept interviews, but they felt uneasy about “not 
knowing how to speak”. They understood the interview in “formal” and “official” terms, such as 
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those conducted by official journalists, and they assumed that I as the interviewer would speak 
from within the dominant discourse.  After a series of explanations, they recommended a young 
woman who “knew how to speak”.  One evening, accompanied by her aunt, 29 year old 
Tangtang, working in the coking factory of the steel company came to me and eloquently began 
her conversation in the following manner: 
I am just a LITTLE (she used emphasizing tone here) worker (xiao gongren) in the 
factory […].The policies just come to our masses no matter whether you like them or not 
and no matter whether you understand them or not. For example, when they needed 
people to participate in the discussion of raising the price of price, the qualified people 
were teachers and civil servants (gongwu yuan). You (referring to workers) don’t have 
the eligibility. We have no place to speak. Even if we were allowed to speak, time would 
be too tight for us to participate [in this kind of activity]. In order to pursue high 
efficiency, each worker [in the factory] is doing a job that is supposed to be done by two 
workers. The days of working leisurely and carefree are gone[…]Those civil servants and 
teachers have much higher income and leisure time, and also their accountability is much 
bigger. The power of workers is so poor nowadays. Now, workers (gongren) are located 
down to the bottom of the society in light of their income and other aspects. Although 
they used to say that the proletariat (gongren jieji) was the leader of this country, I have 
never felt that was true. In terms of economic status, the proletariat is in the bottom of the 
society […] The conditions of we industrial workers (chanye gongren) now are the worst 
in the society. What they let us have is enough rice porridge to fill up the stomach.  
 (Tangtang, a 29 year-old factory worker) 
 
Tangtang grew up in a family in which three generations (including her parents, her 
parents’ siblings and her late grandparents) had worked in the plant and lived on real estate 
owned by the plant. During the Maoist period, the plant functioned as a danwei (work unit), 
which was a social-spatial organizational model for the urban population that functioned as an 
enclosed social and economic space that structured the productive, social, and domestic 
activities, and livelihoods of the workers and their family members (Bjorklund 1986). Before the 
urban reforms Maoist socialist doctrine ascribed structuring functions to the danwei, which 
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helped to organize labour, spatial concerns, urban status, and welfare (Lu and Perry 1997). 
During post Mao period, the dismantling of the danwei system and the subsequent political and 
economic fall of the working class have affected the collective memory and shared past 
experiences among workers (Lee 2007a). These memories are related to the group’s shared class 
identity as the “leading working class” in the Maoist period, which contrasts sharply with their 
present “low suzhi” social status. Tangtang repeatedly used the term “we”, as did many other 
working class women.  
The Maoist terms Tangtang applied were erased from the dominant discourse when she 
came of age, but she employed these terms as if she was a member of the old proletariat. Some 
of the terms were retrieved from the Maoist class ideology including proletariat (gongren jieji), 
industrial workers (chanye gongren), and the power of workers (gongren de liliang). Scholars 
have observed that urban workers in the post-Mao period use Maoist vocabulary to defend their 
interests (Hershatter 2007, Lee 2007a, Rofel 1999), and the continued usage of Maoist working 
class discourse, drawn from the collective memory, shows the oppositional position of the 
present discourse of modernity. Hence, the Maoist vocabulary of working class challenges the 
deceptive binary of “modern” and “traditional”. Moreover, the claim of “not knowing how to 
speak” can be understood as a rejection of speaking within the present modernity discourse and 
as a sign of the confused social position of working class people in China. Over the course of the 
conversation, Tangtang’s aunt, a 48 year old worker in a different factory of the plant, sat beside 
her, watching the TV, without uttering one word. At the end of the interview, she commented 
about her niece: “she is really smart, but fate has been unfair to her. She shouldn’t be one of us”.  
With this concluding comment to her niece, the strong sense of class consciousness once again 
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gives way to suzhi discourse, which undercuts class consciousness and further terminates the 
collective action of class struggle. 
The sense of injustice was often expressed during my interviews with former laid off 
workers.  The informants often began their discussion with memories of the redundancy 
throughout the 1990s when they were only in their 30s—the age that was considered old enough 
to return home for women from the work force. What they have lost includes their material 
livelihood (the Medicare and pension that used to be attached to their “work units”), political 
privilege, and social status. Their psychological injuries were comforted by the Maoist slogan, 
“we the working class have the strength”—utilized by the post socialist state as a strategy for the 
massive lay-offs. Traditional family values also were reinforced to prevent workers’ resistance 
during the lay-off waves. For example, a popular song— called “starting over” appeared 
frequently on the state TV channel the CCTV—sung by an iconic pop singer in China and 
intentionally written to lessen the impact of the massive redundancy, formulated a new discourse 
that combined the Confucian ethics of the family with the Maoist ideology of “the leading 
working class” to encourage laid off workers in their struggles to survive. During the layoffs, 
more than 30 million workers lost employment and social welfare protection in the name of 
modernity (Cai 2006). Nearly half of the workers were laid off in the Chongqing Steel and Iron 
Company alone.
80
  Women’s memories reveal bitterness and a sense of being unfairly treated, 
along with a strong consciousness of the devaluation of the working class. Often they began to 
speak from their identity as redundant workers.  Wong, a 48-year old former redundant worker 
who used to work in a factory and now has a tiny booth in a grocery market began her talk this 
way:  
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 We are “surplus workers” (xiagang gongren), so we always pay attention to any news 
that is good for us. [… ] Now this society’s distribution is so unfair. The government 
officials have money and power; the leaders of state run enterprises have money and 
businessmen too. What about us? I am working very hard with my bare hands to make a 
hard living. I am having a very hard (xinku) life. Both I and my husband are unemployed 
workers (shiye gongren). Our income is unstable.”  
 (Wong, a 48 year-old former redundant worker) 
 
 
Like Tangtang, Wong listed the advantaged groups in comparison with her own life experience. 
She interchangeably employed the state’s definition of xiagang gongren (surplus workers) and 
shiye gongren (unemployed workers), a term that is erased from the state discourse but circulates 
widely as an alternative expression in everyday life. The alternative term contests the state’s 
discourse by revealing the working class’ reality. The class consciousness rising from everyday 
life experience challenges the state’s “harmonious society”, which utilizes Confucianism to 
obscure the increasing tension between classes. 
 MANAGING MARRIAGE IN THE WORKING CLASS HOUSEHOLD  
The interactionality of “doing gender” determines a different way of managing marriage 
for the working class women.  In contrast with the middle class women’s emphasis upon self-
improvement in order to attract exemplars of desirable masculinity (both in terms of physical 
appearance and the added self-worth born of “cultural cultivation”), working class women claim 
that they have no worries about a straying husband because the bearer of masculine identity in a 
working class home has been emasculated by the market economy. Chaoming, a former 
redundant woman worker expressed her point of view of men’s extramarital affairs:   
“Keeping a second wife” happens among government officials and businessmen. They 
have money. My husband doesn’t have money to do that. He can’t even support himself, 
so who would hook up with him? […] if he wants to flirt with someone, once the woman 
finds he has no money, he can’t go on anymore (laugh). The world is so realistic, and 
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everything costs money. Going to the cinema? It costs about 100 Yuan. Dinning out? It 
costs a couple of hundred. […]. You know a Chinese saying? “One has no thought of lust 
until he is rich and powerful; one does not become a thief until he is cold and starving”.  
Extramarital affairs would only last for a couple of days with poor men.  
 
 (Chaoming, a 47 year-old former redundant worker) 
 
Because of their class position and their self-understanding as “being traditional”, when 
working class women use the perceived modern term “managing marriage”,  they refer to  
particular ways of running the household and  “performing gender” in relation to working class 
masculinity. Hence, unlike middle class women perceiving “managing marriage” as a site of 
self-worth and suzhi, managing marriage becomes a different site for working class women. 
While middle class women embrace the discourse of modernity to perform “emotional labour” to 
cater to desirable masculinity at home, working class women tend to employ the discourse 
inherited from Maoist ideology to manage marriage. The working class has been subjected to the 
erasure of their identity from the public consciousness, and thus it faces the impossibility of 
searching for an available language in post socialist discourse; in consequence, the Maoist 
ideology and language justify the continued viability of a working class. 
It is intriguing to look at the vocabulary that working class women employed in talking 
about “managing marriage”. They used many of the same words that middle class women 
employed, but they applied them with different meanings pertinent to their class identity.  Middle 
class women described middle class masculinity as “a responsible heart” (zeren xin), “motivation 
for upward mobility” (shangjin xin), sense of humor (youmo gan) and “funny” (youqu). Working 
class women often shared the use of terms with their middle class counterparts, for example, “a 
responsible heart”, but this term carries different meanings in relation to working class life.  
While for middle class women, “a responsible heart” is tightly linked to the term “motivation for 
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upward mobility” (referring to the ideal masculinity which gains access to financial resources 
that will maintain the life of modernity), working class women disconnect “a responsible heart” 
from “motivation for upward mobility”, (an impossible quality for the emasculated working class 
men to have).  Instead, they connect it to the concept of “jia” (home and family), a cultural 
yearning of one’s belonging.  “A responsible heart” as a quality of masculinity always refers to 
men’s financial support to the family for both middle class and working class women. However, 
for middle class women it preliminarily refers to a man’s potential for acquiring financial 
resources to maintain the middle class life style, while working class women employ it as an 
emphasis of the husband who plays a role as a part of the family (the emphasis is not his 
financial capability). For example, Mingming described the working class women’s 
understanding of “a responsible heart” as follows:  
A husband does not necessarily make a lot of money; rather, he must have a responsible 
heart (zeren xin) to the family (jia). [For example], if [he] has children, he should support 
the family no matter how much he makes. He must be caring to the children and family 
members, such as the elders.  
 (Mingming, a 46 year-old former redundant worker) 
 
 
Because masculinity in the working class household is understood differently, working 
class women use other descriptive terms that are absent from the middle class women’s 
perception of “managing marriage”.  “Equality between men and women” (nannü pingdeng), a 
term addressed by the ACWF’s gender policy formulated during Maoist regime, is often 
emphasized by the working class women in talking of “managing marriage. The language 
employed by working class women often embodies the idea of “equality between men and 
women”.  Although women play the primary role in doing housework in a working class 
household, sharing domestic chores is more often emphasized by working class women. While 
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middle class women emphasize the importance of the economic power of the husband within 
their intimate lives, working class women attempt to dismiss the husband’s earning power by 
employing the ideology of “equality between men and women”. The belief in men as 
breadwinners is not as strong in working class households as it is in middle class households; 
instead, contributing equally to the household’s income is privileged by working class women. 
For example, Huangjie expressed her opinion about this question in the strongest possible terms:  
At least [a husband] should take the responsibility for the family. [He and the wife] share 
the responsibility together, right? I feel that it’s not right if [he] can make money and then 
he sees nobody in his eyes.  I don’t agree that a husband must make more money than 
wife [….] maybe you (refers to a husband) make more than I do, or maybe I make more 
than you do... you are laid off, but you have tried. For example, [if] I make 3,000 yuan, 
you have tried, so it doesn’t matter if you only make 2,000 yuan. Adding together, 5,000 
yuan is enough to support our family. That’s OK. Then I would be satisfied. I would 
never require you to make 3,100 or 3,200 yuan, and then you are a real man. I wouldn’t 
think you are better than me if you make more money. 
 (Huangjie, a 47 year-old factory worker) 
 
 
There are other two terms employed exclusively by working class women in managing 
marriage, “mutual respect” (xianghu zunzhong) and “diligently and thriftily managing the 
household” (qinjian chijia).  “Mutual respect” is a term that the ACWF employs to discuss 
“equality between men and women” within marriage, but it is also a way of defending working 
class masculinity. Masculinity at home is emasculated by the market ideology (Zheng 2009, 
Xiao 2011), but many working class women claim that “men have their dignity”, through which 
they justify working class identity and their intimate lives.  Their justification is achieved via the 
Maoist ideology of gender and marriage and through an essentialist understanding of the sexes 
which posits that “men know things that women do not know”.  While middle class women 
perform “emotional care” and contribute a “modern quality” and gendered “wisdom”  to the 
157 
 
marriage, working class women highlight their particular way of managing marriage with a 
“traditional” quality for a woman , xianhui (genial and prudent) , a term often used to describe 
wives’ quality in “diligently and thriftily manage the family” (qinjian chijia). For example, 
Wong described her perception of managing marriage as follow: 
[A woman] must diligently and thriftily manage the family (qinjin chijia). It’s true. This 
is the most essential for being a good wife.  It seems that more than 60% women are in 
charge of households in our country. Men hand in their salary to wives every month, and 
they keep a little pocket money [to spend on themselves]. Most of the husband’s income 
is handed to the wife, and [the wife] arranges expenses for the family. So women must 
diligently and thriftily manage the family. You can’t spend it all in the first half month 
after getting the money. What about the next half month? Starving?   
 (Wong, a 48 year-old former redundant worker) 
 
“Diligently and thriftily manage the family” (qinjian chijia) was a major theme as a part of the 
party’s  political campaign  of “ diligently and thriftily building the country” used to mobilize 
women promoted by the ACWF in 1957 ( Wang 2006). The ACWF repeatedly has emphasized it 
as “woman work” in different political times, and it has become a widely circulated slogan. It 
carries two layers of political intentions. First, it advances the gendered notion that women are 
the primary carers and “household managers” (Manning 2010, Wang 2005). Second, it aims to 
mobilize women’s labour as contributions to the collective economy (work units in urban regions 
and the People’s Communes in rural areas). The poor economic conditions during Maoist times 
hampered any attempts to modernize the family institution any more than this and subsequently 
barred the further development of “women’s liberation” (funü jiefang). Hence, the function of 
the traditional family as an economic unit continued under the collective economy of the Maoist 
regime (Croll 1981). The usage of the Maoist slogans in the working class women’s discussion 
of managing marriage reflects the cultural understanding of “jia” (home/family), an essential 
place for one’s belonging. In addition, the model of collective economy during the Maoist period 
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remains essential in the working class women’s way of managing household—by pulling all the 
family resources together, with the wife as the “manager” who treats the family as a work unit 
and distributes these resources within the “unit”. This way of “managing the household” in the 
eyes of middle class women is rather out of fashion (traditional/backward). Working class 
women’s use of a residual model drawn from the collective economy in the context of managing 
the family reveals both the continuity of Maoist gender ideology and the troubling economic 
condition of working class households under the post-socialist regime. 
Concluding remarks  
 China’s economic development has ended the Maoist egalitarian era and polarized the 
population’s access to economic resources (Goodman 2008). The rise of the middle class reflects 
that China has entered a consumerist era on the one hand; on the other, it is closely associated 
with the process of modernization in the post-Mao period. Within the party-state’s wealth 
creation projects, the middle class is seen the backbone of the state’s “harmonious society” 
project (Tomba 2009). In contrast to the middle class subjectification within the post-Mao era’s 
modernity discourse, the working class (the Maoist proletariat in state section and the rural 
migrant workers in private sections) has become the “losers” in China’s rapid economic 
development. While the middle class is categorized as the “high suzhi” group in the state social 
engineering discourses of the self ( Liu 2008, Tomba 2009), working class has undergone a 
process of  symbolic annihilation, defined as “ low suzhi” population that is seen a barrier to the 
nation’s modernization effort.  
 The site of managing marriage is intertwined with the discourse of gender, modernity, 
and the emerging phenomenon of class, all of which reflect the gender politics, modernization 
initiatives and the class formation processes of post-socialist China. The different understandings 
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of managing marriage and varied discourses employed by different social groups indicate that 
the current discourses exist across a wide range of media resources and cultural formations. 
Competing discourses and ideologies are interpreted by different social groups according to their 
own interests and social identities. Both middle class and working class women believe the 
common sense notions of gender that prevail during the post Mao period, but perform gender in 
different ways. Middle class women focus on “emotional care” in relation to middle class 
masculinity within the household, while working class women use Maoist vocabulary to 
understand their role in the family and their relationship to their working class husbands. My 
interpretation of the class distinctions within managing marriage discourse attributes divergences 
in large part to the subject-forming aspects of China’s modernization process, under which the 
middle class has become the major target of the post socialist state’s modernity discourse. By 
contrast, working class subscribes to the Maoist discourse that these subjects employed to speak 
of managing marriage and to justify their class identity. Moreover, class position dictates 
different gender performances. While middle class women perform “emotional labour” in their 
intimate lives, working class women emphasize the importance of “diligently and thriftily 
managing the family” (qinjian chijia), a Maoist slogan that derives from the family campaigns of 
the 1950s and 1960s. Managing marriage is both gendered and class-coded, a situation that 
reflects the complexities of gender politics, modernity processes and class formation in the post 
socialist China.  These different ways of “doing gender” help us to understand the material 
conditions of these women’s lives, and are  extremely pertinent to an analysis of  the subject 
positions characteristic of each class.   
 Gender and modernity are intertwined subjects. With reference to a feminist perspective, 
“modernity is gendered not just in the sense that male and female subjects experience it 
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differently, but in how its discursive terms are constituted” (Jolly 1998, 3). Modernity is also a 
global and conjunctural phenomenon. The modernity process in China has developed in 
conjunction with the outside world interacting with its own political, cultural, and historical 
characteristics. The modernity discourse in the PRC has shifted between two political eras (i.e., 
Maoist collectivism, which used to be a way of modernizing the nation, has been redefined as 
“traditional” in the post Mao period, which now equates modernity with “market ideology”). 
Thus the subjectivity of gender is shifting accordingly.  The “iron girls” of the Maoist period 
presented physically strong and mentally determined icons of femininity as collective heroines 
(Jin 2006, Manning 2010). This image is no longer desirable in the post-Mao period. The gender 
ideology in contemporary China increasingly converges with gender norms in other parts of the 
world.  Feminist discussion of gender and class in relation to neoliberalism and postfeminism 
(Gill 2008, McRobbie 2009, Skeggs 2005) illustrates that  many contemporary societies define 
femininity according to middle class values that emphasize wealth and life-style as well as 
subject formation and individual agency. Talbo (2010, 138) refers to this “consumer femininity”, 
a construction that “enters into women’s daily lives in the material and visual resources that they 
draw upon to feminize themselves”.  “Consumer femininity” now prevails in contemporary 
China as well; providing a point of convergence between the discourse of modernity and gender. 
In short, consumer femininity has become the sine qua non of “modern” female subjectivity. 
Moreover, consumer femininity in the Chinese context links to a neoliberal style of agency that 
encourages women to “creatively” manage marriage and thus to master their destiny of a higher 
class.  
 Agents with reflexive bodies are able to question and shake the gendered dichotomies of 
the modernity discourse (Tanabe and Tokita-Tanabe 2003).  However, to what extent are the 
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agents able to negotiate the structure, and/or can the agents be completely “free” vis-à-vis the 
structural factors? In what conditions can the agents be free? These questions are related to the 
binary debate surrounding the question of “active/passive” audience that animates audience 
studies.  The understandings of managing marriage expressed by both middle class and working 
class women in this chapter may help to complicate the active audience, which proposes an 
audience that acts as a collection of free agents. Nevertheless, this chapter does not claim that 
audiences’ resistance is impossible, but rather shows the complexities of active audience 
performance in relation to the gendered structure with which audiences (both middle class 
women and working class women) feel comfortable (e.g. the “common sense” of gender 
constructed as “scientific knowledge” based on biological differences).  Hence, middle class and 
working class women understand and perform the activities associated with managing marriage 
in gendered ways constructed by patriarchal modernity. During both the Maoist period and its 
sequel, women have been situated in the domestic sphere—and yet, middle class and working 
class women conceive of managing marriage in different ways that correspond to their 
positioning of self within relation to China’s modernizing process. Hence, gendered modernity 
should not be seen a deterministic structure, but rather as a power that provides certain 
constraints while inviting agencies to interact with it.  
 Moreover, within the structure, there exist multiple discourses within official media and 
other non-official media resources. While middle class women engage  with vocabulary such as 
“suzhi”, “love” and “wisdom”, working class women often employ different language retrieved 
from  the “woman work” lexicon of the Maoist period term such as “ diligently and thriftily 
managing the family”. The different vocabularies employed by these social groups indicate 
diverse discourses of marriage and family and thus reflect diverse media resources that carry 
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competing messages adopted by audiences in relation to their interests and position. Middle class 
women are comfortable with the discourse of suzhi emerging in the social engineering projects of 
the post-socialist period, while working class women stand inside of the previous discourse that 
continues to appear in the current official media to defend their interests and class identity. 
Multiple discourses and diverse media resources have offered choices to audiences. Employing 
different vocabulary from the given discourses shows the constraints of the structure while 
illustrating audiences’ subjective interaction with the media resources that furnish their 

















Changing sexuality: the dominant, the residual, the emergent 
 
 
In the spring of 2010, Wang, a fifty-three year-old associate professor at a university in 
Nanjing city, Jiangsu Province, was charged with the “crime” of “organizing licentious 
activities”(juzong yinluan).81  Many Chinese news media outlets focused on this lawsuit and 
initiated discussion about the morally deleterious effects of his behavior.  According to the 
media, Wang had actively organized sexually licentious parties for as many as 27 male and 
female adult participants, recruited through internet forums (luntan) and social media. These 
individuals met 35 times in various private locations in Nanjing during 2007 and 2008. In May 
2009, Wang decided to end these gatherings. However, in the summer of 2009, after receiving a 
number of incriminating reports, the police arrested Wang and 22 other people who were alleged 
to have participated in these sexual activities. The media mocked Wang and the other accused for 
failing to withstand the temptations of “advanced thinking” (xianjin sixiang): corrupt Western 
ideas of pursuing sexual pleasure.  
Professor Wang came under the spotlight for two reasons: first, he was no longer young 
and hence was expected to subscribe to a more “traditional” morality; second, he was an 
educator, and therefore conventionally entrusted with the responsibility of “summoning morality 
and introducing good knowledge” (chuandao shouye) in accordance with the Confucian 
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tradition. Wang’s failure to live up to these responsibilities vis-à-vis the maintenance of public 
order cast his behaviour in a shocking light.  
 The statute concerning “crimes of hooliganism” (liumang zui), an umbrella term that 
denotes a wide array of sexual behaviours out of wedlock, was removed from the Penal Code in 
1997 (Lou 1998), but “juzong yinluan” (“organizing licentious activities “or participating in 
“collective sexual behavior”) remains in the PRC’s Criminal Code. This second statute covers 
behaviour construed to be in “open defiance of the state laws and disciplines and social morality 
and subsequently gathering men and women to collectively have licentious activities”.82 The 
penalty for this offence ranges from one to five years in jail. “Immoral sexual behaviour” 
(“yinluan”, or licentious behaviours) can apply to any act that violates heteronormative 
monogamous sexuality, allowing the government to police sexual activities which could 
potentially undermine the dominant social mores. Wang’s case is by no means the only one 
involving a charge of “collective sexual activities” that has found its way into post-socialist 
Chinese courts. Wang’s case helps to illustrate the current relationship between the dominant 
articulation of societal norms, the emergent pursuit of sexual pleasure, and the re-appearance of 
Confucian tradition. Together, these elements reveal the complexities of a changing sexual 
culture in contemporary China.  
The scholarly debates concerning sexual culture in the PRC focus on a binary argument 
over whether the post-socialist state’s approach to sexuality is oppressive or indicative of a 
policy of “open-door sexuality” (Jeffreys 2006). Studies focusing on sexual discourse and the 
state’s policing sexual behaviors lead toward the former (Evans 1997, Kristof 1993, Ruan and 
Bullough 1989, Ruan 1991, Sigley 2006), while recent research on the subject of sexuality 





focusing on commercial sex, a growing gay and lesbian scene, extramarital affairs, pre-marital 
sex and pornographic literature and recent sexual discourse in the form of call-in radio, telephone 
hotlines and internet chat rooms all seem to demonstrates  the latter (Braverman 2002, Erwan 
2000, Hershatter 1996). Neither of these arguments provides an adequate portrait of the sexual 
landscape in today’s China.  
“Reinventing governance” is a catch-phrase which covers liberalizing Chinese policies 
that have been introduced to accommodate the country’s shift towards market-centric social 
relations (Jeffreys 2009, Larner 2000, Newman 2005). This strategy has caused the post-socialist 
state to retreat from its tightly controlling approach to the private sphere (Alford 2004, Farrer 
2002), and has opened up a space for new sexual cultures to emerge. Indeed, penalizing 
“abnormal” sexual behaviors and the punishment of sex out of wedlock—previously labeled as 
“liumang zui” (the crimes of hooliganism) — have been largely withdrawn. Nevertheless, as 
Wang’s case demonstrates, some sexual behaviors are still punished by the penal code; 
moreover, other types of behaviours that are not written into the penal code, such as “viewing 
pornography” (guankan yinhui luxiang) in a private location,83 can still be punished during 
politicized anti-vice campaigns, such as police “wiping out the yellow” (saohuang) raids. At the 
institutional level, strategies for intervening in private life tend to focus on policing youth 
sexuality, through an officially-approved adolescent sex education that views youth engagement 
in sex as forbidden.  For example, in October 2002, two 19 year old college students at 
Chongqing University of Post and Telecommunications were expelled for engaging in premarital 
sex, after their relationship came to the attention of educational authorities, due to the female 
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student’s pregnancy and subsequent abortion (Pan 2003).  These penalties do not apply to most 
individuals in Chinese society today, but their occasional enforcement looms large as a symbolic 
gesture of the state domination in sexuality. 
 In a Foucauldian sense, the state’s dominion over sexuality remains very much present 
within the realms of ideology and discourse, indicating that the state never has and never will 
withdraw its power to control sexuality. Therefore, while sexual practices have become quite 
diverse in reality, traditional ideological language still prevails in the media, serving as a tool for 
social control. Nevertheless, there can be no doubt that private life has been gradually diverse in 
tandem with China’s open market policies. Other types of ideologies and cultures have come to 
prominence through global interchange over the past three decades, and these ideologies and 
cultures have pushed sexual culture toward emerging practices in opposition to the party-state’s 
ideology. However, these emergent forms of sexual culture are not entirely cut off from the 
dominant forms.  The roles of sexual mores derived from the Chinese tradition, especially 
gendered sexual mores imposed on women, cannot be underestimated in today’s sexual culture. 
These longstanding attitudes and gendered sexual mores still exercise a great deal of sway over 
China’s new “sexual freedom”.   
The data for this chapter are drawn from in-depth interviews with 19 middle class 
women, 8 working class women, and 8 female college students.  This chapter deals with 
audience members’ diverse responses to media discourse of sexuality. This chapter also 
incorporates elements from interviewees’ lived experiences, through which past beliefs, 
dominant discourse imperatives and emerging sexual practices converge to sketch a fuller picture 
of sexuality in China today. My argument aims to build upon and move beyond the binary 
debates surrounding sexual culture in the PRC by providing a different interpretation of 
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contradictory phenomena found within sexual cultures in today’s China. Drawing upon 
Williams’ concepts of the dominant, residual, and emergent elements in cultural evolution (1958 
and 1977), I show that the changing sexuality in contemporary China as a process within which 
different forces and beliefs co-exist and compete. While the media narrative of “keeping a 
second wife” speaks within the established idea of monogamous sexuality within marital status 
as the only legitimate and moral form, audiences respond to it in diverse ways. Some of them 
speak in line with the media discourse whereas others either provide oppositional ideas or 
employ more “conservative” ideas about sexuality. These differences indicate the changing 
process of sexual culture in China’s social transition. I argue that the process contains multiple 
and overlapping forms of sexual culture, in which the party-state’s ideology, emergent sexual 
cultures and traditional Chinese beliefs intertwine and struggle. Without examining these 
competing forms, no understanding of sexuality within the PRC and its evolving processes can 
ever be anything but fragmentary and partial. Moreover, in addition to age-based differences in 
attitudes towards sexuality and sexual practices within studies of youth culture, I intend to 
incorporate class-based variables into my account by arguing that the “middle class”, the subject 
of modernity, is absorbing more globalized attitudes through non-official media and thus shows 
more tolerance toward emerging sexual practices than their working class counterparts.  
With reference to Williams’ notion of culture, this chapter first identifies the dominant, 
the emergent, and the residual elements of the sexual culture in contemporary China. 
Subsequently, it moves to examine the ways in which how audience members discuss sexuality. 
The examination of audiences’ responses focuses on their interpretations of the term “keeping a 
second wife”, extramarital affairs practiced by some of the middle-class women, different 
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attitudes toward “sexual freedom” between mother and daughter cohorts, and gendered “sexual 
freedom”.  
The dominant, the emergent, and the residual 
 
Raymond Williams (1958a and 1977) speaks of cultures in the plural, emphasizing power 
relations between the specific and variable cultures embraced by different social groups. He 
particularly conceptualizes culture(s) as processes of social change (1958b), arguing that a 
culture consists of a set of relations between dominant, residual, and emergent elements (1977). 
Williams’ conceptualization of culture contains an epochal analysis of history from a Marxist 
perspective, characterizing an epoch as a dominant formation of the times. For Williams, a 
culture has a dynamic and shifting quality which courses through the historical moments.  
However, the dominant formation contains different moments that consist of different variations 
and stages; hence, each epoch incorporates dynamic, contradictory relationships engaged in a 
complex interplay between dominant, residual and emergent elements. The dominant element in 
the evolution of culture is an “‘epochal analysis, a cultural process is seized as a cultural system, 
with determinate dominant features. This emphasis on dominant and definitive lineaments and 
features is important and often, in practice, quite effective” (1977, 121). The residual aspect of 
cultural change “has been formed in the past, but it is still active in the cultural process, not only 
and often not at all an element of the past but as an effective element of the present. Thus certain 
experiences, meanings, and values which cannot be expressed or substantially verified in terms 
of the dominant culture are nevertheless lived and practiced on the basis of the residue —cultural 
as well as social—of some previous social and cultural institution or formation.” (1977, 121). In 
referring to the emergent element, Williams argues that new meanings and values, new practices, 
new relationships and kinds of relationships are continually being created. 
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This tripartite understanding of cultural change offers valuable insight into the role that 
subversive and oppositional cultures play within dominant culture, showing how these elements 
become intertwined during the process of social change. These concepts can be applied to the 
current state of the changing sexual culture in China. The next step, then, is to identify and parse 
out the residual, dominant, and emergent elements within the process of changing sexuality of 
China. What is won and lost during this re-staging of the sexual landscape? How are these 
changes being perceived? How do these dominant, residual and emergent aspects play off against 
each other? These questions may deepen our understanding of sexuality and social change in 
China. Within the current scholarship, both discourse analysis approaches to sexuality and 
ethnographic studies of youth culture have failed to treat these questions in depth. Different 
approaches lead to different portraits of the sexual culture. For example, an analysis of the 
official discourse might lead the researcher to conclude that the dominant culture of sexuality is 
still monopolized by the party-state’s discourse. However, the dominant culture no longer has a 
monopoly upon Chinese thought and social relations—in fact, it could very well lose its 
dominant position.  How does the dominant culture of sexuality interact with other types of 
cultural forms in contemporary China?  As Williams (1958b) argues, new systems of production 
create new culture(s), and emergent social groups develop new cultures and ideologies.  Hence, 
Williams’ approach to culture deemphasizes the discursive practices of heteronormative and 
monogamous sexuality during a period of globalization and individualization, in which the 
pursuit of personal desires has prevailed among some social groups, especially the younger 
generations examined by youth culture studies (Farrer 2002 and 2003, Pan 2000 and 2004). 
In Williams’ conceptualization, “epochal analysis” refers to the abstracted epochal 
dominant culture as a “static type” and a social norm against which real cultural process is 
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measured. For Williams, cultural process incorporates variations and stages through which 
abstractions manifest themselves over the course of a particular period. The dominant culture of 
sexuality in the PRC is defined by state discourse from both the Maoist period and the post-Mao 
periods, each of which has contributed aspects of the epochal abstraction. However, sexuality in 
China is not governed by a homogenous culture defined solely by state discourse/ideology, 
particularly during a time of transition that is increasingly more open to global cultural exchange. 
Hence, as Williams points out, the importance of an “authentic historical analysis” that is 
attentive to the dynamics of sexual culture at this particular moment. As Williams argues: “We 
have certainly to speak of the ‘dominant’ and the ‘effective’, and in these sense of the 
hegemonic. But we find that we have also to speak, and indeed with further differentiation of 
each, of the ‘residual’ and the ‘emergent’, which in any real historical process, and at any 
moment in the process, are significant both in themselves and in what they reveal of the 
characteristics of the ‘dominant’” (1977, 121-122). Williams’ distinction between dominant, 
residual and emergent elements provides the analytical tools for a survey of sexuality in China 
that incorporates both the dominant official discourse and the celebratory claims of “sexual 
freedom” that draw upon the emergent phenomena of sexual culture. This heterogeneous 
approach to culture highlights the multiple tendencies and forms of changing sexuality in China 
today, wherein sexuality becomes a dynamic site of regulation, negotiation and contestation. 
Given that the official articulation of marriage and sexuality that has long existed remains 
powerful in Chinese media, and linked to the continuity of sexual mores within the state’s 
cultural heritage and cultural typology, it is no surprise that the dominant cultural approach to 
sexuality still exerts a strong pull upon the country’s citizens. The party-state remains the 
dominant power in the social and political spheres, and its ideological presentation of sexuality 
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and marriage cannot by any means be ignored. Sexuality was strictly monitored by legal and 
administrative regulations until the state’s recent overall withdrawal from intervening in personal 
matters such as sex out of wedlock (Ruan and Bullough 1989, Sigley 2006). And yet, these 
dominant forms do not erase the many heterogeneous sexual practices operative within Chinese 
society. Past beliefs offer a set of values derived from traditional Chinese culture. As Williams 
points out,  
The residual, by definition, has been effectively formed in the past, but it is still active in 
the cultural process, not only and often not at all as an element of the past, but as an 
effective element of the present. Thus certain experiences, meanings and values which 
cannot be expressed or substantially verified in terms of the dominant culture, are 
nevertheless lived and practiced on the basis of the residual—culture as well as social— 
of some previous social and culture institution or formation (1977, 122).  
 
This chapter does not aim to explore the complex history of these values; rather, for 
current purposes, I will focus on some elements of this value system that retain a hold upon 
quotidian life and thought in contemporary China, such as the cult of female virginity and the 
larger constellation of gendered sexual mores, which to some extent have been integrated into 
the dominant discourse. For example, the news media narrative of “keeping a second wife” has 
employed these past beliefs to illustrate the importance of marriage and family. These residual 
forms derive from a Confucian tradition that remains not only “actively effective”, but has also 
been absorbed into the party-state’ ideology (e.g. the state’s project of “harmonious family”).  
Moreover, the sexual culture has also been the site of emergent forms embodying new beliefs 
and practices in opposition to the residual and the dominant. Williams defines the emergent as 
“new meanings and values, new practices, new relationships and kinds of relationship are 
continually being created”, while warning that “it is exceptionally difficult to distinguish 
between those which are really elements of some new phase of the dominant culture… and those 
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which are substantially alternative or oppositional to it” (1977, 123). In short, this chapter 
identifies the emergent forms of sexual culture that many studies have pointed out in recent 
narratives of “sexual freedom” and accounts of the sexual practices prevalent within youth 
culture (Farrer 2002, Pan 2006), which are located in the social settings of ‘advanced’ urban 
regions and other sites of westernization/globalization. The emergent forms include youth 
culture, subcultural practices such as homosexuality and sex out of wedlock (premarital sex, 
extramarital affairs, cohabitation without marriage registration), all of which are practiced by 
certain social groups. 
The dominant is engaged in a continuous struggle to sustain and extend its dominance 
through a variety of strategies—the official media, education, legal forms and administrative and 
party sanctions. The residual element can be found in the Chinese tradition, but somehow it also 
appears within the dominant discourse. The emergent element is practiced by certain social 
groups and justified through their preferable discourse and other types of media resources.  This 
struggle for dominance shows that the positions of the three elements and their cultural meanings 
are not fixed and remain in constant flux. The current sexual culture has been recuperated in a 
new articulation of officially sanctioned PRC sexuality: a mixture of traditional mores and 
Maoist sexuality.  A re-articulation of marriage and sexuality in post-Maoist times, along with 
the unexpected emergence of new cultures of “sexual freedom” together help to flesh out the 
story of changing sexuality in contemporary China. Instead of being treated merely as 
disconnected variables, these elements must be understood to have multiple and overlapping 
tendencies that affect the landscape of changing sexuality in China. This requires careful 
attention to the terms of their co-existence, with an emphasis upon the present as a cultural 
moment containing multiple overlapping temporalities. The co-existence of cultural forms 
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suggests that China’s changing sexuality should be treated as an ongoing, rather than a 
completed, process.  
Talking sex and sexuality  
When asked questions regarding sexual mores, sex out of wedlock (questions covering 
subjects such as female virginity, premarital sex, cohabitation without marriage registration, 
extramarital affairs and attitudes toward homosexuality), the informants’ responses revealed 
diverse attitudes.  Some of them complied with the dominant discourse, while others articulated 
their advocacy of and tolerance toward sex out of wedlock. As will be shown, these views of 
sexuality showed a high correlation with the informants’ subject positions in terms of 
generational difference and class distinctions. Moreover, some parts of their understandings 
accorded with the dominant (or the residual) discourse, while other parts incorporated elements 
of the emergent culture. The following sections examine women’s perceptions of sexuality 
focusing on their interpretations of the terminology associated with the practice of “keeping a 
second wife”, the practice of engaging in extramarital affairs, generational differences towards 
notions of sexual freedom and views of female virginity.  The disparate range of approaches to 
these themes illustrates that all three elements of sexual cultural discourse continue to affect 
women’s lives in varying degrees.  
STRUGGLE FOR MEANINGS: READING THE LABEL 
Women’s interpretations of the meanings of the language formulation, “keeping a second 
wife”, tell us a great deal about the degree of their tolerance towards extramarital affairs.  Roland 
Barthes’s work (1977, 1983, and 1990) focuses on cultural semiotics, advocating an approach 
that explores meanings and ways of making meaning through an analysis of linguistic signs, in 
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which deep meanings are often hidden behind the surface meanings communicated by mass 
media. Moreover, Barthes discovers that the hidden meaning is historical and culturally 
constructed within the framework of dominant ideology. Barthes claims that linguistic signs (or 
pictures) are never value-natural, but are always intended to serve ideological purposes by 
convincing audiences to consent the dominant discourse. The term “keeping a second wife” has 
been widely circulated through news media narratives and popular culture. Because the party-
state propaganda depends heavily upon terminological and definitional stratagems (Schoenhals 
1992), the signifier of “keeping a second wife” points to a myth (in Barthes’ terminology), 
confirming that the term is intended to convey ideological meanings. The denotation of the term 
is the product of the surface meaning, which derives from an old institution. However, the term’s 
deeper meaning or ideological function serves to tar extramarital relationships with the brush of a 
stigmatized institution and threaten monogamous sexuality and established sexual mores that is 
part and parcel of the family crisis narrative.  
  However, Volosinov (1973) argues that words have ideological agency. Individuals do 
not use words passively, but actively employ them to transmit meanings of their own, as well as 
to engage in ideological interaction. Ideological phenomena penetrate deeply into everyday life 
in the words (or gestures and sounds) which describe the material world. The dialogic nature of 
utterance always involves an open relation between the speaker and listener. Hence, the listener 
is conceptualized as a responsive, autonomous agent whose actions flow through a process of 
dialogic interaction, and in consequence, individuals are able to manipulate or exercise control 
over their utterances. Volosinov’s perspective provides the grounds for an examination of 
various terminological interpretations put forth by the informants. The term “keeping a second 
wife” is a dynamic social sign, which carries different meanings for different social groups (e.g., 
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especially as defined by class and age). The meaning of the term is not subject to passive 
understanding, but depends upon the active participation of the audience. The meaning of 
“keeping a second wife” takes shape within an arena of struggle between the dominant discourse 
and individual audience members, resulting in a range of accented meanings that can be 
interpreted in multiple ways. 
The return of the term “keeping a second wife” (concubinage) from China’s ideological 
back-inventory indicates a re-articulation of the established ideology of marriage and sexuality 
that defines heteronormative marital relations as the only legitimate place for sex. The encoding 
process tends to refer to extramarital relationships as the condemned “feudal vice” 
(concubinage), and moreover stigmatizes women in this kind of relationship as “concubines”. 
Audience members’ impulse to comply with or contest the monogamous idea of sexuality comes 
to the forefront when they are asked to interpret the meaning of these terms. It is evident that 
audience members interpret the term heterogeneously. If the evidence derived from a case study 
of forty female interviewees provides any indication, factors of age and class do play roles in 
women’s interpretations of these ideologically loaded terms. For example, younger women and 
middle-class women are likely to disconnect the terminology from concubinage. Nevertheless, 
these factors are not the sole determinative indicators of women’s perceptions. There is 
unquestionably some degree of generational difference and class distinction, but women from the 
same demographic categories often reacted differently.  Investigating the factors which 
determine the informants’ interpretative tendencies may require quantitative research on a larger 
scale.  
When I asked what “keeping a second wife” (bao ernai) meant for my interviewees, 
some women referred to concubinage-like relationships and extramarital affairs interchangeably. 
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Nevertheless, for most interviewees, these two terms (extramarital affairs and concubinage) 
express very different meanings. When women referred to these practices as extramarital affairs 
(hunwai qing) and attempted to avoid using the officially sanctioned terminology, they also 
expressed much more tolerant attitudes towards “keeping a second wife”. Other women 
explicitly linked the practice to the old institution, a strategy which allowed them to express a 
moral judgment toward the individuals involved. Many women employed the terminology, but 
what they referred to was extramarital affairs, therefore, demonstrating moral neutrality toward 
the term of “keeping a second wife” when they employed it to refer to extramarital affairs. 
Informants who linked the terminology to the old institution were unlikely to tolerate it. In 
general, Chinese “common sense” condemns the institution of concubinage, while sexual 
practices out of wedlock are tolerated without moral contamination. For example, Guoguo, a 
thirty-three year old woman interchangeably employed the two meanings of the terminology to 
illustrate different attitudes when she attempted to distinguish between “acceptable” and 
“unacceptable” behaviour, and she made it clear that while extramarital affairs treated as purely 
personal affairs in today’s society, the institution of concubinage was not “acceptable”:  
 For ordinary Chinese, “keeping a second wife” is not acceptable. If two people want to 
be with each other, (stops to think), for example our parents’ generation always wants to 
stay together no matter whether they have feelings for each other. Therefore, people 
would feel hatred toward “the second wives” and the ones who “keep a second wife”. 
Now I am more objective. For example, if an acquaintance of mine is “keeping a second 
wife”, I would think first why he is doing it. Perhaps these two are in love, so I feel that’s 
all right. It’s his personal affair, so I wouldn’t care that much.  
(Guoguo, a 33 year-old middle class woman) 
 
 
These terms are understood heterogeneously.  Two main types of interpretations often appear in 
the informants’ discussions.   Neither type of response was the exclusive property of a particular 
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social group (as defined by factors such as class and age), and women within the same 
demographic groups often expressed mixed meanings in different contexts.  
 
First, the informants interpreted these activities as extramarital affairs, demonstrating a 
willingness to question the terminology and an awareness of the negative meanings associated 
with the terminology (the stigmatization of women promoted by this usage). Generally, these 
women expressed hesitation, confusion and a questioning attitude toward news reports that refer 
to all women involved in extramarital affairs as “second wives”. They often highlighted the 
social transformation that has occurred during the course of the past decade, bringing an 
increasing degree of tolerance towards the idea and the practice of sex out of wedlock. For these 
interviewees, the traditional understanding of the practice of “keeping a second wife” needed to 
adapt to a changing social context. Below are three excerpts from responses in which the 
informants questioned the use of the term: “keeping a second wife”: 
 Keeping a second wife? (Laughing). The term is from Hong Kong and Taiwan in 1990s 
specifically referring to Hong Kong men and Taiwanese businessmen back then who 
“had a mainland mistress”. It is a Cantonese term actually.  It can’t include other types of 
extramarital affairs. Now here we use the term “xiaosan” (little third) more often. It is a 
term more close to the reality. 
  (Kunkun, a 35 year-old middle class woman) 
 
 That was in high school when I first heard the term and I hated the whole idea of it. I 
thought how could it exist? Now I feel it’s normal. It’s common now.  Some people I 
know are doing it. …..now it’s not called “keeping a second wife”, it’s called “the little 
third”, referring to “the third party”, which is more neutral than the term of “keeping a 
second wife”, in my opinion. It’s not like, (stop), “second wife” is like a “minor wife” 
and “concubine”, but “little third” is relatively morally neutral, and it sounds better for 
me.  
(Juanzi, a 31 year -old middle class woman) 
 
 I really can’t understand why it is called keeping a second wife. Keeping a second wife 
means a married man has an affair and supports the woman. You provide me with 
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materials and I live with you. But sometimes, I am confused.  I’ve met so many women 
who don’t want money from men in their affairs. I can’t understand.  
 (Dashen, a 47 year-old factory worker). 
 
Second, the transactional nature of heterosexual relationships is particularly visible in 
some cultures (Wamoyi et al. 2010). Escaping from poverty and accumulating capital are given 
as primary motivations for women’s need to engage in sexual relationships with “sugar daddies” 
(Wamoyi et al. 2010).  In two different studies on young women’s sexuality in KwaZulu-Natal 
and Durban of Africa, Hunter and Leclerc-Madlala point out that women’s agency plays an 
important role in transactional sex (Hunter 2002), in which women use sexual power as a 
negotiating tool to fulfill their desires for the commodities of modernity (Leclerc-Madlala 2003). 
These findings are illuminating for the Chinese context of “keeping a second wife”. There is a 
longstanding tradition of material negotiations between the families of the engaged parties 
(Baker 1979, Ebrey 1993, Mann 1991, Watson 1991).  In traditional Chinese society, marriage 
(and concubinage) provided women with access to material well-being, as in the old saying 
“clothing and food all depend upon the man you marry” (jiahan jiahan chuanyi chifan). 
Although this was interrupted by the CCP’s family reform and “women’s liberation” project 
during the Maoist era, the cultural legacy has persisted and continues to play a dynamic role in 
the operations of the marriage market.  Young women’s sexuality is still shaped to a large extent 
by macro-level factors (e.g., economic resources, policies aiming at domesticating the social, 
consumerism, and gender norms), and post-socialist politics have promoted an intensified return 
of the transactional nature of sexuality, complete with a re-discovery of and renewed emphasis 
upon female physical appearance as a key aspect of women’s upward mobility at the micro-level 
which is very consistent with traditional Chinese culture.  
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The return of this approach to femininity in post-Maoist gender politics, together with a 
particular construction of masculinity emphasizing men’s economic resources, have activated 
women’s agency in the negotiation of sexual relationships.  The construction of femininity and 
masculinity in the market economy bears significantly upon current perceptions of the practice of 
“keeping a second wife”. When asked about the meaning of “second wife”, informants generally 
referred to a woman with youth and physical attractiveness in order to qualify for the part. 
Interviewees did not disapprove of transactional sexuality in the case of “keeping a second wife”.  
For these respondents, the physical attractiveness of young women qualified as an asset that 
ought to be used as a tool for accumulating wealth and achieving social security. This tolerant 
attitude toward transactional sexuality was more commonly expressed by middle class women 
than by working class women. Working class women showed more of an inclination to accept 
the media’s suggestion that a “second wife” is “concubine-like”, a term that carries meanings of 
“shame” and “disgrace”. The difference between middle class women and working class women 
may derive from the fact that the middle class women expressed their tolerance and openness as 
a statement of middle class identity, whereas working class women remain more attached to the 
Maoist legacy.  
In short, the informants complied with the media narrative to a certain extent, but 
disagreed as to the artificial linkage between “keeping a second wife” and the old institution of 
concubinage. Negotiation of the terminology shows that, for many women, sexuality is no longer 
rigidly restrained by the traditional monogamous framework. The state ideology is not prepared 
to leave room in its discourse for sexual behaviour that defies monogamous ideas, but various 
social groups have nevertheless opened up a space to accommodate these practices. This 
negotiation also indicates that transactional sexuality has strong cultural roots and is currently 
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embedded in very amenable soil (i.e. the market economy), providing reasons for audience 
members to begin tolerating this behaviour. It is important to note that the social meanings of 
these terms are still shifting according to the changing dictates of cultural sexual processes, and 
thus the terminology itself has become a site where the dominant, residual and emergent cultures 
converge.  
LOVE, DESIRE AND THE SELF 
While middle class women view China as a modern nation, most working class 
informants emphasize the “traditional” nature of the country. Class position not only dictates the 
nature of the informant’s relationship to modernity, but is also associated with particular views 
about sexuality.  With the “openness” of the middle class as the subject of modernity, middle 
class women tend to express tolerance toward extramarital affairs—some of the middle class 
informants had engaged in affairs, describing them as part of the search for “love” and 
“feelings”, and openly discussed their intimate affairs during the course of the interview. 
However, working class women construed extramarital affairs as serious moral lapses.  While 
middle class women emphasized “love”, “desire”, “feelings” in extramarital affairs, working 
class women were likely to single out the transactional factor between the new rich and women. 
For example, they often link extramarital affairs (and “keeping a second wife”) to moral 
weakness. Hence, they show less tolerance toward extramarital affairs. In their view of society, 
the new rich are deemed to be “the polluted”. Many working class informants claimed that 
extramarital affairs are stimulated by the new rich corrupted by money. Employing “morality” 
and asserting their moral superiority is a way of defending working class identity.  
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Working class women also show less tolerance for women who become “second wives”: 
they often employ Maoist terms to refer to second wives as “parasites” (jisheng chong) and the 
ones “gaining without working” (bu lao er huo) whereas middle class women tend to understand 
the “second wives” as either aiming for survival or for love. Working class women also point out 
the survival strategy for women in transactional sexual relationships, but at the same time they 
are likely to express a reflection on their unwillingness to become “that kind”.  
In her discussion of public homosexuality that has become increasingly visible in China, 
Rofel (2007) reveals that tolerance towards homosexuality and statements of gay rights, to some 
extent, are linked to the identity of cosmopolitan citizenship in the public culture. Echoing these 
findings, my middle class informants were eager to express their tolerance to “difference”. They 
claimed to accept homosexuality (some of them have made friends with people who have a 
different sexual orientation), pre-marital sex, extramarital relationships, and cohabitation without 
a marriage license.  Unlike official state discourse, which condemns these behaviors as threats to 
social morality, middle class women advocate these activities as a way of expressing a 
demarcation between “being modern” and “being traditional”,  thereby performing a middle 
class identity that is defined as the “civilized” and “high quality” (suzhi) as I discussed in 
Chapter Four. Interestingly, suzhi is duplicated in such a way that diverges from the state 
discourse. Tolerance and practice of “new” things is a signifier of modern suzhi. For example, 
Zhenzhi , a thirty-three year old middle class informant, laughed at a question that she thought 
too “out of fashion” (guoshi) for her, when I inquired about her opinion of pre-marital sex: 
[Cohabitation before marriage] is so trendy today. It’s not a new thing anymore that one 
can boast about. [It] is a good thing for your marital life later. You wouldn’t know what 
life as a couple is like without [cohabitation before getting married]. It would be a good 
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thing for a couple to practice before getting married even though they just live together 
with not cooking three meals a day but only eating out.  
(Zhenzhi, a 33 year-old middle class woman) 
 
 
This middle class “openness” extended to the practice “keeping a second wife”. Because the 
term “second wife” is no longer synonymous with “concubine”, but is understood as a woman 
with the assets of youth and physical attractiveness, none of these informants condemned the 
“second wives” as “morally fallen”; instead, they rejected the moral discourse in the media’s 
construction of “second wife” and interpreted this behaviour either as a realistic strategy or as 
evidence of “love”. With this rejection of the moral discourse, these women expressed a 
perception of extramarital affairs that does not comply with the media’s moral tone. Their 
approach to extramarital affairs often demonstrated their “openness” as modern subjects: 
 I just told my colleague this morning about what I had read online. It is about a young 
wife having sex with a boy who was born post-1990. She and the boy were caught in bed 
by the husband. That is what I read online.  I said to my colleague that I never had 
believed in the idea of being “caught in bed” before.  Who could be so STUPID?  Being 
STUPIDLY caught like that?  But when my neighbor was caught in bed in front of my 
eyes, I began to believe [people are really STUPID].  
 (Zhengzheng, a 31 year-old middle class woman) 
 
  Sexual mores advocated by the official discourse are seen as “traditional” by middle class 
women.  “Unconventional” sexual practices are seen as new trends brought on by the process of 
modernization. One’s acceptance of new trends is a sign of modernity, and performing 
modernity has become something of a signifier of one’s modern suzhi.  The understanding of 
modernity is likened to the appreciation of a fashion show, accepting that things constantly 
appear as the new and disappear as the old, helping to indicate one’s subscription to the subject 
position of modernity. Many middle class informants employ the term “chao” (“fashionable 
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waves”) to describe homosexuality, extramarital affairs, and premarital sex. Formerly, this term 
applied only to trends in food, clothing, magazines, and styles of films. Being “chao” 
(fashionable) refers to one’s performance of a modern suzhi. For example, when comparing the 
different meanings of “extramarital affairs” and “keeping a second wife”, one middle class 
informant Zhuzhu said:  “[these two terms] actually refer to the same thing, but the word 
“keeping” (bao) seems to come out of a more fashionable (chao) way”. Nevertheless, despite 
their tolerance and embrace of sexual liberalism, all middle class women expressed a belief in 
the importance of marriage. Cohabitation without marriage registration is a temporary behaviour 
for couples who intend to marry. These informants considered remaining unmarried throughout 
one’s life as a failure. 
Four of the middle class informants, Jojo, Jin, Yuanyuan, and Mei showed no reluctance 
to discuss the details of their extramarital affairs in a guilt-free manner. In Farrer’s (2003) and 
Chang’s (1999) studies on extramarital affairs in Shanghai and Taiwan, both scholars found a 
double standard in sexual mores which applied differently to men and women. The news 
narrative of “keeping a second wife” also echoes this double standard in sexual mores. These 
four informants challenged that kind of double standard by criticizing the cultural script and 
spoke out regarding their own experiences as participants in extramarital affairs. For these 
women, the discourse of love and romance is an accepted fact of modern life, and thus pursuing 
love and desire triumphs over gendered sexual mores. In her discussion of Ding Ling’s female 
characters, Barlow points out that “love”, “romance” and “desire” are understood as important 
conceptions of modernity in the early twentieth century of China (Barlow 2004).  If these 
conceptions have lent strength to women in the May-Fourth period to challenge traditional 
mores, they also are employed by the middle class women to justify their personal affairs in 
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contemporary time.  With the concepts of “love” and “romance”, the decision to become 
involved in affairs triumphantly expresses one’s modernity (as opposed to being a captive of 
traditional morality). All four women employed these concepts to justify their “cheating” against 
gendered sexual mores. For example, Fong, a thirty-one year old middle class woman, criticized 
a common description of “sexually loose” women in the following way: 
“Red apricot flowers climbing out of the wall”?  What do you mean? This is a modern 
society now. How could you use this traditional standard to judge women in extramarital 
affairs like that?  This saying is so ridiculous. I wouldn’t bother to criticize it.   
 (Fong, a 33 year-old middle class woman) 
 
In justifying their extramarital affairs by employing the codes of modernity, these women 
demonstrated that the cultural codes that Farrer (2003) discovered in his study on extramarital 
relationships in Shanghai, such as family responsibility and guilt, no longer dominate in 
women’s narratives. Unlike the women in Farrer’s study who ended their affairs due to the 
cultural codes, two informants had ended their affairs due to disappointment with their lovers 
and decided to permanently keep the affair unknown to their husbands. One had divorced her 
husband and started to live with the man with whom she had an affair and the fourth divorced her 
husband, married her lover but later divorced again. These stories reflect an oppositional attitude 
towards official discourse and the evolution of sexual culture in China.   
Women’s extramarital affairs in the cultural codes are defined as moral weakness. How is 
this cultural imposition on women dismantled and why do women become guilt-free in pursuing 
their sexual desires?  Farrer (2003) examines the “rhetoric of motives” within the cultural 
context, but the underlying causes of these motives remain unexamined; in particular, the 
scholarship provides no analysis of the ways in which the self plays a role in women’s 
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justification of their extramarital affairs (turning the representation of “bad women” into 
“modern women” who are expected to yearn for love and self-fulfillment). 
Anthony Giddens’ work (1990, 1991, and 1992) on modernity and intimate relationships 
helps us understand the changing nature of sexuality in contemporary China—what tensions, 
forces and experiences dominate individuals’ lived experiences and how they cope with them 
while pursuing a good life. For Giddens, one of the consequences of modernity is liberation, 
autonomy and empowerment (1992). The growth of capitalism in China has radically 
transformed individuals’ experiences of their lives, and social relations have been globalized to 
some extent, while “old” practices and meanings (both material and psychological) have 
shattered.  Life ruled by emerging knowledge and information rather than previously established 
rules and orders becomes reflexive, always subject to uncertainty, revision, and subversion in 
accordance with new conceptualizations.  In particular, intimate relationships are no longer 
embedded in local communities/structures of authority and kinship networks, patterned by 
traditional meanings; instead, they are created by mutual strangers through “a mutual process of 
self-disclosure” and sexual experimentation (1990, 121-122). Gidden’s conceptualization of 
modernity also sheds light on the relations between modernity and the idea of self (Giddens 
1991). His central idea regarding the interconnections between modernity and the self is that the 
replacement of traditional orders creates opportunities for freedom and self-actualization through 
a series of life-style choices, rather than being “given” or “discovered”. Moreover, love 
relationships take on heightened value as the principal means of creating self-identify, achieving 
authentic being and restoring emotional security (1991). Liberated sexuality can be touted as the 
key to personal meaning and social context.  
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Drawing attention to the self is a salient trait of modernity. As Giddens (1991) states, one 
of the most important hallmarks of modernity is not only related to institutions, but the reflexive 
self (1991), a free agent pursuing its own desires. The four middle class informants who made a 
point of discussing their extramarital affairs all perceived the self in modern terms. Their age 
ranges from 30 to 55. They discussed “feelings”, “love”, and sexual desires that they found hard 
to obtain within the bounds of their marriages, a situation which freed them to pursue their 
desires with other people. The guilt-free manner in which they expressed these ideas depended 
upon a justification of their extramarital affairs as means of pursuing “love” and “feelings” and 
the modern self, and thus evidently shows that modernity discourse of the self emerges in 
opposition to the established ideological position on marriage and sexuality.  Women’s 
extramarital affairs are associated with a quest to understand the self that is embedded in 
modernity. Love and feelings become keywords in women’s accounts of their extramarital 
affairs. Having an extramarital affair was interpreted in a positive manner—as a means of getting 
in touch with one’s emotions and feelings. Feelings are the immediate expression of the self in 
extramarital affairs, offering a powerful argument against the official messages of monogamous 
sexuality.  
The concepts of love, feelings and romance take the aforementioned form in women’s 
understandings of extramarital affairs as presented by Frith and McRobbie (1990, 378) in their 
analysis of the media’s impact upon women: “girls are encouraged from all directions to interpret 
their sexuality in terms of romance, to give priority to notions of love, feeling, commitment, the 
moment of bliss”. Jojo, who had an extramarital affair in the mid-1990s, recalled her love affair 




Back in the mid-1980s, my mother liked [my ex-husband] and insisted that I must marry 
him because he was talented and established in his career. So I married him. He was 
fifteen years older than me. I married him for my mother. Later in the mid-1990s, I met a 
younger man, much younger than me actually. I had such a strong feeling for him, so I 
ran away with him.  I was a bad woman in the view of the society because I left my 
family and my duty as a mother behind. But I was determined to do so for myself. I was 
thirsty for love”.  
 (Jojo, a 54 year-old middle class woman) 
 
 
In pursuing love and romance, sexual pleasure is no longer men’s privilege, but becomes an 
experience that women desire.  The informants expressed no shame in speaking of their sexual 
desires and pleasure during the course of these interviews. They talked openly about orgasm and 
sexual experience.  For example, here is what Jing and Mei said: 
 I thought I was asexual and frigid before I had sex with Yang (her lover). Now I can 
come five times when he makes love to me. It’s amazing.  It is a wonderful feeling 
having sex like that. But with Liu (her husband), I feel nothing. I just lay back to 
complete my duty, hoping to get it over with as soon as possible. 
                                                             (Jin, a 30 year-old middle class housewife)                                  
                    
[My husband] had premature ejaculation; he didn’t want to talk about it. He felt 
embarrassed when we went to see a doctor. You can compare this thing and you know 
obviously who is better in bed. With LuLing (her lover), sex is much more enjoyable. 
 (Yuanyuan, a 33 year-old middle class woman) 
 
 
In sum, these women have rejected gendered sexual mores and have embraced sexual 
liberalism in their pursuit of love, feelings and sexual pleasure. They deploy concepts of love, 
feelings and romance as ethical categories in order to justify sexual desires that have previously 
been depicted as signs of “bad women” in the cultural scripts. Modern discourse plays a major 
role in the altering the landscape of sexual culture. Nevertheless, despite their guilt free attitude 
towards their affairs, two of the informants whose husbands had higher status claimed that they 
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would rather keep their marriage for security reasons, both materially and psychologically. Both 
women also used another concept derived from Chinese culture to justify this decision: qinqing, 
which refers to a familial connection between husbands and wives that should not be sundered.  
 
NOW AND THEN: MAKING SENSE OF TIMES 
Zhuzhu reflected upon the different attitudes towards premarital sex expressed by three 
generations of women—herself, her mother and her grandmother: 
It’s not a big deal if I live with my boyfriend for a while and later for some reason we 
break up. For my mother, she may think that it’s better if I live with someone whom I 
will marry in the end. My grandmother would think I have lost some value for a girl 
(virginity) in the cohabitation. 
(Zhuzhu, a 31 year-old middle class woman) 
 
Generational difference in the perception of marriage and sexuality remains significant.  How do 
women make sense of the shifts in the perception of marriage and sexuality between different 
generation cohorts, and what are their attitudes towards these shifts?   The data for this section 
are from a focus group interview I conducted in Chongqing that happened to include four middle 
class mothers whose daughters were coming of age. The data are also drawn on some informants 
individually interviewed including both middle class women and working class women who also 
happened to have a daughter coming of age.  Older informants compared their youthful 
experiences with their daughters’ lives at present, particularly with regard to mate selection, 
courtship, marriage, and virginity. Conversely, the younger informants that I interviewed 
individually and in two focus groups of female college students compared their own lives with 
the cultural context experienced by their mother’s generation.  
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 Evans (2007) explores mother-daughter relations by reflecting on gendered meanings 
perceived by women in relation to their subjective perceptions of gender.  Subjective positioning 
of women in different political moments of the PRC is closely linked to their discursive 
environments; nevertheless their own experiences often challenge the discourse. Evans’ 
discovery is helpful for analyzing the changes as well as the liaisons between mother and 
daughter cohorts.  Over the course of conversation with my informants, the perceptions 
expressed by the older cohort evidently shows that the dominant discourse has shaped their lives. 
However, this group’s attitude towards the time of “sexual freedom” expresses a complex rather 
than a simple disapproval of the emerging sexual culture to which their daughters are subjected.  
The mothers sighed for the fun they missed during their youth and envied the “good 
times” that have grown out of the expansion of “freedom” and choices available to their 
daughters. Although mothers reflected that their generation was too conservative and had no fun, 
they also attributed positive values to their girlhood: for example, being conservative in 
courtship, shame of premarital sex and adhering to the view that dating is only for marriage.  By 
using the words “pure”, “naïve” and “innocent”, these women made clear their feelings about 
how “a girl ought to be”. Despite the “envy” they felt for their daughters’ generation’s 
“freedom”, they nevertheless expressed the sentiment that “public morals are declining day by 
day” (shifeng rixia). Hence, the mothers worried about the negative impact of “sexual freedom” 
upon their daughters.  On the one hand, the older cohort expressed worries about the younger 
cohort’s safety in the changing sexual culture, based on an understanding of weak and passive 
female sexuality. On the other hand, the mothers’ cohort was willingly subjected to current social 
morals (shehui fengqi) in order to keep pace with contemporary society, and have had no choice 
but to try to adapt themselves to the changes in the current sexual climate. For example, many 
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informants said that they did not approve of the fact that their college-aged daughters were living 
with their boyfriends, but they turned a blind eye to it and made an effort to tolerate the fact. The 
mothers’ cohort was aware of the wave of modernity, a trend toward distinguishing one’s suzhi 
as part of the superior segment of the population; therefore they expressed a passive tolerance of 
and contradictory attitude towards sexual liberalism.  
By way of contrast, the daughters’ cohort reflected on their lives by emphasizing the 
modern subjectivity which distinguished them from their mothers. They advocated in favour of 
the sexual freedom that the mother cohort deplored. “Sexual freedom” is understood among the 
daughters’ cohort within its social, cultural and historical contexts. Premarital sex is no longer 
taboo; instead, it becomes a normative part of female maturation and development.  Female 
virginity has lost the importance that it held for the mothers’ generation.  Remaining single 
throughout one’s lifetime is no longer considered abnormal, although it is seen as a lost 
opportunity for happiness. Divorce, seen as a moral weakness in the past, is accepted as part of 
“China’s moving step forward” (jinbu), based on the consideration that marriage ought to derive 
from “love” instead of mere responsibilities.  
Nevertheless, different from Giddens’ conceptualization of  autonomous individuals in 
modern society (1991), sexual freedom is neither understood primarily as an aspect of individual 
autonomy and independence nor an equal right for both sexes; rather, it is generally interpreted 
as a phenomenon related to positioning the self in line with the pushing force of  modernity.  The 
daughters’ cohort’s rejection of sexual restraints that used to be placed on the mothers’ cohort is 
not exactly identical to conceptions of free love during the 1960s in the West. Sexual freedom 
during the 1960s generally went hand in hand with a women’s consciousness-raising movement 
and the pursuit of a brand of autonomy and independence that challenged ideologically 
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prescribed gender roles (Wheeler 2013). It was a desire for autonomy that embraced the new 
urban youth culture (August 2009). Young women in the 1960s breaking out of traditional 
restrictions, seeking independence and sexual freedom and challenging male dominance grew 
common in Western societies (Lehman 2011).  
By contrast, sexual freedom in contemporary China derives from conceptions of 
modernity and life style considerations. Although transformations within institutions, cultural 
codes and social contexts are forces of changing sexuality (Farrer 2002, 2003), the understanding 
of modernity plays an important role for both the mothers’ cohort and the daughters’ cohort. The 
mothers’ cohort is seen as representative of “tradition”, while the daughters’ cohort represents 
modernity. Hence, the mother-daughter relation is a metaphor for the liaison between “tradition” 
and “modernity” and between the emergent and the residual. Nanshan, a young middle class 
woman, described the liaison in this way: “our parents’ generation is still with us, so our tradition 
is with us too”. Hence, the daughters’ positioning of the self and their identification of the liaison 
not only demonstrates their self-identity a subjects of modernity, but also reveals the interplay 
between the residual and the emergent aspects of culture.  
 GENDERED SEXUAL FREEDOM 
The previous social and cultural formation of sexuality is a set of social norms based on 
oppressive patriarchal norms.  The traditional family/marriage institution contains a whole set of 
norms designed to regulate a sexual landscape rigidly differentiated by gender (Ebrey 1991, 
1993, Levy 1968, Watson 1991). The enforcement of sexual mores fell far more heavily upon 
women, while men, by contrast, were often granted sexual license (Hsu 1971)—and this practice 
is still supported by the social construction of male promiscuity as I discuss in Chapter Three. 
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These residual ideas of female sexuality have persisted over time (and have been integrated into 
the dominant ideological view of marriage and sexuality). Female virginity and sexual 
restrictions imposed primarily on women reflect a set of values from the Chinese tradition—what 
Williams (1977) describes as “some previous social and culture institution or formation” but still 
“in effect” at present. This cultural inheritance from the Chinese tradition has been a constant 
through many different historical periods and political regimes as a residual force upon the 
changing landscape of sexual culture. These past beliefs continue to exert an influence upon 
contemporary Chinese sexual culture.  
  The residual life of these past beliefs is evident in institutional practices as well as 
women’s everyday life experiences. It is actively advocated through institutional channels such 
as the media and educational programs. The media narrative of “keeping a second wife” offers a 
textbook example of the institutional dissemination of gendered sexual mores. Sex education has 
recently become a signifier of modern education that is seen to be part of “joining the trajectory 
of the international community” (yu guoji jiegui), but it is understood as a way of reinforcing 
biological difference and is carried out through “female chastity courses” for girls, while boys’ 
courses emphasize a particular conception of masculinity associated with the term “machismo” 
(“saving masculinity”, zhengjiu yanggang qizhi) (Fang 2012).  Examples which trumpet the 
importance of female virginity continue to appear once in a while. Campaigns for protecting 
female virginity and chastity are organized by female university students who aim to preserve 
female virginity as a significant token to be offered in exchange for a husband’s love (Li 2012). 
In 2011, a female representative of the People’s Congress claimed that “a girl’s virginity is the 
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best bride’s gift to the husband’s family (po jia)”.84  She claimed the idea while serving as a VIP 
guest host at a Shanghai TV station. In 2012,  Satellite Television of Hubei Province ran a show 
for public interest promoting traditional morality, inviting an internet celebrity, “the goddess of 
chastity”, to lecture upon the importance of female virginity.85   
These advocates for female virginity have enjoyed a great deal of success in public 
discussions. The “effectiveness” of these “residual elements” is confirmed by some of my 
informants. They identified its impact and have admitted that while not all men are concerned 
about their wives’ virginity, some of them do indeed mind if their female partners (girlfriends 
and wives) are not virgins.  Female virginity is seen as something that can add to a wife’s value 
in a symbolic way, signaling that the husband receives her complete devotion, both physically 
and mentally. Some informants cited the statement written by Eileen Chang, a well known 
Shanghai writer during the 1940s, to illustrate the importance of female virginity for a husband: 
“a man conquers a woman’s full heart by taking her virginity”.  Below are two excerpts from 
accounts by two women discussing the importance of female virginity for marriage: 
 I gave my virginity to my husband. So did he to me. We got married afterwards. 
Everything was perfect for us.  He often talks about the issue [of virginity]. He feels that 
he would mind it if [I had not given my virginity to him]. I wouldn’t mind [if he wasn’t a 
virgin] as much as he would. For example, his friend’s wife was not a virgin when this 
woman married [his friend]. My husband despises her. He feels that this woman doesn’t 
deserve matrimonial happiness. In fact, I feel that female virginity is a factor that protects 
the marriage. It works in this way that husband respects you more.  
                                                                                  (Juanzi, a 34 year-old middle class woman) 
 
                                                          
84
  “Shanghai renda daibiao Bai Wanqing: zhencao shi nuhai zuihao de jiazhuang” (a Shanghai representative of the 
People’s Congress Bai Wanqing: viginity is the best bride gift), Changjiang ribao (Changjiang Daily), March 4, 
2011. 
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 “Hubei weishi tui gongyi lei jiemu, yao zhencao nusheng jiang daode” (Hubei Satellite TV plans to launch a 




[People’s taking female virginity seriously] is because of thousands-years Chinese 
tradition. In fact, people do think [female virginity] is important. How do I put this? The 
society may no longer care [whether a woman gives her virginity to her husband or not]. 
The majority of people do not care if a woman has kept her virginity until marriage. But 
if it happens to a person himself, a husband definitely will be upset about the fact that [his 
wife didn’t lose her virginity to him].  
 (Kunkun, a 35 year-old middle class woman) 
 
The celebratory accounts of “sexual freedom” do not deny the fact that the “freedom” is 
practiced in a gendered way (Farrer 2002, Pan 2006). Both qualitative studies (Farrer 2002, 
2003) and quantitative studies (Pan 2004, 2006) on “sexual freedom” note that many past beliefs 
and gendered assumptions concerning the sexual natures of men and women remain unchanged 
and continue to affect women’s lives. Consequently, although changes in sexual mores have 
generated much progress in terms of sexual equality and women do enjoy more sexual freedom 
than ever before, the space of sexual freedom left for women is much more restricted than it is 
for men. In general, men benefit far more than women from China’s extremely gendered 
interpretation of “sexual freedom”.  The evidences of gendered sexuality add an ironic account to 
the statement of “sexual freedom” and require an interpretation moving beyond the statement.  
In my informants’ accounts, female virginity is no longer viewed as an oppressive social 
norm by which every woman in the society must be judged; rather, these concerns are more 
likely to play themselves out within marital relationships (i.e., virginity becomes either a source 
of happiness or discord between husbands and wives). Often, the informants identified the place 
where they live as an “open” and “tolerant” society, in which the old norms have been forsaken; 
however, they claimed that the past norms are still valued in personal relationships. This may 
indicate that the residual element appears in a transformative way, and it is the transformation 
that allows the residual element to persist. Nevertheless, the core of residual elements remains 
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constant and carries with it the content of past beliefs. For example, female virginity played out 
in marital relationships retains a traditional symbolic meaning as a token of a woman’s physical 
and mental devotion to the male partner. Many of the informants, including both middle class 
women and working class women, have claimed that husbands take far more serious interest in 
their wives’ virginity than women do in their husbands’. On the one hand, the persistence of 
female virginity as an attribute to be valued in marital relationships may reveal the continuing 
importance of a cultural emphasis upon a “harmonious” unity in marriage, rather than as a 
partnership between two individuals with equal sexual rights. On the other hand, women’s open 
discussion of unequal sexual rights between husbands and wives may paradoxically derive from 
the fact that women have gained a greater awareness of sexual inequality within marriage. This 
awareness may indicate that the residual elements are undergoing rapid changes. 
Concluding remarks 
Sexual culture in the PRC is characterized as repressive by discourse analysis and policy 
studies (Dikotter 1995, Erwin 2000, Evans 1997, Hershatter 1996), or seen to be undergoing a 
process of sexual liberalization by youth culture studies (Farrer 2002, Pan 2000 and 2004). These 
claims and discoveries each contain some elements of truth, but neither presents a complete 
picture of sexual culture in the PRC. By building upon and moving beyond the previous studies, 
this chapter argues that sexual culture in China is a changing process that contains multiple and 
overlapping forms of sexual culture. Moreover, while age difference continues to be significant 
in attitudes towards sexuality, class emerges as a variable to examine degree of adherence to the 
official ideology of sexuality.  
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 Along with dramatic social changes in the economic and political spheres, in 
contemporary China, Chinese sexual culture is undergoing a profound transformation, in which 
the discursive practices of the dominant ideology concerning marriage and sexuality, past beliefs 
regarding sexual norms and an emergent sexual liberalism co-exist, overlap, and compete. The 
dominant ideological (and legal) view of marriage and sexuality—which has framed the 
heterosexual marital unit as the normative place for sexual relations—is challenged by the 
increasing practice of premarital sex and extramarital affairs, cohabitation without marriage 
registration and sexual behaviours previously defined as “abnormal”. Some of these emerging 
practices are subverting sexual norms and usurping the dominant position, such as premarital 
sex. Although marriage is no longer the only place for sex, it remains essential to the Chinese 
common sense understanding of happiness. All interviewees, including middle class, working 
class women, and college students, aged between 18 and 55, expressed the importance of 
marriage and viewed remaining single as a failure of life. Premarital sex often occurs among 
women who intend to marry their male partners. The past beliefs concerning female virginity 
still exist at the level of the private sphere, and sometimes can play an important role in 
determining matrimonial happiness. This indicates that the residual element remains in effect, 
but in a transformative way that makes it persistent. The effectiveness of this past belief suggests 
that the advent of “sexual freedom” does not grant equal sexual rights between women and men. 
It is, at best, a highly gendered “freedom”. These forms of sexual culture help to define the 
complex parameters of sexuality in China today.  
There are several different attitudes towards this sexual freedom. Generational difference 
continues to play a significant role as an indicator of these attitudes. Members of the younger 
generations are likely to embrace the idea of sexual freedom, lining up against their older 
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counterparts in exactly the manner that the youth culture scholarship suggests. However, my data 
collection reveals that members of the older generations are making an effort to adjust their 
views of social change in terms of sexuality. Apart from the indicator of age, my interviews with 
both middle class and working class women indicate that class may be added as an important 
determining factor with regard to attitude towards sexual freedom. Middle class interviewees 
showed more tolerance toward sexual practices outside of the dominant frame (such as sex out of 
wedlock and homosexuality), whereas working class respondents showed more attachment to the 
dominant discourse (and past beliefs). However, this claim would require a larger quantitative 
study before it can be generalized.  These differences rooted in age and class helped to determine 
individuals’ subject position vis-à-vis China’s trajectory toward modernity. The younger 
generations and middle class respondents were more likely to see themselves as participants in a 
modern social order that defines individuals as “open”, “tolerant” and “fashionable” subjects. In 
this understanding of modernity, concepts of “love” and “feelings” become ethical categories 
deployed by middle class women to justify their extramarital affairs, and thereby enable them to 
challenge the dominant ideal of monogamous sexuality. 
The discourse of modernity plays an important role as a pushing force in transforming 
sexuality. This particular discourse derives from multiple utterances coming from different 
media resources. On the one hand, it includes state discourse as a part of the state’s 
modernization of the family, which depends upon a monogamous idea of heteronomative 
sexuality and temporarily takes precedence as a dominant element. On the other, the modern 
discourse also incorporates many ideas derived from sites of global cultural exchange, which 
encourage audience members to adjust themselves to concepts of tolerance in opposition to 
monogamous and heteronomative sexuality. Interplay and struggle often occurs within and 
198 
 
between the multiple forces which make up the discourse of modernity. Embracing the 
monogamous idea is often seen as standing by modernity, while tolerance towards other types of 
sexual practices is also a signifier of being a “modern” subject. Interestingly, ideas derived from 
the state’s “modern” discourse are often seen as “traditional” by audience members who have 
embraced an attitude of “sexual freedom”. This may point the way toward a sexual culture in 
which the dominant ideas concerning marriage and sexuality will cede more space to other ideas, 
giving birth to a growing tolerance that will permit the sexual culture of the PRC to become 
















Gender and Corruption: The Cultural Script, Narratives and Contentions  
 
 
In the spring of 2012, Bo Xilai, the potential candidate for the chief of the Chinese 
Communist Party, was suspended from his party posts after the police chief of Chongqing fled to 
the US consulate in Chengdu. According to an official statement from a party’s leader’s meeting 
reported by the state news agency (Xinhua), Bo stood accused of “corruption, abuse of power, 
bribe-taking and improper relations with women”  (Patience 2012). The statement added 
pointedly that “Bo had affairs and maintained improper sexual relationships with a number of 
women” (Patience 2012). The scandalous nature of Bo’s affairs became a hot topic and prompted 
the Chinese social media (blogs, BBS and micro-blogs) to conduct “human flesh search engine” 
(renrou shoushuo, doxxing), an exposure of identity and private information of those women 
involved in a scandal through internet search. Bo’s wife, Gu Kailai, was mentioned as a “source 
of the trouble” (huoshui) and apparently played a key role in exposing Bo’s corruption. Bo’s case 
is a recent example of media’s construction of official corruption. These political downfalls have 
occurred frequently during the PRC’s history. While most casualties during the Maoist era were 
accused of failing to support the party line, allegations of corruption have accounted for the 
majority of these incidents during the post-Mao period. Often, the theme of the “keeping a 
second wife” (bao ernai) or the role of a bad wife has figured prominently in the narrative of 
these officials’ corrupt practices. 
Corruption has become an increasingly salient issue in politics during the post-Mao era, 
in tandem with the rise of the Chinese economy. Official corruption in China has caused severe 
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social animosity towards the regime and is perceived as an acute problem that could bring about 
the collapse of the political system (Zhou 2010). The literature on corruption in China often 
views the problem through the lens of the political economy of corruption, an interpretive 
framework that has enabled analysts to study the causes and consequences of corruption, along 
with the patterns, the scale, the perpetrators, and the measures enacted to curtail corruption 
(Holmes 2006, Manion 2004, Sun 2004, Yu 2008, Zhou 2010). “Keeping a second wife” 
(supporting a mistress) is included as one of the behaviors of corrupt officials in this scholarship 
(Sun 2004, 177).  
This chapter aims to take a different approach to corruption. Instead of focusing on the 
factuality of these allegations, the official account of corruption in the media will be treated as a 
(re)construction for a discourse analysis. As a whole, it takes a cultural approach to corruption by 
engaging the lived experiences and perceptions of the message receivers. Moreover, it provides a 
gendered perspective of corruption, with an investigation of the media discourse of corruption 
vis-à-vis the audience’s response to the discourse. The analysis focuses on audience members’ 
storytelling and their methods of talking-back to the discourse of corruption centered upon 
“keeping a second wife” in the media’s narrative. Drawing upon the data from interviews of both 
middle class women and working class women and the data collected from the social media in 
China—weibo and BBS—I argue that the media link between corruption and “keeping a second 
wife” has generated a very interesting (and vigorous) audience counter-narrative, on the one 
hand, which reflects the intensity of social animosity towards officialdom and provides palpable 
evidence of a political consciousness that the state has striven to erase. On the other hand, the 
political consciousness is largely diluted by the prevailed consumerism culture acting as a 
counter force.  
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In this chapter, I begin by displaying a cultural script employed to formulate storylines of 
corruption in the news media. Subsequently I examine ways of resistance to the cultural script by 
the audiences. The focus of my examination will focus on audiences’ narratives and genres of 
their narratives.  
The cultural script: good women and bad women 
 
In his discussion on the British news reports of the Falklands’ war, Hall (1984) employs 
the concept of “historical reconstruction”, which he describes as a news narrative that is “derived 
from the longstanding British tradition of handling its own history” (1984, 2). Hall’s 
interpretation reminds us that history often controls our perception of the present, following 
Marx’s statement  that “the tradition of the dead generation weighs like a nightmare on the brains 
of the living” (Marx 1852). Hall’s insight sheds light on our understanding of the media’s 
narrative of corruption in China. Borrowing Hall’s method, I show how the media’s narrative of 
corruption is a historical reconstruction, in which a cultural script derived from the Chinese 
political tradition serves to camouflage a contemporary political crisis.  
In the historical reconstruction of an official’s downfall, the cultural script from the 
Chinese narrative tradition repeatedly appears as the key plot to illustrate the causes and 
outcomes of corruption, representing the political issue of corruption as an issue of sexual affairs 
out of wedlock. In educational textbooks and popular culture, dynastic political crises are 
presented as stories about seductive “witches” who enchant and distract rulers, triggering 
dynastic collapse. This tradition has produced a cultural script that reappears in modern PRC 
politics as a tool for making sense of and organizing reception of political incidents.  One of the 
most important modern examples of “the witch” is the figure of Jiang Qing, Mao’s wife, a 
central villain (or scapegoat) in the narrative of Mao’s “mistakes”, which caused national 
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catastrophes such as the Cultural Revolution (Terrill 1999). The common saying that “women 
are the source of troubles” (hongyan huoshui) figures prominently in the story of each dynasty’s 
demise, and becomes a key plot point in the modern narrative of corruption. This persistent 
cultural script roots an inexplicable misogyny in the political storytelling tradition, stigmatizing 
women’s participation in politics and/or women’s involvement with men in politics. In this 
narrative tradition, dynastic dissolution is often attributed to the emperor’s favourite 
concubine(s), who breaks the ruler’s concentration on state affairs and plunges the state into 
chaos. Misogyny in narrating politics has become a subconscious aspect of popular culture, 
repeatedly inscribed in films, fiction and other types of cultural production. This tradition of 
political storytelling reappears in the treatment of the relation between an official’s corrupt 
practice and his “second wife”. The media narrative of corruption almost invariably positions 
corrupt officials within this narrative tradition.  
 In his study on corruption and criminality in Russia, Verdery (1996, 220) conceptualizes 
various anti-corruption campaigns as “talk of witchcraft”, which blames problems on “evil 
phenomena” that plague the society through media reporting and scholarly writing on post-
Soviet affairs. The symbolic gesture in talk of witchcraft is also evident in the Chinese media’s 
reporting of corruption, in which rampant corruption caused by the political system are 
overlooked. Instead, the problem is blamed on extramarital relationships through the media’s 
creation of family crises. Women frequently become the scapegoats during these narratives of 
corruption. Media accounts of corruption highlight officials’ affairs with “second wives” as the 
triggering motivation of corruption. Morality, and women’s “virtues or vices” in particular, 
becomes a crucial contributing factor in the discourse of corruption.  News stories and 
commentary opinions repeatedly establish a magic link between corruption and fallen “witches” 
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(huli jing). For example, the following commentary is fairly a representative utterance in the 
discourse of corruption:  
  Many corrupt officials have not yet sensed the truth that “a mistress is the source of 
troubles” (huoshui). These mistresses are blinded by lust for gain, and they collude with 
officials by way of their beautiful appearance, their extreme coquette and their scheming 
minds; in consequence, they become a blast fuse and an accelerator for officials’ 
unbridled corruption as well as the transfer station and even may play a hand at money 
laundering.[…] if going through those corrupt officials’ files on the purpose of 
[confirming the truth above], [we will find that] regardless of the level of corruption that 
officials committed, and regardless of their rank, indeed many tumbled as a consequence 
of engaging in lechery and those charming skirts. […] the Central Committee for 
Inspecting Discipline has regarded the eradication of cadres’ keeping a mistress as an 
important project in the systematic fight against corruption. Here, we are warning those 
cadres who are still keeping a mistress, look out for your official career and the happiness 
of your family. 
86
   
 
 
Commentaries such as this formulate a discourse which aims to dominate the subject by 
supplying authoritative opinions to affirm a superior position in relation to the subject (Ang 
1985). Related to the commentaries, news stories of corruption highlight the scandals of 
officials’ extramarital affairs, and thus a cultural script involving stories with a “naturalized” 
understanding of gender, in which a dynasty’s fate is “cursed” by a foxy “witch” (concubine), 
becomes a contemporary account of an official with a promising future who is ruined by a 
materially demanding woman (labelled as his “second wife”).  
 There are two elements in the cultural script hardwired into the corruption narrative. 
First, culturally and historically, a man’s ascent up the ladder of officialdom (guanchang) is 
understood as the elite man’s ultimate goal and a glorious achievement for life. In return, he 
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gains material rewards and mental satisfaction (honour, achievement, and masculinity) and 
further benefits his entire family members and relatives in the Chinese political tradition. This 
cultural understanding of the importance of being an official is reinforced in the news stories 
which show the fatal consequence of sexual relations with “witchy” women. This cultural script 
reflects the pre-modern nature of the political system in contemporary China. Second, women’s 
sexual mores are understood as a crucial factor that causes the downfall and the rise of a 
regime/dynasty. The traditional Chinese narrative of dynastic politics always blames a woman 
who causes the state’s collapse through her feminine charms. This woman is often condemned as 
a “foxy witch” (huli jing):  an inhuman, wicked fox spirit who takes the form of a woman. The 
historical figure of the “foxy witch”, a persistent temptation and danger to the men who compose 
the political elite, reappears as “the source of troubles” in the stories of corrupt officials.   
 In contrast to the “foxy witch”, “a good woman” (either a mother or a wife), is culturally 
understood as the positive influence on the son’s or the husband’s political career, bolstering his 
sense of morality and affecting the state’s fate during a crisis such as a foreign invasion. The 
cultural construction of “good women” was integrated into the CCP’s political discourse well 
before the establishment of the PRC. For example, in the 1940s, when discussing women’s role 
in the modern Chinese society, Zhou Enlai, the well-known CCP revolutionary and later the 
Premier for life under the Maoist regime, made a rather contradictory statement pertaining to the 
“new women” (xin nüxing) that had prevailed since the May Fourth Movement in the early 20s 
(which advocated liberating women from the family responsibilities). He repudiated the 
traditional meaning of “virtuous wives and good mothers” (xianqi liangmu) and revised the 
notion of the mother’s duty for revolutionaries and later socialist causes (Manning 2010). The 
“mother’s duty” in Zhou’s interpretation actually emphasizes the importance of “good women” 
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in the communist context, which later became a part of the ACWF’s discourse during Maoist 
regime. 
 This approach of good mothers (or good wives)’ influence as a role model on the society 
appears in the neo-liberalist governance of the post Mao regime, such as “Ten Outstanding 
Mothers” campaign in recent years (Guo 2010). The idea of “good women” (wives and mothers) 
replicates itself in current political anti-corruption campaigns and has become a purposeful 
strategy used to deter rampant corruption. The morality of women is understood as an important 
issue for anti-corruption campaigns. The CCP’s anti-corruption discourse criticizes “morally 
fallen” women and praises good women’s virtues. For example, one of the projects of the state-
affiliated All China Women’s Federation (ACWF) is to mobilize women to combat corruption 
within the family. The ACWF’s approach is to emphasize wives’ morality in restraining the 
behaviour of their husbands (officials).  In 2005, for example, the ACWF edited and published a 
book series—“managing an incorruptible family” (lianjie chijia)—and subsequently organized a 
nationwide “educational reading activity” described as “the family functioning to build a clean 
and honest government” (jiating zulian).87  It targeted officials’ wives.   
 The ACWF’s campaigns focus on wives’ virtues as positive influences on their husbands’ 
behaviour and condemn wives with bad morals for motivating husbands to embrace corruption.  
In the ACWF’s highly gendered interpretation of corruption, past and present are integrated as an 
illustrative reality, in which the task of restraining corruption throughout thousands of years of 
Chinese history has depended upon the virtue of “good wives”.  The ACWF’s book series 
retrieves examples of good wives and bad wives from dynastic China to the Communist Party’s 
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PRC, and it ascribes the behaviour of good and bad officials alike to the influence of their wives. 
Hence, women’s morality is the key to a regime’s rise and fall.  
 The current media narrative also dwells upon the image of virtuous wives preventing 
corruption. For example:   
[The corrupt officials] did not cherish the happy family that they already had. Every 
established party member and cadre used to work hard and continually improved 
themselves when they were young.  Every one of them was able to completely focus on 
his official career simply because there was always an industrious and virtuous wife 
standing behind him with utter and quiet devotion to manage a warm home for him. 
[This] has confirmed the fact that “there is always a great woman behind every successful 
man”. When these men succeeded in their official career, the flower-like beauty of these 
great women had faded. However, wives were still waiting in the dim lamplight for you 
to come home. Thinking about this, how could [these corrupt officials] not cherish their 
wives and how could they be willing to desert their happy family? How could they have 
reasons to support a mistress and keep a second wife?[...] Party members and cadres who 
face lust should learn a lesson from them, otherwise, you will destroy your happy family 





Corruption becomes inextricably linked to issues of gender and familial relations in the media 
discourse. In her discourse analysis of gender and sexuality in the PRC, Evans (1997) points out 
that the understanding of gender is based on an essentialist view that remains prevalent in 
Chinese public discourse. With reference to the cultural script, the ruler/official is characterized 
exclusively as male and is assumed to have the masculine virtues of strength, intelligence and 
rationality, all of which entitle him to “manage” the political realm. However, the male sex also 
has promiscuous tendencies (Chang 1999, Evans 1997), a weakness that can be taken advantage 
of by seductive women. Consequently, if the man is seduced, he becomes corrupt. Thus, as 
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feminist scholars have pointed out, the female sex represents the “body” and “nature” 
(MacCormack and Strathern 1980, Ortner 1974) in many societies.  
In the case of China, women are divided into two types, possessing “natures” dictating by 
their sexual morality: the “bad” and the “good”. In this understanding of politics, “bad” women 
seduce promiscuous men and trigger corruption (damaging the stability of a regime), while 
“good” women exert a positive influence on their husbands and help to promote clean 
government. In this way, gender in the discourse of corruption functions as camouflage in 
political discussions. This manner of discussing corruption fails to target the real problems in 
Chinese political life. Under the aegis of this cultural script, news reports attribute corruption to 
officials’ “keeping a second wife”.  News reports indicate that there always is a “second wife” 
(mistress) behind an official’s corruption, and hence the strategy of the Bureau of Combating 
Graft in detecting any bribery and embezzlement cases is to rely upon catching the mistress in 
order to build a case. 
89
   
In short, the news discourse of corruption restages the traditional “talk of witchcraft” and 
blames political impropriety on sexual relations between naturally promiscuous men and 
“morally fallen” women. This narrative is facilitated by a cultural script that makes use of a 
longstanding misogyny in Chinese political storytelling. The essentialist construction of gender 
roles and sex natures is expressed as “common sense” (e.g. the “natural” way of living for men 
and women). The news construction of corruption appeals to “common sense” understandings of 
gender which remain operative amongst the Chinese people.  
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However, cultural theorists have built a theoretical framework for audience studies that 
aims to explore the possibilities of negotiation and resistance (Hall 1973, Grossberg and Nelson 
1988). Hall’s model of encoding/decoding offers insights into the ways in which media messages 
operate through both media production and audience’s interpretation (Hall 1973). By elaborating 
media message-receiver relations, Hall challenges the media effects model in which meaning is 
made only by cultural producers and simply received by the audience. For Hall, meanings 
embedded in messages are made in practice, and through the struggles of competing positions.  
In Hall’s model, an audience faces three positions. The first is that the audience interprets 
representation completely within the dominant ideology as it is encoded. The second is a 
negotiated reading. The audience accepts the underlying framework of the ideology, but 
challenges some parts of it. The third is an oppositional reading against the ideology. This 
encoding/decoding model allows for a more process-oriented understanding of media production 
and consumption. In short, the encoding process reveals the relationship between media 
messages and ideology and shows how the representation embedded in the messages are 
naturalized through this process, whereas the decoding process illustrates the possibilities for 
contesting ideology inherent in the reception process itself (Hall 1973).  
  How do audience members perceive the linkage between corruption and “keeping a 
second wife”? The following sections are intended to reveal the possibilities of audience 
resistance and strategies of contention, obtained by opening up new narratives of their own and 
employing genres in response to the cultural script in the news narrative of corruption.  
Talking-back: storytelling and genres 
Corruption and keeping a “second wife” are seen as tightly linked issues, both in media 
narratives and audience’s responses to these stories. While the media discourse emphasizes the 
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theme that many corrupt officials “keep a second wife”, audience members also link “keeping a 
second wife” to government officials. However, despite this convergence between the media and 
the audience, audiences differ sharply from the media discourse in their interpretations of the 
causes and consequences of corruption. Most of my informants clearly disagreed with the 
cultural script that blames “fallen” women.  In the women’s interpretation, “keeping a second 
wife” is not interpreted as the cause of corruption, but, rather, as the consequence of corruption. 
A survey of 623 respondents from various cities in China conducted in 2007 reveals that 74% of 
respondents list governmental officials as the top group that is most likely to be corrupt, and only 
0.2% of respondents agreed that “having mistresses” is the most socially damaging aspect of 
corruption (Yu 2008).  The survey does not aim to focus on the connection between these two 
facts, but the statistics in the survey illustrate that the respondents’ perception of corruption and 
“keeping a second wife” contests the media’s presentation of the narrative.  
My fieldwork confirms women’s rejection of media stories about corruption and 
“keeping a second wife”.  When asked “who is keeping a second wife?” the majority of the 
interviewees named (without hesitation) government officials (dangguan de) as the group most 
likely to be guilty of this behaviour, in line with other social groups such as businessmen.  If 
“keeping a second wife” is a  signifier of bad morals, as the media claims, the linkage between 
government officials and “keeping a second wife” may reveal a strong social animosity towards 
the regime. Instead of linking women to bad morals, however, audiences identify the officials 
themselves as the source of bad morals, and most of the informants rejected the idea that 
“women are the source of troubles”. It is this counter discourse which contests the media’s 
narrative about the primary culpability of “morally fallen” women. With the sense that 
corruption systematically and collectively prevails (Gong 2006), having been asked “what kind 
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of woman is the second wife”, audiences began to narrate stories of “second wives” retrieved 
from their life experience—stories that they had heard, witnessed and sensed. These counter-
narratives constitute a method of talking-back or contradicting the media’s narrative. 
Official corruption and “keeping a second wife” is also a topic often discussed on blog 
sphere. As of 2011 is estimated that there are 181 million bloggers in China (Leibold 2011). The 
scholarship on Chinese Internet culture focuses on information control versus resistance, cyber-
civil space, online activism and web based communities (Tai 2006, Xiao 2011, Yang 2009, 
Zheng 2007). Scholars in this field have pointed out the importance of the internet in China as an 
expanding space that is altering the discursive terrain of the party-state and challenging the party-
state’s domination (Yang 2009, Yu 2007). The blog-sphere, which includes blogs (boke) and 
microblogs (weibo), and community-based web forums (luntan/BBS) are of particular 
importance in providing a dynamic and communicative platform for netizens (wangmin), 
allowing them to either engage in political debates or indulge in personal expression and 
fetishism in a time of consumerism (Leibold 2011).   
Corruption is one of the most widely discussed issues on the blogs, micro-blogs and web 
forums. Often, governmental officials’ sexual scandals trigger netizens’ interest. The theme of 
“keeping a second wife” and governmental officials appears repeatedly in BBS, blogs and micro-
blogs.  The equation of “governmental officials” with “corruption” has assumed the status of 
“common sense” among bloggers. These scandals have become online public dramas that 
provide netizens with the opportunity to ridicule the hypocrisy of powerful officials. Moreover, it 
allows bloggers and micro-bloggers to respond directly to the media narrative’s cultural script.  
Talking-back can be formulated in various ways, but the data I collected through the 
interviews with women and social media analysis focuses on two particular types of resistance: 
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interviewees’ storytelling (offering narratives of their own) and the actions of bloggers and 
micro-bloggers that intervene to question the narrative of the relationship between corruption and 
“keeping a second wife”. When the “common sense” of gender roles and sexual natures 
encounters the “common sense” of the official corruption, the cultural script can become 
destabilized by vigorous critique from both my informants and bloggers/micro-bloggers.  
 
STORYTELLING AS RESISTANCE 
 
 
 When asked their opinions about women who fit into the label of “second wives”, many 
informants started to tell stories that they heard or stories of their acquaintances, friends or 
relatives, with which they expressed their point of views. As Bruner ( 1986, 139) points out, “the 
stories we tell and the stories told of us give meaning to lived experience, shaping our identities, 
our sense of the world we live in, and our positioning within the world. In essence, we live 
storied lives”. Stories are not opinion-neutral, but while public storytelling, such as the media’s 
narrative, is—as argued by Ehrlich and King (1994), White and Epson (1990)—a social creation 
within specific cultural contexts, designed to serve the interest of power, private storytelling may 
serve as a healing process during the aftermath of traumas (Anzaldual 1999), a creation of 
meanings (Portelli 2000) or a revelation of the values of the marginalized (Mohanty 2003).The 
storytelling of my interviewees reveals that storytelling can serve as a form of negotiation and 
offer resistance against the dominant discourse.    
 In my interviews with women, the opportunity for them to express their opinions through 
storytelling has been a crucial element for them. For instance, they tell stories of ordinary women 
who are labelled as “second wives”. Storytelling offers them a way to deviate from the available 
language provided by the dominant discourse and to make sense of things that have been 
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overwhelmingly defined by those in power.  By telling stories that they have witnessed and 
sensed, they show their disavowal of and resistance to the dominant discourse, and subsequently 
construct a contradictory reality. Hence, this storytelling offers a framework that organizes 
personal consciousness and action into a coherent sense of reflective volitional perspective upon 
the things that they have witnessed.  The media construction of “women as the source of 
troubles” in corruption is negotiated through rejection of the media narrative, as well as an 
affirmation of women’s own storytelling. By re-telling the stories of “second wives”, they 
reframe the media discourse of corruption.  Moreover, their storytelling provides a means of 
resistance to the stigmatization of the “witch” women. In so doing, the enigmatic cultural script 
reappearing in the media narrative of corruption is deconstructed. Through disconnecting the 
“witch woman” from the cause of corruption, women’s storytelling places the media’s narrative 
in question and provides a counter-script that represents a sociopolitical reality which contests 
the cultural script.   
There are two salient themes in women’s own storytelling of corruption and “keeping a 
second wife”, which I categorize as “the survival narrative” and “the morally neutral narrative”; 
both are in opposition to the media’s discourse. In addition, many of the interviewees made 
reference to a serial TV drama, Woju (snail dwelling)—which was aired in 2009 and triggered 
public discussion about a variety of social issues (including corruption and “keeping a second 
wife”)—to express their perception of corruption and “second wives”. The talk of Woju reflects 
both narratives and, in addition reveals the impact of consumerist culture in China that has 






“She had no choice”: the survival narrative  
When asked their opinions about women who are labelled as “ second wives”, many 
women spent considerable time telling stories of their acquaintances, friends and relatives who 
may fit into the label of “second wives.” As I listened, I began to gain a sense of how these 
stories construct a different narrative: one in which audience members define and perceive the 
story of “keeping a second wife” in ways that the media’s narrative was not articulated. Their 
stories significantly reshaped the issue of “keeping a second wife” and acknowledged the 
inadequacy of the metaphor of “second wife” for a fuller description of gender reality.  Contrary 
to the media’s representation, “second wives” are frequently treated as vulnerable victims of 
gender inequality and the policies of marketization in women’s storytelling. The figure of the 
“second wife” becomes a family supporter bearing hardship in the narrative of interviewees. 
Their stories offer a form of counter hegemony in response to the moral discourse that is mainly 
imposed on women. The stories below represent this kind of narrative.  
 One of my female classmates had to become a “call girl” (yingzhao nülang). She had 
been with different men to get money after her work unit (danwei) was dismantled. Her 
husband’s work unit was also bankrupt. They had a child in school. You know schooling 
is very expensive now. She had no choice. She had to do it for her child. Really, I don’t 
want to judge her.  
 (Luyan, a 46 year-old factory worker) 
 
I have a classmate.  Her work unit (danwei) had ill economic returns, she was like that. 
She went to Guangzhou, hoping to make some money to support her family. At the 
beginning her life [in Guangzhou] was really hard until a man from Taiwan started to 
support (baoyang) her, and then her life became better. It’s been ten years since she came 
back [to Chongqing]. That was ten years ago.  
 (Mingming, a 46 year-old former redundant worker) 
 
 Some girls, you know, twenty something, have to be with men in 60s just for having a 
meal. It is too sad. I have seen several. A relative of mine was like this. [She] was in her 
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thirties, but had been with a man in his sixties. She did it for this reason.  There are many 
of women like her. Her child was given to her after divorce. Her husband just left.  Men 
are shameful. It was settled that he would pay child support, but he didn’t. She had to 
raise the child, and [pay] to keep the child stay in school. At the same time, she had to 
pay the government for her pension plan every month. You know the unemployment rate 
is so high now. She had no choice, so she got involved with an old man. She had to pay 
her pension plan, pay her child’s schooling and put food on the table. Now she has started 
to have a pension and her child has graduated, so she left [the old man]. Many girls who 
don’t have a job have to depend on men. If she can’t find a job, and if there’s no way to 
make a living, she will look for a man [to support her]. If a [laid off] woman goes to do 
cleaning jobs, she may earn several hundred yuan per month, but if she has to support her 
child and pay her pension plan, then she can’t survive. She has to find a man to help her. 
You know, the competition in the job market is so intense. If you don’t have personal 
contacts (guanxi), no matter how capable you are, you can’t find a decent job. 
 (Liuliu, a 55 year-old factory account) 
 
 
The three storytellers are from a plant in Chongqing, one of the largest state-section heavy 
industries established during the Great Leap Forward. The plant is not only the danwei (work 
unit) that they work (or worked) for, but the place where they grew up, joined the workforce and 
were laid off or witnessed their co-workers being laid off. All three told the stories of redundant 
women whom they knew as acquaintances, relatives and friends, and they justify these women’s 
survival strategies within their circumscribed set of social and political contexts. The terms they 
employed, such as ill economic returns (xiaoyi buhao), dismantlement of danwei (danwei kuale), 
pension plan (yanglao jin) and expensive schooling, reflect a much wider social and economic 
environment that they have been living with during the transition to privatization and 
marketization. In these three stories, the “second wives” are all redundant workers of the state-
owned enterprises.  Being a “second wife” is interpreted as a means of struggling through 
hardships; the protagonists in women’s narrative are not identified as fallen “witch foxes”; 
instead, their narratives express sympathy and understanding towards “the second wives”.   
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This storytelling illustrates that China’s marketization has reinforced gender inequality 
and has increased the economic gap in terms of gender. In particular, women have borne the 
brunt of redundancy during the waves of layoffs during the late 1990s. In this narrative, social 
welfare initiatives established under the Maoist state, including schooling, pensions and 
Medicare are marketized during post-Mao period, greatly undermining women’s economic status 
(Chen 2004). Also, Liuliu’s story reveals that there is lack of protection for divorced women, 
placing this group in an extremely vulnerable situation when they are laid off. In Mingming’s 
story, she used the term “call girl” (yingzhao nülang) instead of “second wife”, and thus it shows 
the vagueness and confusion evoked by the terminology of media’s use of the term “second 
wife”. It also reveals a disagreement with the media’s identification. While the media is likely to 
employ the term of “second wife” to refer to any woman in an extramarital relationship, the 
audience members tend to employ the term specifically in reference to officials’ (and the new 
rich’s) extramarital affairs. Hence, the moral condemnation of “keeping a second wife” becomes 
a social problem associated with the privileged classes.  
Unlike the media discourse, women’s narrative about their friends and relatives offers a 
complex portrait of reality instead of a simplistic reduction of women to the status “second 
wives”. The figure of the “second wife” in the storytelling refutes the image of the “witch fox” 
that triggers corruption. Women narrate their stories about women from the standpoint of lived 
experiences, in contrast to the media’s stigmatizing label of “second wife”. Being a “second 
wife” is understood as a survival strategy of “second wives” whose lives are not in their hands. 
The theory of gender stratification presents gender inequality in economic power at both the 
macro- and the micro-levels in contemporary societies (Lenski 1966) The de facto gap in 
economic power between men and women affects women’s life options (Blumberg 1984).  
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Gender inequality in earning power has deteriorated during the post socialist period (Shu and 
Bian 2003), reinforcing a tradition of mate selection that prioritizes the economic and social 
status of the male sex. Moreover, Chinese culture and society places a high premium on the 
sexual attractiveness of women, opening up a material and ideological option for women to 
achieve the economic status or pursue a survival strategy through their intimate relationships 
with men.  The “storytellers” understand these particular social and cultural contexts, viewing 
them from a subject position that allows them to show tolerance to “second wives” and interpret 
their experiences differently from the media’s moral condemnation of women.  Kunkun, a 
middle class wife, points out critical issues that social actors have had to cope with during the 
period of marketization and spoke in a manner that offers resistance to the “moral panic” 
promoted by the media’s creation of “family crisis”:   
 You see, we commoners (lao baixing) have to bear all the costs of social welfare, such as 
[the costs of] Medicare and education. So when you are young, you must earn as much 
security as you can.  What [these young women] can take advantage of only is [their 
youth]. We won’t get into the question that if there is affection between her and the man. 
As long as [these young women] can accept what they have to pay for, there’s nothing we 
have to worry about.  
 (Kunkun, a 35 year old middle class woman) 
 
 
 “Something funny”: the morally-neutral narrative 
 
In contrast to the moral condemnation of the “second wives” who bring about official 
corruption, many women tell stories of “second wives” with a morally neutral tone.  This 
detached moral perspective about the practice of “keeping a second wife” reveals social 
tolerance towards extramarital relationships and, more importantly, it shows that audiences do 
not link a “second wife” to corruption.  Audiences’ understandings of “keeping a second wife” 
often take a position of moral neutrality in their storytelling. In fact, many of the interviewees 
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claimed that they had “no judgemental comments” towards “second wives”. None of the 
interviewees made any effort to construct a link between this practice and the condemned pre-
modern institution of concubinage.  In contrast to the media’s moral sensitivity, audiences sketch 
a morally neutral script which opposes the cultural script. It should be noted that I do not intend 
to indicate that moral neutrality can exist. What I aim to point out is that the audience’s attitude 
towards “second wives” in their storytelling provides a point of resistance to the cultural script. 
This is clearly reflected in the following stories: 
 I have a friend. She’s been married for ten years, but she has been separated from her 
husband for nine years. They separated right after their child was born. This woman has a 
long term relationship with a married man whose wife is unhealthy and hence caused the 
problem for their “husband and wife life” (fuqi shenghuo, sex). So [my friend and this 
man] have kept a long term relationship purely for sex. Both of them need it, and it 
doesn’t affect either of their families. At the beginning when I heard it, I felt it was 
bizarre. But she has been with this man for quite a while, more than two years. Now I feel 
I can accept it.  
 (Yuanyuan, 33 year old- middle class woman) 
 
 In most cases, “keeping a second wife” is very pleasant. Murders and disputes of 
property are very rare. In my social circle, my husband’s friends are economically well 
off. I have seen it very often. All cases are like this: men have extramarital relationships. 
I dare to say that 80% or even 90 % of them have very pleasant relationships of “keeping 
a second wife”. Both parties enjoy this relationship. It is like this: the wife doesn’t know, 
so the wife is joyful too. Whenever the man has formal occasions, he still takes the wife 
to attend decently; the second wife is not known [by the wife]. The “second wife “is 
satisfied with her economic gains, or satisfied with the man himself. The man deals 
perfectly with both women. Several years later, their relationship ends. The woman walks 
away with money, meanwhile she finds a boyfriend. They get married in the end.  
 (Zhengzheng, a 31 year-old middle class woman) 
 
 A friend’s cousin, about 31 years old, had been with a man from Guangdong province. 
They had a 5 or 6 year-old child. The man bought an apartment and a car for her in 
Chongqing. The car is worth 100,000-200,000 yuan. He came to stay in Chongqing for 
several days every month. It was like the form of “keeping a second wife”. Last month, 
she received a call telling her that the man suddenly died. She was told to attend his 
funeral. She was also told like this: you were with him for money, so you were not 
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entitled to the inheritance. She didn’t work when she was with the man, and the man used 
to give her about 10,000 yuan every month. She went to Guangdong for his funeral, and 
after she saw things there she broke down. She found that she wasn’t the only woman [in 
his relationship]. Besides the first wife, (laughing), there were three other women, and all 
of them had a child. We often talk about this as something funny. This is particularly 
normal in China at present if we compare this issue with other bigger issues, such as the 
sudden disappearance of a state-owned enterprise. 
 (Nansan, a 35 year-old middle class woman) 
 
 
These three storytellers are middle-class professionals. The extramarital relationships that they 
describe are practised by ordinary men and women and are narrated in a way that refrains from 
any discussion of corruption. This approach to narrative is frequently expressed in women’s 
storytelling. Because of moral neutrality and tolerance toward extramarital affairs, the tone of the 
storytelling is diverting and whimsical as a comedy drama. The third story-teller, Nansan, ends 
with a comment that contrasts “keeping a second wife” with “bigger issues”. With her word 
“normal”, she characterizes other ongoing social issues as “absurd”.  In so doing, she reveals her 
rejection of the cultural script that blames political problems on extramarital affairs. In addition, 
she makes a point of identifying “the disappearance of the state enterprises” (guoying qiye) that 
not only hints at the issue of marketization and privatization I mentioned in the “survival 
narrative”, but also gestures toward the issue of official corruption. She certainly makes no effort 
to equate “keeping a second wife” with corruption, and shows no inclination to think of these 
issues as linked. 
Talking “Dwelling Narrowness”” (Woju) 
Dwelling Narrowness (Woju) is a popular serial TV drama that first aired in the fall of 
2009 on national and later on provincial and city channels. The drama deals with social concerns 
about housing prices in urban regions and the social inequality between the privileged (e.g., 
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government officials) and under privileged classes (e.g. the urban working-class). It also reveals 
the sense of entitlement of the rising urban middle-class through its aspiration of commodities. 
The TV drama focuses upon a sexual relationship between a married official and a young female 
office worker.  This central storyline was later criticized by the state authority for its “negative 
impact upon society” (Hung 2011).  Dwelling Narrowness gained huge audience popularity and 
flooded excitement on the internet and social media after it aired. “Mortgage slave” (fangnu), 
“second wife” (ernai), and “Song Siming” (the corrupt official in the drama) were the most 
popular online search terms during the discussion of the drama that occurred in the aftermath 
(Huang 2012). 
I first became familiar with this TV drama through my interviews with women.  During 
the interviews, my questions regarding the link between “keeping a second wife” and corruption 
spurred informants to discuss the drama. They re-narrated the story from their perspectives, 
focusing particularly on a storyline involving an extramarital relationship between the middle-
aged official and a young woman.  After I acquainted myself with this TV drama, I made a point 
of mentioning it to interviewees who did not allude to it. As it turned out, all of them had 
watched at least part of the series. I came to realize that the TV drama might be used to test the 
audiences’ perception of “second wives” and corruption.  
When I asked Wong whether she knew about the drama or not, she replied:  
 I watched a little. Many people told me that it was very interesting. But when I started to 
watch it, it was nearly finished.  I watched it on and off after I began to watch. It was 
almost over every time after I finished work at night.  
Question: Did you hear people talk about it? 
They did sometimes. Afterwards I read newspaper critiques about the drama. [People] 
were saying that the drama was written in a very bold way, and they said that the author 
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courageously wrote about official corruption. Government officials are corrupt, because 
they have money to support “second wives”. If they didn’t have money, how could they 
do it? [People] were saying that the language of the drama was very bold. After it was 
first aired, it is said that now it has been banned, so we didn’t have a chance to watch it 
afterwards. It wasn’t on TV anymore when they told me that it was necessary to watch. 
It’s not aired on any channel now.  
Question: Can you watch it online?  
I don’t use the Internet. My daughter said she would download it for me when I had a 
moment for leisure. Many people watched it online. I don’t know how to use the Internet. 
Besides, I have little time for pleasure.  
Question: Do you still want to watch it?  
 I think it is necessary to watch it. People said that it was written very well. The language 
in the drama is very bold. It is like throwing a heavy bomb to those men who keep a 
“second wife”. Everything is brought to light.  I think [the author] must know these 
characters in her life, so she wrote it excellently. It is very close to the reality as if it was 
the experience of “second wives” in real life. [The author] just concentrated all of their 
experiences on one person. 
(Wong, a 47 year-old former redundant worker) 
 
Wong indicates that corruption is a topic that people in society are exceedingly concerned about 
and attributes the drama’s success to its ability to bring this staggering issue into the spotlight. In 
Wong’s narrative, her desire to watch the drama is ignited by an approach to the political issue of 
corruption that resists the tabloid treatment of corruption and “second wives”.  By emphasizing 
the drama’s bold language and the fact that it was banned after its first airing, she hints that the 
show speaks to political concerns that many citizens in contemporary China understand as the 
“unspeakable”. Her resentment of government officials emerges when she alludes to illicitly 
obtained “money” and “second wives”, two metaphors of “evil vices” that represent the image of 
government officials in the social reflection. She also acknowledges that, after the show was 
banned in the official media and TV stations, audiences still have an alternative means of 
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watching the drama. This reveals the degree of audience enthusiasm for the topic of corruption 
and speaks to the Internet’s role in ending the official media’s monopoly of communications. In 
the end, a metaphorical term she used, “heavy bomb” indicates the intensity of social animosity 
towards governmental officials. More importantly, the “bomb” is clearly aimed at the officials, 
not the “second wives”. Wong’s narrative provides a clear expression of resistance against the 
media’s construction of “fallen witches” as the “source of troubles”.  The rhetorical figure 
representing government officials in the drama (Song Siming) triggered fury among audiences 
that consider it the character an authentic representation of the regime’s ruling political class 
(Huang 2012). Wong’s perception of the drama reflects this type of audience reception.  
When I asked Fong what kind of cultural product she liked to consume, she mentioned 
the drama in her reply:  
[…]  I rarely watch Chinese films, but if I hear of some representative Chinese films   
 made recently, those ones that are said to be classic serial TV dramas and I feel they have 
 the significance of inspiration, I will watch them, such as Woju.  
Question: I’ve heard that it is relevant to “keeping a second wife”? 
Yes. It is about two sisters. The old sister lives with [her husband] in Shanghai after 
 graduation. Both of them are university graduates who have nice thoughts about their 
 future. However, because of the pressure of buying an apartment, [their life turns to be 
 not so nice]. They can’t afford to buy an apartment. They are already married and have a 
 baby. Now here is the younger sister. After she graduated from a university, she becomes 
 a white collar office worker. She has a very ordinary boyfriend who loves her very much. 
 However, because of her work she accidently meets the mayor’s secretary. He likes her 
 very much, and then these two begin a relationship. He provides many conveniences for 
 her. In the end—I don’t feel it is a tragedy anyway—this girl splits up with [the 
 secretary]. Her older sister has bought an apartment and opened her own school as she 
 has wished. The young sister is pregnant when she broke up with the secretary. She has 
 accepted this  kind of supporting relationship. Then she has an argument with her 
 lover—[the secretary], and has a miscarriage during their argument. The secretary died in 
 a car accident on the way to visit her in hospital. Then she leaves for the US with a large 
 sum of money given to her by the secretary. 
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(Fong, a 33 year-old middle class woman) 
 
Fong also expressed her enthusiasm for watching Woju, but she did not perceive exactly 
the same issues in it that Wong did. In contrast to Wong’s perception, Fong narrates the drama in 
a way that highlights its entertaining elements and the “spectacular accumulation in neo-
liberalism” in urban China (Huang 2012).  In her interpretation, the show becomes a melodrama 
focusing on the “love entanglement” between a young woman and a privileged man—the most 
desirable exemplar of masculinity in mate selection. Despite the miscarriage experienced by the 
female protagonist and the death of the male protagonist, she interpreted it as a happy-ending 
drama. Fong introduces two key elements in support of her “non-tragedy” interpretation. The 
first is that the older sister finally owns a condominium and becomes an entrepreneur by opening 
her own school. The second is that the younger sister receives “a large sum of money” from the 
official and leaves for the US, a signifier of a better life. Fong’s narrative reveals the social 
values in the “market ideology” of China (Wang 2002) and what constitute a good life: property 
ownership, entrepreneurship, money, and arrival in the US. These elements are key words in the 
pop culture that reflects the pursuits and dreams of many people in China.  
 Like Wong, Fong does not employ moral condemnation when discussing the younger 
sister, the “second wife” of the mayor’s secretary; instead, the younger sister is the heroine of the 
love story who has made the US her destination.  Fong’s experience of the drama exemplifies the 
morally neutral approach to talking about “second wives”. Moreover, the theme of corruption in 
the drama is not Fong’s focus in her re-telling of the drama.  The link of corruption and “keeping 
a second wife” is largely diluted as “providing convenience”, a term used for the purpose of 
everyday networking that society members perform in China. The money given by the official in 
Fong’s narrative is no longer the metaphor of “evil vice” that it is in Wong’s; instead, it becomes 
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a bridge to the “happy ending” of the drama—the US. The production of Dwelling Narrowness 
reflects the efforts of the Chinese media industry to produce “audience commodity” under 
China’s party-state-led capitalism as it work to integrate into the global economy and 
neoliberalist paradigm (Huang 2012, Yu 2011). Fong highlights the aspects of the drama that 
help to solidify the “right kind of audience”.   
In short, if Wong attributes the drama’s success to the exposure of officials’ moral vices, 
Fong’s re-telling of the drama reflects material desires in China’s consumerist culture. Wong is a 
former redundant factory worker in the state section, while Fong is a professional and the wife of 
a successful businessman. The divergent highlights of the drama in their re-tellings reflect a 
profound divide between working-class and middle-class women in the materialistic and 
ideological formation of classes—the grievance of the disfranchised working class vis-à-vis 
middle class aspirations (obsessing on developing capital and being a home-owner).  
 Nevertheless, despite the divergence between these two views of the drama, both Wong 
and Fong express a rejection of blaming “second wives” for political corruption, and both offer 
resistance to the dominant discourse promoted by the official media. Evidently, audience 
members understand the complicity of “keeping a second wife” and perceive it in a way that 
subverts the media’s narrative. At the end of the discussion on corruption, Wong specifically 
commented on the linkage between corruption and “keeping a second wife” in the media and 
pointed out how “keeping a second wife” becomes a camouflage for more deeply-rooted political 
problems: 
 I often read revelations of officials in the newspapers. What I feel is that the Communist 
Party is a one party system (yidang zhi). [People] don’t have a place to speak. There’s no 
way to do anything about [corruption]. The maximum that the party does is to expose 
certain officials. That’s it. But the situation in China now is corruption throughout the 
whole of officialdom. As someone excellently put it like this:  if an official is to be 
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purged (xiake), first his sexual relationships are to be exposed, and then his economic 
issues emerge. Finally his corruption is exposed.  
(Wong, a 47 year-old former redundant worker) 
 
GENRES: IRONY AND RIDICULE AS RESISTANCE  
Social media has changed the nature of communication and public discourse. Social 
media emerge as web-based services that allow users to build a public or semi-public forum 
within a system, in which audience growth becomes massive (Boyd and Ellison 2008). Jenkins 
(2006, 2) conceptualizes social media as “convergence culture”, shaped by “media convergence, 
participatory culture and collective intelligence”. These three concepts reveal social media’s 
nature, in which audience members act as producers as well as consumers. This allows audiences 
to embrace “participatory culture” in social media in a way that had never been possible in 
conventional media forms (Jenkins 2006). In recent years, social media sites in China have 
drawn millions of internet users’ attention and many of these blog producers and readers have 
become social media writers and activists (Yang 2009, Wallis 2011). Chinese blogs, micro-blogs 
(weibo) and BBS have shaped and transformed public discourse/public culture and helped to 
give voice to dissent and social unrest (Yang 2009).  Blogs, Microblogs and BBS have opened a 
civic space for ordinary citizens to mobilize activism and to discuss sensitive topics that used to 
be dominated by the party-state’s media apparatus (Xiao 2011, Zhou 2009).  
Of all the sensitive issues related to political discussion, corruption is one of the most 
popular subjects raised by participants in social media. A large number of bloggers and micro-
bloggers produce and circulate messages that expose and inquire into the increasingly rampant 
and systematic corruption within the state. Netizens, a popular term derived from the 
combination of “Internet” and “citizens” (wangmin), often refer to the denial of citizens’ rights in 
physical social space and advocate the practice of citizenship through participation in political 
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activities within the cyberspace. These technologically-enabled activists have employed many 
ways of talking corruption, constantly questioning the regime’s anti-corruption strategies and 
expressing their disappointment and anger at the failure of anti-corruption initiatives. Their 
questioning reveals a vigorous rejection to the “talk of witchcraft” and places the blame squarely 
upon a political system that is the nexus of corruption. Netizens advance their critique through 
the genre of talking corruption.  In his discussion on the genres pursued by “netizens”, Yang 
(2009) describes satirical verses mocking corrupt officials, through which he points out that 
genres of contention shape the narratives employed by netizens.  
 In response to the linkage between corruption and “second wives”, bloggers and micro-
bloggers have generally employed the genres of irony and ridicule in talking back to the media’s 
cultural script.  These genres play an important role in deconstructing the official media’s 
discourse about corruption. This playful use of language usage and narratives makes a rhetorical 
impact by interrupting narrative continuities, disabling aesthetic recuperations and systematically 
suspending utterances (Newmark 2012). In the case of Chinese social media responding to the 
linkage of corruption and “keeping a second wife”, irony consistently culminates in revealing the 
errors and follies of the official discourse. The genre of irony in the audience’s responses to 
narratives of corruption and keeping a “second wife” reflects audiences’ political resistance 
towards the “witchcraft talk”. It is a disruption of the media’s official narrative. The genre of 
irony and ridicule is also a practice of resistance, through which audience/producers (blogger and 
micro-bloggers) strategically deconstruct the media discourse. Moreover, the genre formulates a 
satirical counter-narrative by reproducing “second wives” as the heroines of anti-corruption. In 
so doing, netizens ridicule the party’s feeble anti-corruption campaigns. 
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 The case of “the sex diary” in 2010, a sexual diary presumably written by the chief of the 
Bureau of Tobacco of Guangxi Province that was exposed on the Internet is an excellent 
example of the netizens’ genres. The diary reveals the chief’s extramarital relationships with 
various women.  It immediately stirred up mocking commentaries and circulated widely on BBS 
community boards, blogs and micro-blogs. It became a hot topic on the Internet, targeting 
governmental officials’ moral failings. After the diary was exposed, the chief was dismissed by 
the party. In response to the party’s decision, netizens satirically concluded that the chief was a 
“good cadre” by citing the diary. Bloggers and micro bloggers revealed that in comparison with 
the majority of party cadres and officials, the chief spent much fewer public funds on banquets 
and expensive drinks and took fewer bribes than an average official. These posts accused many 
party cadres and officials of gambling, banqueting and organizing extravagant drinking parties 
paid for by public funds; while also levying charges of embezzlement, bribing the higher-ups, 
keeping “second wives” and visiting prostitutes. In comparison with these activities, netizens 
ironically concluded that the exposed chief was a “good cadre” of the Party.90   
In this case, it was the moral conduct of government officials that was targeted, rather 
than the moral failings of “bad women”.  In contrast to the media’s narrative of sexual scandals 
as a result of witchcraft talk, the netizens strove to expose the hypocrisy of the official media 
discourse. The talk of officials’ sexual scandals in the social media does not emphasize moral 
judgements upon sexual relations out of wedlock; instead, the audience’s moral judgement 
specifically focuses upon officials’ extramarital relationships. By exposing party cadres and 
officials’ sexual scandals, netizens deliberately contradict the images of party cadres and 
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officials as powerful authorities; in so doing, they question the legitimacy of a regime that is 
composed largely of similarly morally lax individuals.  
In particular, in response to the media’s narrative about the close link between corruption 
and “second wives”, (such as the Bureau of Anti-Corruption’s strategy of “catching a mistress to 
break though a corruption case” reported in the news),91  netizens deliberately represent “second 
wives” as “heroines” of anti-corruption. For example, a picture of a “second wife” drawn by (an) 
anonymous micro-blogger(s) emerged after the collective sexual scandal of Chingqing officials 
was exposed in 2012. The sexual affairs of several officials in major posts in Chongqing were 
taped by businessmen and used as leverage to secure lucrative business projects. The name of the 
woman involved in the scandal was Hongxia (red glow), which was transformed into a different 
meaning with the same sound in Mandarin: Hongxia (the red woman warrior). In this picture, she 
is dressed as a woman soldier of the CCP’s Red Army in the 1930s. The title of the picture 
sarcastically mimics the official campaign of “the Backbone of China” organized by several state 
media and state agencies in 2011 that aimed to select “model citizens” (Figure 3, page 231). 
Netizens comment upon the phenomenon as offering the only hope of wiping out corruption. By 
mimicking the party’s declaration of anti-corruption, netizens express their emotionally loaded 
resistance toward the talk of “second wives” in corruption. Moreover, netizens utilize the party’s 
propaganda terminologies to illustrate how the “second wives” become “heroines” in order to 
ridicule the party’s anti-corruption mechanism and the party’s repeated commitment to anti-
corruption over the decades, all of which have been mocked as jokes by the netizens. In this 
narrative, bloggers and micro-bloggers act as skillful proponents of a counter narrative. Genres 
act as codes that provide ironic effects for resistance. Below are two excerpts from tengxun 
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Jinyang wang, August 6, 2006.  
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weibo, one of the popular social media websites in China, revealing recent netizens’ responses to 
recent events pertinent to the narrative of corruption and “second wives”: 
Title: Eight women lodge an accusation with their underwear 
92
 against the county party 
chief  
Dangcang of Gansu Province is an impoverished county at the national level.  Wang 
Xianmin had been the county party secretary for 1212 days, but he had accumulated 
wealth amounting to 15,000,000 yuan, equivalent to one tenth of the whole county’s GDP 
and 5,000 years of a peasant’s income. However, his downfall is due to eight women’s 
joint appeal that bypassed the immediate leadership and presented to the higher levels. 
“Second wives” once again become heroines of anti-corruption by putting a corrupt 
official down with their underwear. Pay respects to the “second wives” fighting in the 




The Chinese character of anti-corruption! These beauties are agents deeply hidden away 
who endure humiliation in order to carry out an important mission. We pay respect to 
you! You have greatly helped the Disciplinary Committee and the Judicial Organs. The 




 Two micro-bloggers here first employ the effect of comparison with the numbers that illustrate 
the appalling fact of corruption: numbers reflecting the official’s tenure in office and the amount 
of funds that he stole (while offering an instructive comparison to the average peasant’s income). 
Also, the number of women who had intimate relationships with the official is used to reveal the 
absurdity of the corruption drama. Moreover, sardonicism is employed to ridicule the party’s 
failure to pursue a genuine anticorruption campaign. The micro-bloggers use the language of the 
party’s propaganda and eulogistic style to achieve the sardonic grin, such as “heroines of anti-
corruption”, “frontline”, “deeply hidden agents” and “endure humiliation in order to carry out an 
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important mission”, all of which derive from the common lexicon of the party’s propaganda 
machine and have become part of everyday vocabulary in China.  
 Thornton (2007, 204) points out that the Chinese state, historically constructed as a moral 
agent, produces a normative vocabulary to guide mass conduct. Monopolistically controlling 
political meanings has been the Party’s tradition (Schoenhals 1992). The rise of the Internet 
offers a chance to breach the closed structure of the Party’s propaganda and ideological work 
(xuanchuan he yishi xingtai gongzuo). Sarcastically mimicking the party’s language in response 
to the news media’s “witchcraft talk” about corruption thus is a direct refutation of the party-
state’s narrative. Below are three excerpts from BBS and weibo sites that illustrate the genre of 
irony and ridicule which mimics the party’s propaganda vocabulary. 
A “second wife” once again renders meritorious service. The party chief of Wuxi City 
has been “doubly disciplined”. The members of the party committee of Wuxi City have 
been entirely disciplined. This is due to a mistress’s report. This is one more case of anti-
corruption and a second wife.  Mistresses’ fighting against corruption is a sharp weapon 




Without a doubt, Guo Meimei is an excellent representative among second wives. She 
not only has broken the record of second wives’ for the highest consuming taste, but is 
also a heroine of anti-corruption who cares about public benefits. She remained 
unperturbed and skillfully exposed the corruption issues of the Red Cross of China to all 
the people in China during her efforts as a “second wife”. She has made an extraordinary 
contribution of second wife’s fighting against corruption to our Party right before our 
party’s birthday. Her achievement has been affirmed by millions of netizens. She is an 
anti-corruption model who has broken Asian records and set sights on the world level, 
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From Yangfeng, the former vice party chief of Xuancheng city of Anhui Province, to 
Wang Shouye, the former vice commander of the Navy, to today’s Pang Jiejue, [we have 
noticed that] our anti-corruption work began to benefit from the “turning against her own 
side” by corrupt officials’ mistresses. The mistresses’ “heroic undertaking” has become 
earth-shaking news. The main force of anti-corruption’s long term efforts are not as 
effective as a mistress’ sudden “arousal”… there is an active group of mistresses in the 





In these excerpts, netizens believe that the political system does not truly aim to eliminate 
corruption; instead, corruption is exposed because of some official’s failure at the political level. 
Hence, netizens mimic the party’s language from different historical periods, including the 
language of the party’s military period in pre-1949, Maoist and post-socialist periods. The last 
excerpt employs terms derived from the national anthem, aiming to show that the state is in a 
serious crisis comparable to the anthem’s invocation of the Sino-Japanese War. Micro-bloggers 
show a desperate longing for political reform by sarcastically drawing attention to the hopeless 
situation that has placed the nation in crisis—a crisis that netizens blame on the political system 
itself, rather than on sexual improprieties which figure so prominently in the official media’s 
construction of reality.  The social media’s approach to talking about corruption offers staunch 
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 The genre of blogging offers very important insights into China’s social media culture. 
Through their generic interventions, netizens give little credit to the regime’s efforts to curtail 
corruption.  The genre illustrates a strong political consciousness, in which it is widely realised 
that corruption cannot be solved within the existing system (Zhou 2010). The scale and depth of 
corruption are often compared to levels attained during the notorious Manchurian dynasty—the 
darkest time described in the history textbooks. Indeed, the sense that current CCP officialdom is 
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similar to the late Manchurian officialdom pervades current Chinese social media. Netizens 
believe and circulate any kind of message that helps to reveal the darkness of the regime. For 
example, a message on one Sina micro-blogger’s home page describing how the officialdom 
functions was forwarded by 34,582 micro-bloggers within two days in April 2012. Bloggers 
commented that this ought to be the real image of the rotten state: 
The former party chief of Wuxi city who was arrested last year said: “[whenever I] gave 
a hint, someone always came to provide millions of yuan to me. [Whenever I] give a 
promotion to a cadre, millions of yuan were handed in. I myself also needed to be 
promoted; therefore, of course, I needed to hand money in to the higher ups. This is a 
well-equipped cycle. If I had not taken the money, how could I have had money to provide 
good services to the higher ups? Our police chief purchased shares in entertaining 
places, and he took money whenever the police arrested or released someone. He also 
took money when the police helped the developers to tear down people’ homes. [The 
police chief] was offered a long term hotel room for sex whenever he was provided 
sexual bribes. Didn’t I know this? Of course I knew. All of us were sitting in the same 
boat.” 99 
 
In 2011 excitement about the Arab Spring echoed through Chinese cyberspace and many 
netizens asked whether a “Jasmine Revolution” would occur in China.  Although scholars argue 
that the narrow representative basis and fragmented and polarized nature of social media cannot 
successfully galvanize a movement to bring democracy to an authoritarian state such as China 
(Benkler 2006, Dyson et al. 1996, Hindman 2008, Shirky 2008, Sunstein 2007), my data 
collection through social media shows that much social unrest has occurred in the cyberspace. 
Social unrest within cyberspace undermines the figure of the state in the Chinese tradition. The 
figure of the Chinese state in the longstanding political tradition is similar to a “father figure” in 
the traditional family institution.  Cyber unrest is a challenge to the political tradition and 
moreover it brings cutting edge ideas of what the state ought to be like into circulation. The party 
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state obviously has seen the dangers of cyber unrest.  It is believed in the blogosphere that the 
state’s budget of “weiwen” project (defending domestic stability) is more than the national 
defence. This has prompted netizens to disseminate a message that the state’s enemies are not 
foreign intruders, but its own “antizens” (yimin, ants), a sarcastic word that reflects how 
commoners are perceived by the state.  This term is circulated in cyberspace to refer to the 
powerless masses that can easily be crushed by the massive state mechanism.  The term itself 
emphasizes the enduring antagonism between the “officialdom” and the “commoners” (lao 
baixing). There evidently exists an intense social animosity toward the state, particularly vis-a-
vis the officialdom, which is described as a dirty place full of “thieves”, followed with an 
injunction to begin “killing, killing, and killing officials” (Yu 2008). How to transform the cyber 
unrest into a revolution in reality is a question for many bloggers. As Hanhan, a young writer 
known for his critique of the government who has millions of young fans online, says in his blog, 
“everybody knows what the problem is, but the key for us is what to do”. 100 
In addition to mocking the media’s link of keeping a “second wife” and corruption, 
bloggers and micro-bloggers specifically target the cultural script. For example, when the 
downfall of Bo Xilai in the spring of 2012 caused the cultural script to reappear (with Bo’s wife 
cast as “the source of troubles”), many micro-bloggers specifically spoke out against the 
witchcraft talk of corruption by clearly pointing out the absurdity of the media’s discourse, and 
the cultural script crumbles under the impact of the audience’ sarcasm and mimicry:  
 
In this country all the bad things that men have done are women’s fault. 
 
The thing normally is like this:  in general women either become scapegoats or have 
dragged the men into the mire. If a man has a good wife, everything with the man will go 






well. Behind every successful man always stands a good woman whereas the reason why 
a man becomes a loser is simply because he has got a bad woman.  
 
It‘s been a convention for thousands years. Whatever happens, “women are the source of 
troubles” (hongyan huoshui). All the responsibilities of a state’s subjugation must be 





Corruption is a serious problem in contemporary Chinese politics. However, in the media 
discourse of “keeping a second wife”, a cultural script is incorporated in the narrative of 
corruption that blames political failings on extramarital affairs and particularly on women’s role 
in instigating extramarital affairs. The media narrative of “keeping a second wife” has 
transformed the issue of corruption into an issue of “sex nature”, in which the combination of 
male promiscuity and the material girls is narrated as the driving force behind corruption. 
Essentialist understandings of gender and sexuality are firmly accepted as common sense in 
society; however, when the understanding of gender is linked to political issues such as 
corruption, the witchcraft talk confronts rigorous opposition.  
This chapter focused on audience members’ own narratives in opposition to the media’s 
discourse and genre of talking-back in the Chinese social media. While some audience members 
describe “second wives” as vulnerable victims of the march toward marketization and 
privatization, other members used a “morally neutral” tone and viewed the practice of “keeping a 
second wife” through a consumerist lens. Both of these approaches have introduced a perception 
that has not been represented in the media narrative and have disconnected the media linkage 
between “second wives” and the sources of corruption. Furthermore, sarcasm in direct responses 
                                                          




to the cultural script in the social media indicates a growing grass roots animosity towards the 
regime. The sense of the absurdity of the corruption narrative derives from two stances: political 
consciousness that urges political reform and consumerism that dilutes political consciousness. 
These two stances are contradictory forces. It is widely realized that new media technology has 
changed the landscape of communication. The monologue of the state voice now must contend 
with the centrifugal effects of the Internet. Much has been said about online activism that opens 
up a civic space for greater social participation in political events (Yang 2009). With reference to 
the state-society framework, the Internet— in particular the social media— have allowed a 
vitalized society to begin resisting the authoritarian state and testifying to the changing patterns 
of the state and society interactions (Zheng and Wu 2005). However, while serving as a tool for 
mass collaboration in political activism, the internet and social media also work to promote 
brands, fashion, and markets (Tapscott and Williams 2006). This chapter, therefore also 
highlights a case for further studies on the roles played by the internet—in particular the social 














Conclusion: media, audience and social change in contemporary China 
 
 The media account of “keeping a second wife” and the audiences’ responses to it provide 
a context for understanding the dynamics of media reception and the complexities of socio-
cultural change in contemporary China. Media engagement in today’s China no longer adheres to 
a passive pattern of senders/receivers. The repressive way of communication that once 
characterized conventional media forms (e.g. the party’s newspapers and official TV channels) 
has fallen by the wayside, and an “audience activity” lens is required to understand media-
audience relations in the current political and social context.  As Bird (2003) points out, the 
relationship between the media and audiences can best be understood as a creative, dynamic and 
transformative process, often involving active engagement. The diversity of audiences’ 
interpretations is also found even in the authoritarian state such as China. Moreover, audiences’ 
interpretations illustrate that marriage and sexuality in the PRC cannot be only understood 
through the state ideology and the dominant discourse in the dramatic social change.  
 The aim of this dissertation has been to examine the dynamic relations between the media 
discourse and audiences’ interpretations, a project that allows us to gain a better understanding of 
the landscape of marriage and sexuality and how social change within these contexts occurs in 
contemporary China.  In this concluding chapter I address the two key issues from the study: 
audience activity presented in this dissertation and the implications of the entangled relations 
between gender, class, and modernity in relation to marriage and sexuality in China.   
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Passive audience or active audience? 
  
 Media must be understood as an articulated relationship among texts, institutions and 
audiences (Carter and Steiner 2004)). Studying media institutions is important from the 
perspective of political economy. However, a cultural approach to media—the expressed goal of 
this dissertation—needs to examine both texts and audience. This study may be about the 
audiences in China, but it raises theoretical and methodological questions that could well be 
considered by audience scholars in other contexts. 
 Over the past three decades, the state media—  the news press and the TV as the major 
forms— in China has undergone radical reformation on the trajectory of commercialized media 
industries (Zhu 2012). The commercialization of media has opened up two different functions for 
the state media: disseminating the party’s propaganda for ideological control and pursuit of 
profit. This double function has resulted in continuing discourses previously established by the 
market orientated media forms; consequently, the party’s propaganda became more skillfully 
persuasive in the post Mao regime, eschewing the repressive tactics of the Maoist state (Brady 
2008). Another outcome of the commercializing media is that China has entered an epoch of rich 
media proliferation with a variety of media resources now available. Digital technologies and 
globalized media flows have forced the Chinese media to evolve beyond a state-centric and 
party-propaganda view of its function to a strategy defined by commercially driven 
globalization, consumerism and transnational markets.  In addition to choosing from a multitude 
of media resources through international news channels and the internet, people blog, organize 
and become members of different communities in chat rooms and social networking sites. All of 
these have brought significant changes in the relationship between the media and the people. The 
expansion of the information and the Internet gives people more freedom in selecting media 
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resources (Dong and Shi 2007), and engaging with other types of ideologies that shape their 
everyday lives. The multiplicity of global media flow-ins from the West and other Asian regions 
(e.g., Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, and Hong Kong), much of which is reproduced 
through the state media, has made an impact on local audiences, decentralizing the dominant 
ideology. This variety of media resources fuels the audience’s capacity for negotiation and 
contestation.  The co-existence of the previously established discourse and the diversity of media 
outlets that carry oppositional messages open up a gap between the discourse and the audiences 
in the rich media environment, thereby opening up the possibility of rethinking the ways in 
which audiences engage with the media in contemporary China. 
 Audience scholarship has undergone two stages of conceptualization dealing with 
audience activity. Early audience studies tended to focus on the effects of the media upon an 
audience viewed as the victim of ideologies. For example, McRobbie’s work (1982) on the 
British girls’ magazine Jackie uses textual analysis to investigate dominant ideology about 
youthful femininity disseminated by capitalist popular culture. It reveals how media texts 
produced by capitalism, in which the audience is surrounded and washed over. As McRobbie 
(1991) later reflected, her study on Jackie “gives the impression that the magazine is like a huge 
ideological wall in which the audience is a prisoner” (1991, 114). In recent decades, audience 
studies have focused more on the notion of “audience activity” (Allor 1988, Erni 1989, Fiske 
1988, Grossberg 1988, Morley 1992, Radway 1988), investigating audiences’ negotiation of and 
oppositional readings/watching or creative interaction with the media. Particularly within critical 
mass communications research, the idea of the resistant audience emerges against the theory of 
media effects, such as feminist studies focusing on women’s rejection of the stigmatization of 
women in the media (Russo and Jackson 2002). Much research has been conducted within the 
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active audience framework, in which audiences are seemingly able to be completely free to 
negotiate and resist dominant codes.  
 The understanding of audience in this study is within Cultural Studies that emphasize 
negotiation and creativity. Nevertheless, this study demonstrates that audience activity is both 
complex and changing, and neither the passive nor the active interpretation accounts for all of its 
particularities. This study acknowledges that the audience can be active when applying codes of 
their cultural competences to give negotiable or oppositional interpretations.  At the same time, it 
can be passive when being manipulated by many kinds of ideologies. Moreover, building upon 
recent scholarly development of audience activity (Bird 2003, Livingstone 2004, Hermes 2009), 
this study has made an effort to move beyond the debate of active/passive audience, and to think 
about the question of audience through the differences of context and social position.  
 Chapters Four, Five, and Six have shown that audiences are able to vigorously reject the 
media’s linkage between “keeping a second wife” and official corruption, whereas their 
responses to heteronomative and monogamous sexuality are diverse. Some of them complied 
with the media discourse while others expressed emerging ideas oppositional to the discourse. 
With the gender “common sense” proposed by the media, the audiences have shown greater 
adherence to the gender ideology in the media that emphasizes gendered roles determined by 
biological differences. Hence, this study demonstrates that the audience, to a certain extent, is 
active but restrained by structural factors. Active audience cannot be completely free. As we can 
see for the analysis in Chapter Four, middle class women employed a lexicon derived from the 
modernity discourse (e.g. “love”, “feelings”) as they encountered it in other media resources to 
reject monogamous sexuality. In contrast, working class women utilize Maoist class ideology to 
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defend a class identity that has been erased by post-Mao politics. The diversity of audience 
understandings results in different social-economic positions, such as class and generation. 
 Moreover, the previous audience studies have focused on particular kinds of media forms 
in its analyses of audience reception. For example, studies on soap operas audiences 
investigating pleasure politics (Ang 1985, Brown 1994, Brunsdon 1986, Hobson 1989, Radway 
1984), genre research on women’s magazines (McRobbie 1982 and 1991, Hermes 1995), and 
analysis of TV audiences examining the relationship between television and gender politics 
(Brunsdon 1986, Gray 1987, Morley 1986). The audience in these studies “[is] cordoned off for 
study and therefore defined as particular kinds of subjects by virtue of their use not only of a 
single medium but of a single genre as well” (Radway 1988, 363).  This study brings a different 
methodological approach toward a broader version of audience, which is attempted to respond to 
the challenges of changing audience in the age of the Internet acknowledged by scholars (Bird 
2003, Livingstone 2004 and 2009, Silverstone 2005). As Hermes (2009, 112) points out, 
identifiable audience “entity” and reception of particularly texts or genre in audience studies no 
longer reflect changing media and social realities. Hence, this study combines both ways of 
media studies based on the communication reality by bringing in different methods: qualitative 
and digital ethnography and cross boundaries of media forms. It has included the readers of the 
news reports, viewers of the TV drama (i.e. Dwelling Narrowness, Woju) and social media 
participants, as they all relate to “keeping a second wife”. My approach to audiences that 
interpret one particular subject in different media outlets may offer a case to show that the 
conceptualization of audience might be situated in larger social, political and cultural contexts 
instead of remaining mired in the process of categorization.  
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 This study has also made an attempt to move beyond Hall’s (1973) encoding/decoding 
model that considers autonomous relations between media texts and readings of the texts.  By 
engaging in the critical relations between the media, audience and the state, this study illustrates 
that audiences can be fragmentary as well as public depending on audience subjectivities. When 
audience members respond to corruption, they form the public, becoming something more than 
the fragmentary audience proposed by the postmodernist view—and they show a 
correspondingly greater resistance to the media discourse.  This study shows that the mass media 
in China is subject to interrogation and debate by the Chinese audiences, and to certain extent, 
can generate large audiences and foster popular participation. 
 Therefore, it can indeed form a public, such as the online debates concerning the ironic 
genre-responses to the link between “keeping a second wife” and corruption. However, this 
critique offers a limited form of cultural resistance to gender ideology, globalized forms of 
consumerism and the social engineering necessitated by neo-liberal expansion in China (e.g. 
“suzhi”). As scholars (Bird 2003, Hermes 2009, Livingstone 2004) suggest, the media function 
with the larger social and cultural contexts, and thus the analysis of audience for future studies 
needs to move beyond the paradigms of “passive/active” audiences. Audiences are receivers and 
consumers as well as participants and dissidents. 
In short, the conceptualization of audience in this study is within Cultural Studies, but it 
places audience in a larger social, cultural, and political context instead of treating it as a decoder 
of a particular text or genre. I focus on audiences’ social positions that bring different 
understandings of the context.  I hope this treatment will invite audience scholars to think about 




Gender, class, and modernity in changing sexuality in contemporary China 
 This dissertation studies marriage and sexuality in contemporary China through the lens 
of media and audiences. The relations between media and audience involve a complex process of 
social change. This dissertation deals with the audience interpretation of “keeping a second wife” 
stories presented in the media. The study treats the various media as cultural forms, rather than 
isolated texts/messages taking place within the social sphere, and defines audience reception as 
activities in everyday life, rather than merely textual engagement. More importantly, this 
dissertation asks questions about the extent to which social actors adhere to the discourse of 
marriage and sexuality and how sexual culture evolves in a dramatically changing society 
through the lens of media reception. 
 Chapter Three, a discourse analysis of “keeping a second wife” in the news media, 
reveals that the ideology of marriage and sexuality established since the 1950s is disseminated 
through news reports. Three decades after China’s opening up to the world, monogamous and 
heteronomative sexuality within marital status remains the only legitimate and moral form of 
sexual behavior recognized by the official discourse. The continuing ideological re-articulation 
of monogamous sexuality through the news narrative of “keeping a second wife” indicates that 
the “retreat” of the state from the practice of controlling sexual behaviours is not complete. The 
way of controlling sexuality in post-Mao regime has shifted from direct intervention through the 
laws and administrative regulations to “governing at distance” (Wang 2001), to a skillful reliance 
on “persuasion” through media discourse (Brady 2010).   
 Nevertheless, individuals have gained greater autonomy in private affairs over the past 
decades. The previously established ideology lost considerable power during the course of the 
modernity process in China.  The complex terrain of multi-vocal, multimedia and multiple-flows 
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of media messages brought enormous challenges to the dominant ideology. At the same time, 
audiences have become ever more fragmented, fractured and entangled in the matrix of different 
kinds of media resources and discourses. The fragmentation of the audience shows that state 
ideology cannot penetrate the audience en masse as it used to during the Maoist regime. Thus it 
no longer has a monolithic power and degree of audience adherence to the ideology has become 
heterogeneous.  
 In order to examine ways of attachment to the official discourse among different social 
groups, this study takes  class  into account to  examine the distinction between the rising middle 
class and the working class—identities that are linked to the politics of subjectivities produced 
by China’s modernizing efforts.  It is clear that class identity has an impact on the degree of 
adherence to the ideology of monogamous sexuality. The subjectivities of middle class people 
are linked to “modern selfhood”. This idea places a particular emphasis upon the discourse of 
suzhi, which enables middle class women to negotiate the official discourse with other types of 
modernity discourse that they received from other types of media outlets. Notions of “love” and 
“feelings”—used to define heterosexual monogamy in opposition to traditional marriage forms 
when the ideology of marriage was articulated in the 1950s (e.g., “freedom of marriage”) — now 
are employed to challenge the idea of monogamous sexuality and justify the pursuit of 
extramarital affairs. It is the concept of “modern selfhood” that enables them to tolerate “defiant” 
sexual behaviours, such as sex out of wedlock and homosexuality. 
 In comparison with middle class women’s taste-oriented media resources that carry more 
non-official ideas, working class women usually choose the state media outlets, which include 
local official media such as the Party’s dailies and official TV channels. As a consequence, 
working class women are more likely to engage the party’s propaganda language and thus 
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showed less tolerance of sex out of wedlock.  The working class is marginalized by the 
modernity discourse, and thus their adherence to the ideology is more clearly reflected in their 
vocabulary than it is among their middle class counterparts. In terms of age difference, younger 
generations are likely to have fewer ties to the idea of monogamous sexuality than their older 
counterparts. This confirms the scholarly finding that the younger generations exhibit a different 
attitude and behaviors than their older counterparts in relation to marriage and sexuality (Farrer 
2002, Rofel 2007).  
 Chapters Four and Five illustrate that China’s modernity process has accelerated in recent 
decades and has played an important role as a “pushing force” to change individuals’ perceptions 
of self and the society in relation to marriage and sexuality. Particular subject positions produced 
by the modernity process have shaped particular ways of living. Middle class and younger 
generations figure prominently in the story as modern subjects that link to the discourse of 
modernity (e.g. suzhi) and thus show more tolerance towards a plurality of sexual behaviours. 
Thus, the dominant ideology of monogamous sexuality is contested by the increasing levels of 
tolerance and morally neutral attitudes adopted towards “keeping a second wife” and other types 
of sexual behaviors out of wedlock. This tolerance towards “difference” is understood as a 
quality of “modern selfhood”. The discourse of modernity is often employed by middle class 
women and younger generations to contest the ideology that encourages monogamous and 
heteronormative sexuality.  
 Nevertheless, social and cultural change does not simply take the form of one ideology 
replacing an old one in a direct and linear fashion. With reference to Raymond Williams’ (1977) 
conceptualization of culture as a competing process of three elements, the modernity process 
may have produced new subjects but the older cultural traditions do not fade away instantly. 
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Frequently, the traditional forms and values are transformed into the dominant and the emergent 
forms. As women make sense of “managing marriage” and adapt to a changing perception of 
sexuality, the “common sense” of gender roles inscribed in the established ideology as well as in 
the recent modernity discourse occupies a dominant position. Gender ideology is firmly and 
widely believed, although ways of performing gender within marriage may differ between 
middle class women and working class women as well as between older people and their 
younger counterparts. While expressing an interest in independence and the “freedom” of 
pursuing sexual pleasure, middle class women and younger women also indicated that 
entrenched values of marriage and strong family ties deeply rooted in the Chinese culture and 
reinforced by the dominant ideology proved more resilient than what Yan (2009) has observed 
“individualization” in the intimate lives of women in contemporary China.  
 The selfhood of the middle class and younger women often emerges via the exercise of 
consumer choice in the global market and is shaped by the larger structural factors that constrain 
as well as enable their agency. While middle class women are attracted to financial independence 
through their own careers and put conceptions of “love” and “feelings” into the notion of 
extramarital affairs, they are unable to abandon the importance of marriage and family. We see 
that incapacity in their awareness of their social position and life condition connected to their 
male partners. At the level of intimate relations, where traditional values and gendered sexual 
morés (e.g. female virginity) prevail, the male sex continues to enjoy far greater “sexual 
freedom”. Hence, how women actually manage marriage is both rooted in cultural heritage as 
well as emerging ideas and aspirations. These findings add a culturally specific context to revise 
the theory of modernity (Giddens 1991, Bauman 1992), which claims that traditional values and 
customs are undercut by individualization during the course of the modernity process. In the case 
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of middle class women’s managing marriage in China, we see a convergence of “modern 
selfhood” and the dynamics of cultural values retrieved from the Chinese tradition as well as 
from the dominant ideology. 
 Chapter Six shows a vigorous rejection of the link between official corruption and a 
cultural script that stigmatizes women in politics, and reveals multiple layers of audiences’ 
reception of gender “common sense”. On the one hand, gender ideology benefits from the status 
of common sense. It is seen as “modern scientific knowledge” that reinforces normative 
masculinity and femininity; essential gender differences and separate roles and expectations for 
men and women. On the other, the gender common sense appears to be rigorously rejected at the 
political level. The media link between corruption and “keeping a second wife” has generated a 
very interesting (and vigorous) audience counter-narrative that reflects the intensity of social 
animosity towards officialdom, and provides palpable evidence of a political consciousness that 
the state has striven to erase. The political consciousness is largely diluted by the prevailing 
consumerist culture acting as a counter force. These instances of audience rejection mostly rely 
on data culled from the social media, which inclines to deconstruct authoritative script and to 
ridicule official moral legitimacy. 
 The intertwined relations between gender, class, and modernity in this study raise 
questions that may cross disciplinary boundaries and extend to other scholarly fields. First, class 
is a major cleavage in contemporary Chinese society (and thus it is employed to be examined to 
gain any insight into the practice of sexuality in contemporary). The concept of class in this 
study is a negotiated one, which has restrained a further discussion on the links between class 
identity and heterosexual intimate relationship. The observation of class in contemporary China 
in the scholarship, to date, has been limited to understanding patterns of economic inequalities. 
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How does class identity in China link to cultural conditions such as “taste” as Bourdieu (1984) 
states? How should class in China be studied within an intersectionality paradigm that links to 
other social inequalities such as gender? How does class identity play out in intimate 
relationships?  This study has followed the “borrowing model” (Baxter 1994) conceptualized in 
the US and North European contexts to categorize wives’ class identity in post-Mao China. Does 
this model offer a perfect fit with contemporary Chinese society? Can we categorize women’s 
class identity alone? These questions raise further questions for scholars interested in the study of 
class issues.  
Finally, the politics of sexual freedom emerged in post-socialist China, which link to the 
construction of the modern self, have made sexuality a malleable discourse in the framing of 
“modernity” against “tradition”. The emergent liberation of sexuality employs new discourses 
and practices of self, seemingly reinforcing individual freedom, desire, autonomy, and pleasure 
as alternatives to the repressive past. It is a wave in the Far East echoing what McRobbie (2009) 
calls “the aftermath of feminism” observed in western societies, in which women assumably 
have gained all kinds of freedoms through consumption and choices. How do we think about 
sexual freedom within feminist theorization? Does it fit into the model of “women’s liberation”?  
Borrowing Stuart Hall’s (1996, 222) question to the ascendancy of the new right in Britain and 
the US, “Are they the dawn of a New Age or only the whisper of an old one”?  In future 
research, I look forward to further exploration of these questions within Chinese context as well 
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Appendix:  participant information 
 




Date of interview 
Zhengzheng 31 editor married  private company 
owner 
June 12, 2011 
Huangjie 47 factory worker 
in the state- 
sector 
married  factory worker in 
the state sector 
June 13, 2011 
Zizi,  33 journalist  married bank cadre June 13, 2011 
Peng  35 teacher married  state-owned 
enterprise cadre 
June 15, 2011 
Nansan 34 editor  married  businessman  June 15, 2011 
Zhuzhu  31 journalist  married  businessman  June 20, 2011 
Jojo 55 teacher married teacher/writer June 10, 2011 
Jin 30 housewife married private company 
owner 
July 15, 2011 
Tangtang  29 factory worker 
in the state-
sector 
single  July 17, 2011 
Yuanyuan 33 restaurant 
owner 
divorced   July 20, 2011 
Mingming 46 redundant 
worker 
married  redundant worker July 20, 2011 
Zhenzhi 33 teacher married state-owned 
enterprise cadre 
July 22, 2011 
Guoguo 33 housewife married lawyer July 24, 2011 
Kunkun 35 editor married  cadre in a state-
owned investment 
company  
July 25, 2011 
Wong 47 redundant 
worker 
married redundant worker July 26, 2011 
Chaoming  47 redundant 
worker 
married factory worker July 26,2011 
Fong 33 teacher married  businessman July 27, 2011 
Juanzi 34 bank 
accountant 
married  bank cadre July 27, 2011 
Ruru 47 company 
manager 
married city-rank official July 30,2011 
Dashen 47 factory worker married factory worker August 5, 2011 
Mei 37 editor married private company 
owner 
August 5, 2011 
Luyan 46 factory worker married factory worker August 6, 2011 
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Liuliu 55 private factory 
accountant 















August 7, 2011 
Gong 46 dentist  married businessman Focus group, 
August 7, 2011 
Zhao 47 medical doctor married businessman Focus group, 
August 7, 2011 
Duo 45 medical doctor married state-owned 
enterprise cadre 
Focus group, 
August 7, 2011 
Zhou  24 student single  Focus group, June 
24, 2011 
Haijuan 23 student  single  Focus group, June 
24, 2011 
Qianqian 23 student single  Focus group, June 
24, 2011 
Meixia 23 student single  Focus group, June 
24, 2011 
Li 19 student single  focus group, June 
26, 2011 
Ma 20 student single  focus group, June 
26, 2011 
Cheng 20 student single  focus group, June 
26, 2011 
Sun 20 student single  focus group, June 
26, 2011 
Yang  25 migrant 
worker 
married migrant worker focus group, July 4, 
2011, morning 
Wu 19 migrant 
worker 
single  focus group, July 4, 
2011, morning 
Xu 28 migrant 
worker 
married migrant worker focus group, July 4, 
2011, morning 
Jiang 30 migrant 
worker 
married migrant worker focus group, July 4, 
2011, morning 
Xi 42 migrant 
worker 
married farmer focus group, July 4, 
2011, morning 
He 18 migrant 
worker 
single  focus group, July 4, 
2011, afternoon 
Xue 32 migrant 
worker 
married farmer focus group, July 4, 
2011, afternoon 
Duan 23 migrant 
worker 









married migrant worker  
focus group, July 4, 
2011, afternoon 
 
  Zhang       21 Migrant 
worker 
single  focus group, July 4, 
2011, afternoon 
 
* All names are pseudonyms. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
